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2Abstract
The motivation for this thesis began with observations of the 
debate in the media over the implications of the debt crisis, who was 
to blame and possible solutions. The terminology used (liquidity, 
solvency, default, repudiation, arrears, etc.) was not considered to 
be helpful in critically analysing the situation. Indeed, this 
terminology was likely to create confusion when trying to understand 
the causes, consequences and alternatives for the debt crisis. What 
causes debt repayment problems? Why do borrower countries prefer to 
suspend debt repayments rather than simply repudiate debt? How have 
lenders coped with this situation? Is there any evidence of an 
improvement in the situation? For a reader interested and familiar 
with the debt literature, these questions are not new. What is 
important is to have an understanding of the possible remedies and be 
able to design a solution that might resolve the debt crisis in a 
timely manner rather than allow it to drag on indefinitely with all 
the costs that tlhat would imply. This thesis explores these questions 
and shares the views of the advocates of debt relief as part of the 
solution to the debt problem.
In order to place the debt problem in context, the thesis begins 
with a brief historical account of the borrowing practices of Latin 
American countries since their independence from Spain. Default is 
not a new phenomenom. What is new is the source of lending (private 
banks and not bond holders) and the institutions involved (IMF and 
World Bank). This has implications for the way debt has been handled 
which we explore in chapter 1. In addition we review the efforts of 
researchers in modelling sovereign loans, explaining debt 
restructuring and searching for the determinants of debt repayment
3problems. The complexities found when dealing with sovereign loans 
lie in their nature, or more simply, the lack of collateral.
In chapter 2, we take into consideration more explicitly the 
peculiar nature of sovereign loans and design a two period horizon 
pure “willingness to pay’ model to explore its implications in the 
loan market equilibrium. If we assume sufficiently risk-averse
borrowers and neither adverse selection nor moral hazard, we find that 
the competitive equilibrium is inefficient. We then reframe this 
basic model into a bilateral monopoly context and include some
bargaining elements. We derive the elements of conflict, the Pareto 
negotiation locus and discuss possible bargaining solutions in the
context of the static axiomatic approach.
The design of any solution to the debt crisis requires an 
understanding of what precipitates a borrower into arrears. Chapter 3 
offers an empirical study of LACs during 1971-86 which aims to compare 
different empirical specifications and trace variables that might 
usefully be included in our statistical model. Using those results, 
in chapter 4, we test our empirical model which now includes economic 
indicators, "crude* political proxies and country heterogeneity fixed 
effects. Our findings suggest that they are relevant in the 
assessment of the causes of debt servicing problems.
Finally, in chapter 5, we consider the debate concerning “debt 
overhang* in Latin America. We also provide an account of how the 
debt problem has been managed and conclude that a prompt solution can 
not rely on “refinancing* nor on voluntary market debt reduction 
schemes.
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Chapter 1
SOVEREIGN LOANS: A REVIEW OF PAST LENDING EXPERIENCES
AND SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
1. Introduction
The history of s o v e r e i g n  lending teaches that a repeated pattern
of enthusiatic lending and borrowing followed by nonrepayment and
turmoil in the international financial market is not new. However, 
the wave of lending in the 1970s ended in financial distress with no 
clear views of how to restore succesfully normal conditions in both 
the borrower countries and the international banking system. In 
searching for a solution, researchers have analysed past lending
experience and made analogies with the present situation. They have
also modelled the behaviour of lenders and borrowers and have used 
econometric techniques to determine what factors precipitate a 
nonrepayment problem.
The aim of this chapter is to help in understanding the present 
debt crisis and the complexities encountered in trying to unravel it. 
We organise it as follows. Firstly, considering that the present debt 
crisis is to a large extent, but not exclusively, a Latin American
affair, we review the historical experience of Latin America
highlighting differences and similarities with actual lending 
practice. Secondly, we review the growing concern shown by debt
analysts about the present crisis and its implications. Finally, we 
conclude by drawing some inferences to try to explain why "debt
fatigue" persists.
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2. Review of the Latin American Lending Experience
The history of international lending in Latin American countries 
(LACs) is as old as their independence from Spain in the 1820s and may 
be divided into two long periods, running roughly from the 1820s to 
the 1940s and from the 1940s to date. This division is appropriate 
because of the different lending practices involved. Bonded lending 
was the major source of finance until World War II and was then 
supplanted by direct loans from official creditors, multilateral 
agencies and commercial banks.
2.1. The Period Before World War II
Prior to the 1940s, the major long-term foreign investors were 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Capital export from America 
mainly took the form of direct investment. In contrast, British 
overseas investments were mainly in the form of foreign bonds and 
foreign lending.
From the days of South American independence up to the end of 
World War I, British imperial lending remained the most important 
source of capital. The international credit market had the following 
predominant characteristics (Sachs, 1982; Dale and Mattione, 1983; 
Higonnet, 1983) :
a) Government borrowing was mainly financed by private bonds;
b) These bonds were, in general, issued at fixed rates of interest 
with long periods of maturity;
c) The role of banks was limited to being underwriters and promoters 
of bond issues but not lending their own funds to foreign governments;
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d) Negotiations were carried out between the debtor country and 
private bondholders (or bondholder committees) without intervention of 
the creditor’s government nor other official institution. This, 
perhaps, explains why private bondholders’ retaliation was limited to 
(at most) threatening the borrowers with exclusion from new bond
issues.
There were several international lending waves during this 
period. Lindert and Morton (1989) counted eight waves: the 1820s,
including loans to most of the newly independent nations of Latin 
America; the 1850s; the late 1860s and early 1870s; the late 1880s; 
the years between 1904-14 and the late 1920s. Each wave ended with at 
least some occurrence of repayment breakdowns due to international 
trade depression, government budget crisis, investment failures, 
dishonesty, etc. Indeed, the credit record of Latin America can be 
summed up by a quote from Max Winckler (Foreign Bonds, 1933): “The
fiscal history of Latin America ... is replete with instances of 
government defaults. Borrowing and default follows each other with
almost perfect regularity. When payment is resumed, the past is 
easily forgotten and the new borrowing orgy ensues. This process 
started at the beginning of the past century and has continued down to
the present day. It has taught us nothing".
i
Mexico-" requested its first loan in 1822 and two years later, it 
obtained the first loan from London. The creditors were Goldschmidt 
House and Barclay, Herring, Richard & Co. They lent £4,800,000 in 
exchange for government bonds at 6* annual interest. After deductions 
(commissions and other charges), only £3,682,538 was delivered to
"For more details, see Bazant (1968) and Lindert and Morton (1989).
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Mexico. Originally, the loans were supposed to be used in long run 
programmes with the purpose of increasing the country’s welfare. 
However, the loans were used to finance military armament and 
equipment and to finance government expenditure.
Between 1826 and 1856, the Mexican government defaulted^1 six 
times (1827, 1832, 1838, 1846, 1847, 1854). During this period,
renegotiations involved:
a) Consolidation of debt at lower interest rates (e.g. the debt was 
consolidated at 5% interest rate in October 1837);
b) Conversion of old debt into a new issue with partial debt 
forgiveness (e.g. in 1842, the amount of interest arrears was &>08,122 
from which £l09,026 was forgiven and the remainder converted to 
debentures not subject to interest rates and payable when Mexico had 
excess cash);
c) New loans and new bond issues.
After a short period of financial health, the Mexican government 
was once again in arrears. The governments of Britain, France and 
Spain intervened and tried to seize control of the customs 
collections. New bonds were floated which were used in part to 
finance repayment of old debts. In 1867, Benito Juarez refused to 
honour all debts and all debt-receipt-customs agreements. Foreign 
lending to Mexico restarted under Porfirio Diaz in 1885 but stopped in 
1911 with the Mexican Revolution. Thereafter, Mexico’s credit rating 
was not restored until the lending wave of the 1970s.
“Unless otherwise stated, we do not distinguish between technical 
default, formal default nor repudiation (see Mendelsohn, 1984). We 
use default in its broader meaning i.e. partial or total debt 
repayment suspension.
14
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Defaults in Argentina have also been common"'. The first 
Argentine foreign loan in 1824 was underwritten by the Baring 
Brothers, one of Britain’s leading merchant and acceptance banks. 
Argentina soon defaulted on this loan and debt arrears were finally 
settled in 1857 with some write-down on the accrued interest. On a 
fairly large scale, Argentine securities (mostly government issues and 
government guaranteed railroad bonds) were sold in London between 
1862-1875. Again, Argentina defaulted in 1876 and debt arrears were 
paid in the next five years with no write-down.
In the late 1880s lending wave, capital inflow to Argentina 
increased substantially with most of it in the form of portfolio 
investment. A large proportion of public sector borrowing was 
contracted by national and provincial government banks to fund private 
land acquisitions, residential and commercial construction, purchase 
of farm stock and equipment and working capital. In contrast to this 
rise in foreign borrowing, expansion in exports was moderate while 
import growth accelerated. The trade deficit averaged 16% of exports 
in 1881-1995 and increased to 49% in 1886-1890. The interest 
payment-to-export ratio reached 66% in 1889. Foreign borrowing was 
reaching unsustainable levels and by November 1890, Argentina 
suspended payments on its sterling debt. This time, the Baring 
Brothers were on the verge of bankruptcy and given the size of 
Baring’s liabilities, the Bank of England and the British Treasury 
intervened.
In January 1891, an agreement was reached to provide a loan of
JFelix (1987) analyses the debt crisis of the 1890s (in particular, 
the Argentinian lending experience) and the 1930s.
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£l5 million repayable after three years at a 6% interest rate. This 
new loan was secured with Argentine customs receipts and intended to 
help resume debt servicing and pay arrears on the railroad guarantees. 
At the same time, Argentina was expected to reduce its money stock by 
15 million pesos in each of the next three years and at the end of the 
third year, resume debt servicing from exports. However in 1892-93, 
the government deficit increased and so did the money stock. Exports 
did not rise, imports increased and Argentina fell into arrears. A 
new agreement was reached in 1893. Argentina was allowed to suspend 
30% of its annual interest payments for five years and all principal 
repayments for eight years. In the late 1890s, Argentina settled its 
accounts thanks to the improvement in its terms of trade and by the 
early 1900s, the beef boom strengthened Argentina’s balance of
payments and its securities were well accepted in the international
financial markets.
The 1930s debt crisis followed a strong wave of foreign lending 
from the United States which had displaced Britain as the most 
prominent capital exporter. U.S. capital exports mostly took the form 
of portfolio investment directed heavily to Europe. Latin America’s 
gross external debt was smaller than that of North America, 
Asia-Oceania and Europe. However, U.S. direct investment was mostly 
concentrated in Latin America.
The 1930s depression brought for all borrowers, and Latin America 
in particular, a decline in business activity and government revenue, 
a deterioration in the terms of trade and reduction of export volume 
and cuts in international lending. Defaults started in January 1931 
with Bolivia followed by Peru, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica. 
Uruguay and El Salvador defualted in 1932, while Panama and Cuba did
16
so in 1933. By the end of 1935, fourteen Latin American countries 
were in default (see table 1).
This experience of widespread default provides an important 
source of information on the causes and consequences of default. Was 
default triggered only by the effects of the Great Depression? Were 
defaulters punished?
In fact, Eichengreen and Portes (1985) tested a variant of the 
model suggested by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) for a sample of 
world-wide borrowers. After applying ordinary least squares to annual 
cross section data for 1930-38, they found a significant and negative 
association between the level of indebtedness and income growth. 
This, they argue, might indicate credit rationing after 1930. Export 
instability and the degree of openness had the correct signs but were 
not significant. Eichengreen and Portes also explored the causes of 
default (as measured by the proportion of a country’s debt in default) 
during 1934-38. They found that the tendency towards default was 
positively associated with the debt/income ratio, the extent of 
deterioration in the terms of trade and the percentage increase in the 
government budget deficit. They also included two dummy variables, 
one for Australia and another for Latin America. The significant and 
negative coefficient of the Australian dummy was interpreted as 
resulting from Australia’s cultural and political ties with Britain. 
In contrast, the Latin America dummy although negative, was not 
significant and suggested that the economic variables (included in 
their regression) explained reasonably well the default tendency of 
these countries.
Using a sample of five Latin American countries (Argentina,
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Table 1
Default and Rescheduling of 
Latin Aaerican Governaent Debts to Foreign Creditors since 1820
Privately Privately Loans, Mainly Privately 
Held Bonds, Held Bonds, Official, Held Loans, 
1820-1929 1930s 1940-79 1980-86
Argentina Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes
Brazil Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chile Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colombia Yes Yes
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes
Dominican Rep. Yes Yes
Ecuador Yes Yes Yes
El Salvador Yes Yes
Guatemala Yes Yes
Hait i Yes
Honduras Yes Yes
Mexico Yes Yes Yes
Nicaragua Yes Yes
Panama Yes Yes
Paraguay Yes Yes
Peru Yes Yes Yes Yes
Uruguay Yes Yes Yes Yes
Venezuela Yes Yes Yes
Source: Lindert and Morton (1989)
Notes : Yes indicates that a rescheduling and/or a default occurred in the
specific period; a blank space indicates that none of these events
occurred.
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Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru), Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) 
assessed the cost of default in the 1930s. They estimated the extent 
of default (i.e. the reduced debt servicing after suspension of debt 
payments) and the level of debt forgiveness implied in the 
renegotiations of debt contracts. These, in turn, gave them an 
approximation of the amount actually repaid (after default and 
renegotiations) and a proxy for the direct component of default cost. 
Future access to credit markets is considered the indirect component 
of default cost. Jorgensen and Sachs concluded that both components 
of the cost of default were low. The debt burden of defaulting 
countries was eased by the concessional nature of the settlements 
(extended maturities, reduced interest rates and although the 
principal was not cancelled, unpaid interest was not capitalised) and 
by the debtors’ practice of secret debt repurchase of their own debts 
at deep discounts. Similar to Lindert and Morton (1989) and 
Eichengreen (1989), they suggested that the return of these countries 
to the capital market in the 1950s did not show any systematic signs 
of discrimination between defaulters and non-defaulters.
2.2. The Period After the 1940s
The outcome of the 1930s depression and the reconstruction of the 
countries involved in World War II restricted the access of developing 
countries to the private capital market. As a result international 
and government organisations played an increasingly important role in 
developing country borrowing.
Two major international institutions were created in this period:
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the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank was charged with providing 
financial assistance for both the reconstruction of Europe and 
fostering the development of emerging nations. The first objective 
was achieved by the Marshall Plan because the World Bank could not 
provide adequate resources for the reconstruction. Thereafter, it has 
traditionally concentrated on financing infrastructure and structural 
adjustments as well as providing funds to improve health and education 
in developing countries.
The IMF’s early role was of securing the fixed exchange rate 
system and multilateral convertibility. In addition, the IMF was 
charged with the provision of medium term finance (3 to 5 years and 
ocassionally up to ten years) to assist countries with temporary 
balance of payments difficulties. Members countries suscribed 
according to their means and they can draw an initial tranche of their 
entitlement with no conditions. Further drawings (i.e. higher 
tranches) require a commitment to implement stabilisation programmes 
designed by the IMF in order to achieve control of their current 
account deficits and make them eligible for market borrowing.
The Paris Club is the main mechanism through which official debt 
is rescheduled. Its first meeting was in 1956 to reschedule 
Argentina’s multilateral debt. In spite of the importance of the 
Paris Club, it is not possible to consider it as an institution since 
it is not a permanent body. The Paris Club meets only when default is 
imminent and there is a need to agree guidelines for rescheduling of 
all official loans and private loans which have an official export 
credit insurance75.
^Kisic, Danino and Morales (1985) analyse the history of the Paris
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During the 1950s, bilateral and multilateral institutions played 
a negligible role in Latin America. Capital flows took place mainly 
in the form of private direct investment by multinational 
corporations. In 1950, almost half of the U.S. foreign direct 
investment was directed to LDCs and 38% of it was concentrated in 
Latin America. However, in the period 1950-79, the LDCs (and LACs) 
share decreased while the flows to developed countries showed an 
increasing trend (see table 2). This shift may be explained not only 
by the willingness of the U.S.A. to expand investment once economic 
reconstruction was under way, but also because in LDCs (LACs in 
particular) the issue of foreign control and dependence became very
C
controversial and sensitive".
The 1960s were characterised by the importance of official flows. 
Table 3 shows the high participation of multilateral and bilateral 
institutions in providing external resources to Latin America. They 
provided an average of 60% and 40% of the external net inflows during 
1961-65 and 1966-70 respectively but only 25% in the period 1971-75.
The Eurocurrency market, or Euromarket for short, operating since 
the mid-1950s was not a source for LDC loans during the 1960s. Most 
of the credits obtained were drawn by industrialised countries. Loans 
from the Euromarket were more available to LDCs in the late 1960s with 
Brazil and Mexico as obvious candidates because of their relatively 
high levels of growth and development.
Club and provide details about the mechanics of its negotiations.
"Kindelberger (1984) and Lall (1974) addressed the controversial issue 
of private foreign direct investment in LDCs. For details about LACs 
sensitivity to foreign direct investment, see Thorp (1985), Bitar 
(1985), Grifith-Jones (1984) and Diaz Alejandro (1970).
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Table 2
United States of Aaerica Direct Investaent Position Abroad 1950-82
(percentages)
Developed Developing Others Latin America share
Countries Countries in total LDC
1950 48.3 48.7 3.0 37.7
1957 55. 1 40. 5 4.4 31.4
1960 60.6 34.9 4.5 23.5
1966 68. 1 26.8 5. 1 25.4
1970 68.7 16.6 14.7 14.7
1972 71.3 24.8 3.9 13.8
1974 75.3 18.0 6.7 13.3
1976 73.3 21.4 5.3 12.5
1978 74.5 23.1 2.4 12.3
1979 74.2 23.8 4.0 12. 1
1980 73.5 24.7 1.8 12.3
1981 73.1 24.8 2. 1 13.3
1982 73.7 24.0 2.3 14.1
Source: ‘Selected Data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad",
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Washington, 1982.
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Table 3
Structure of Net Inflow of External Resources
in Latin Aaerica1 1961-1975
(annual averages in percentages)
Net Public Inflow^ Net Private
1961-65 60.2 39.8
1966-70 40.1 59.9
1961-70 47.6 52.4
1971-75 25.2 74.8
1973 20.2 79.8
1974. 26.5 73.5
1975 23.3 76.7
1976 19.6 80.4
1977 12.0 88.0
1978 7.3 92.7
1979 9.6 90.4
Source: International Bank of Development (IBD)
Notes : ^Includes member countries of the IBD.
^Includes bilateral and multi lateral official loans.
'Includes supplier credits, banks loans, bonds and direct 
investment.
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In spite of some reschedulings of official and private loans, 
there were no serious indications of debt difficulties during the 
1960s. By the early 1970s, neither international official loans nor 
foreign direct investment were able to meet the capital requirements 
of LDCs. There was a call for the revival of private capital markets 
to complement in the short run, and replace in the long run, some or 
most of the official lending (Kindleberger, 1981).
During the 1970s the supply of funds into the Euromarket grew 
rapidly, fed by capital surpluses from OPEC countries. 
Euro-syndicated loans" (priced at "floating" interest rates i.e. Libor 
plus spread) became an important source of finance to the LDCs. In 
contrast, the international bond market (which charged fixed interest 
rates) was reserved for "first class" borrowers i.e. developed 
countries (see tables 4 and 5).
The 1973-74 oil shock was accompanied by world wide inflation and 
recession. The large supply of funds also helped to drive real 
interest rates down and commercial banks turned their attention to 
emerging industrial nations among the developing countries. After 
1975, spreads on Euroloans to LDCs and OECD countries dropped and, 
although the former was still higher, the gap between them reached a 
minimum in 1979. The share of LDCs (and LACs) in the Euroloan market 
showed an upward tendency, also peaking in 1979 (see table 5). Plan 
(1989) suggests that the spreads in 1979 did not reflect sufficiently 
the different creditworthiness of various countries but was instead, a
fc'For a discussion of commercial bank and syndicated lending, see 
Donaldson (1985).
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Table 4
International Bond Market1 and Main Borrowers 1976-83
(percentages)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Eurobonds 44.3 52.3 41.2 45.7 57.2 59.7 66.2
Foreign bonds outside U.S.A.
23.2 25.8 41.9 43.3 34.6 26.1 26.2
Foreign bonds in the U.S.A.
32.5 21.9 16.2 11.0 8.2 14.2 7.6
Total bond issues (millions U.S. dollars)
32669 33976 34279 40990 41920 52985 78042
Main Borrowers:
Industrial Countries^
74.0 69.9 72.2 77.4 77.7 77.1 80.7
Developing Countries
5.5 10.4 13.0 7.9 6.3 9.2 6.5
Latin America 2.3 7.5 7.6 5.1 4.7 6.9 3.2
Centrally Planned Economies
0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
International Organizations'1
20.3 19.0 14.1 14.5 15.8 13.5 12.7
Source: "World Financial Markets", Morgan Guaranty, January 1984.
1983
64.1
30.1 
5.8
75669
79.0
3.3 
0. 1
0. 1 
17.6
Notes : ^New issues with a maturity of three years or more. 
“Includes multinational organizations.
"Includes regional development organizations.
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Table 5
Distribution of Eurocurrency Bank Credits1 by Borrovers 1976-83
(percentages)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Industrial Countries*
39.0 41.2 41.3 32.9 50.5 64.6 50.0 51.9
Developing Countries
52.1 50.2 53.2 57.9 45.3 33.9 48.7 44.7
Latin America 30.0 23.7 30.4 34.0 31.1 22.6 31.5 20.8
Centrally Planned Economies
8.7 8.1 5.3 8.9 3.6 1.3 0.9 1.6
International Organizations'1
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.8
Memorandum Item: Total Eurocurrency Bank Credits (million U.S. dollars)
28849 41766 70179 82812 77392 133379 84905 73899
Source: "World Financial Markets", Morgan Guaranty, January 1984.
Notes : "Credits with a maturity of one year or more, publicly announced 
in millions of U.S. dollars.
“Includes multinational organizations.
"Includes regional development organizations.
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symptom of increased bank competition’.
Initially, developing countries borrowed to finance their 
current account deficits and cope with the recession. For example, 
Brazil, a major oil importer, financed the higher oil prices through 
external borrowing. However, the availability of foreign credits soon 
led to increases in debt. The Mexican debt grew faster when it became
an oil exporter. The Southern Cone of Latin America embarked on trade
and financial liberalisation programmes and found, at that time, that 
it was more advantageous to borrow from abroad since real domestic 
interest rates exceeded real Libor rates (Diaz Alejandro, 1985; Calvo, 
1986; Edwards & Edwards, 1987).
A brief description of the international debt trends during the 
1970s helps to provide a picture of the pre-crisis period. According 
to World Bank estimates, more than 75% of the long term debt 
outstanding owed by LDCs falls in the category of sovereign debt (i.e. 
public and publicly guaranteed) with a higher dependence on loans from 
private creditorsthan from official lenders.
The distribution of debt in LDCs is highly skewed (see table 6 
and 7). More than 40% is debt owed by Latin America and the Caribbean
(LACCs from now on) which also have a high debt burden as suggested by
the debt/GNP and debt/export ratios. Within the LACCs, the debt owed 
by sovereign borrowers is more than three times larger than the
:Devlin (1989) argues that the attractiveness of the unregulated 
Euromarket and the reduction in information costs by the appearance of 
syndicated loans induced large entry of new banks in the international 
credit market and hence, vigorous competition among all banks.
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Table 6
LDC Long Tera External Debt^ by Type of Borrowers and Lenders 1976-S3
(million of U.S. dollars and percentages)
Total Debt Borrowers
Creditors from 
Public Borrowers
Outstanding Public Private Official Private1"1
(million U.S.) (*) (*) (*) *)
1973 109240.9 76.6
1974 135400.3 76.7
1975 161539.1 77.8
1976 194586.7 79.6
1977 239515.6 80.6
1978 301152.2 82.0
1979 355082.4 88.3
1980 411539.3 82.4
1981 470094.8 80.4
1982 525585.7 81.3
1983 597646.7 82.9
23.4 61.8 38.2
23.3 59.1 40.9
22.2 57.0 43.0
20.4 54.0 46.0
19.4 51.7 48.3
18.0 48.8 51.2
17.7 46.7 53.3
17.6 47.0 53.0
19.6 46.0 54.0
18.7 44.8 55.2
17.1 42.3 57.7
1983-84, 1984-85).Source: World Bank Debt Tables (1982-83,
Notes : "Includes only disbursed long term debt.
“Refers to public and publicly guarantee loans.
"Refers to private non guarantee loans.
4
Multilateral and bilateral official creditors.
5
Includes bonds, commercial bank credits and other private loans.
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Table 7
Latin Aaerica and The Caribbean Public Long Tera External Debt 1972-83
(percentages)
Share in LDC Share in LDC LACCs Public Debt Share of major 
Total Debt Public Debt by Type of Creditor LAC Borrowersiin
Official Private LACC Public Debt
1973 40.2 33.0 41.8 58.2 57.6
1974 42.3 35.7 38.2 61.8 60.5
1975 41.9 35.9 36.3 63.7 63.2
1976 42. 4 37.7 31.2 68.8 64.9
1977 41.9 37.9 38.3 71.7 62.6
1978 42.2 38.5 26.9 74. 1 65.6
1979 41.9 38.5 23.6 76.4 65.0
1980 41.6 37. 8 23. 8 76.2 65.0
1981 43.9 39.0 23.4 76.6 66.1
1982 44.6 40.4 22.7 77.3 67.3
1983 47.2 43.9 20.5 79.5 68.7
Source: Uorld Bank Debt Tables (1982- 83, 1983-84, 1984-85).
Notes : Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
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private non-guaranteed debt and from 1974 onwards, private creditors 
are the most important source of loans. The share of official 
creditors has decreased from 46% in 1973 to 24% in 1980 while the 
share of private creditors increased from 54% to 76%. Moreover, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are the major borrowers, accounting on 
average for about 60% of all the LACCs indebtedness. Also for these 
major borrowers, private loans are the most important source of 
f inance.
The risk to banks from foreign lending increased substantially. 
During 1975-77, U.S. bank claims to LDCs grew at the rate of 28% per 
annum (Devlin, 1989). U.S. commercial bank exposure (as a percentage 
of their primary capital) to Eastern Europe and non-oil LDCs increased 
from 132% in 1977 to 163% in 1981 while the exposure of the nine 
largest U.S. banks rose from 188% to 240%. At the end of 1982, the 
exposure of the nine largest U.S. banks to the five largest LAC 
borrowers ranged from 108% to 263% (Cline, 1984 and table 8). This 
reflects the potential vulnerability of U.S. commercial banks to 
debt-servicing difficulties.
There is a vast literature on the causes of the 1982 debt crisis 
(Diaz Alejandro, 1983, 1984; Cline, 1984; Dornbusch 1983, 1984;
Allsopp and Joshi, 1985; Bianchi ed., 1985; Thorp and Whitehead ed., 
1987 among others). The increase in the price of oil for 
oil-importing LDCs, the need to finance new oil discoveries in 
oil-exporting LDCs, the sharp rise in real Libor during 1981-82, the 
1980-82 global recession which substantially reduced exports and 
caused a deterioration in the terms of trade are counted as the most 
important external causes of the 1982 debt crisis. Dornbusch paid
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Table 8
Exposure as Percentage of Capital, Major U.S. Banks, end-1982
A
Capital“in
i
ARGEN BRAZIL MEXICO VENEZ CHILE TOTAL “ million
Cit icorp 18.2 73.5 54.6 18.2 10.0 174.5 5989
Bank of America 10.2 47.9 52. 1 41.7 6.3 158.2 4799
Chase Manhattan 21.3 56.9 40.0 24.0 11.8 154.0 4221
Morgan Guaranty 24.4 54. 3 34.8 17.5 9.7 140.7 3107
Manufacturers Hanover 47.5 77.7 66.7 42.4 28.4 262.8 2592
Chemical 14.9 52.0 60.0 28.0 14.8 169.7 2499
Continental Illinois 17.8 22.9 32.4 21.6 12.8 107.5 2143
Bankers Trust 13.2 46.2 46.2 25.1 10.6 141.2 1895
First National Chicago 14.5 40.6 50. 1 17.4 11.6 134.2 1725
Source: Extracted from "Internet ional Debt: Systematic Risk and Pol icy
Response", Cline (1984).
Notes : Exposure in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Venezuela.
“Primary capital (shareholders equity, subordinated notes and 
reserves against possible loan losses).
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special attention to the role played by the U.S.A. in the 1980-82 
recession through its inflation-stabilisation program and policy mix 
of tight money and easy fiscal policy.
Government budget deficits played an important role in Brazilian 
and Mexican indebtedness while overvaluation of the currency is 
crucial in explaining the Argentinian and Chilean debt situation. In 
general, budget deficits, overvaluation of the currency, capital 
flight" and current account deficits have to be counted as the 
domestic sources of Latin American repayment difficulties.
On August 12 1982, the Mexican Finance Minister Silva Herzog
announced that they could no longer make payments on their external 
debt. This event marked the start of succesive rounds of
reschedulings (of official and bank loans) particularly in Latin 
America. It has also changed the role of the IMF and World Bank. In 
the 1980s, despite numerous criticisms3, the IMF has assumed a more 
active role by recommending stabilisation programmes as a necessary 
precondition for rescheduling private and official loans. The 
participation of the World Bank (and IMF) in Paris Club meetings 
involves monitoring debt restructuring agreements.
In spite of the numerous reschedulings and the 1985 Baker Plan, 
the debt situation has not improved for Latin American borrowers and 
commercial bank lenders have provisioned large reserve loan losses.
"For a study relating capital flight and external indebtedness, see 
Lessard and Williamson eds. (1987).
"An account of these crticisms in relation to Latin America can be 
found in Pastor Jr (1987).
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Because of the persistence of the debt crisis, the Brady Plan was 
launched in 1989 and the IMF and the World Bank have been assigned new 
tasks. That is, to support and encourage the debt reduction process. 
We analyse the response to the debt crisis and its possible solutions 
in our final chapter.
3. International Debt Literature
The vast literature generated from the present debt crisis 
encompasses developments in debt management. The crux of the debt 
dilemma is twofold: stability of the international financial system
and the welfare of developing countries.
Concerns about the rapid increase in external obligations during 
the 1970s resulted in a large number of analytical papers which have 
already been surveyed by McDonald (1982). Another set of papers 
attempted to discuss aspects of developing country finance and debt 
and these have also been surveyed by Eaton and Taylor (1984). An 
interesting examination of multi-period models of foreign borrowing is 
provided by Glick and Kharas (1986). Country risk and its 
implications for modelling the credit market are discussed in the 
excellent paper by Eaton et. al. (1986). In addition, a review of the 
statistical approach to country risk can be found in Saini and Bates
(1984), Heffernan (1986) and Lanoi (1986). Therefore, we are faced 
with the fact of little originality in trying to add another survey. 
Instead, we rely on the previous surveys, select some models to 
illustrate the efforts made by researchers in analysing sovereign loan 
contracts and finally, attempt a brief updating.
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3.1. Theoretical Models
In trying to explain the causes of the present debt crisis and 
provide insights into borrowers’ debt capacity and debt 
sustainability, researchers have focussed on macroeconomic models and 
tried to determine the stable and unstable debt paths. The general 
approach to this problem is through macroeconomic accounting 
identities (e.g. balance of payments, current account, 
savings-investment gap, etc.) and then working out the implied 
dynamics through the use of other macroeconomic relations.
Dornbusch (1984) identifies the main causes of the debt crisis
starting from a debt accumulation equation D =(l+i )D ^-NX where D is
the dollar value of the outstanding debt, i is the nominal value of
the interest rate on the outstanding debt and NX is the non-interest
component (measured in U.S. dollars) of the current account. This can
then easily be transformed into a debt-export equation x^=kx^ ^"n
where k=(l+i )/(l+g), x is the debt/export ratio, g is the nominal
(dollar) growth of exports and n is the NX/exports ratio. Since an
ever-increasing debt/export ratio describes a situation which is not
viable, the history of the debt problem can be summarised in terms of
this debt/export equation. Borrowing during the 1970s made the
accumulated debt (x^ ) large, the oil shocks and overvalued exchange
rates made n negative and the increase in real interest rates 
t
followed by the world recession adversely affected the non-interest 
current account and thus, the debt/export ratio.
From a similar basis, Congdon (1985) illustrates the problem 
faced by borrowers. He starts with a current account identity 
dD=T+rD, where d stands for change, D is the amount of debt, T is the
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trade deficit, r is the interest rate on debt and rD is the service 
balance. Financial stability requires a constant debt-to-export ratio 
(D/X = a ) so the steady state is characterised by dD = adX = T+rD. By 
dividing thorugh by X and letting g be the growth of exports (dX/X), 
then the equation describing the steady state is a(g-r)=T/X. 
Therefore, g>r implies T/X>0 and the borrower is able to run a trade 
deficit. Conversely, if g<r, the borrower has to be able to run a 
trade surplus to achieve stability.
A more sophisticated version is presented by Cohen (1985). He 
derives an index of solvency which is associated with the minimum 
level of debt repayment when the real lending interest rate exceeds 
the country’s growth rate. Whatever is not repaid is refinanced by 
the lender so the index satisfies the solvency ("transversality*) 
requirement i.e. debt grows strictly at a slower pace than the 
interest rate. He proceeds to estimate his solvency index for a 
number of countries dividing the future into two sub-periods from 
1983-1995 and from 1996 onwards. By making some forecasts about rate 
of growth of exports and the effective lending rate, he arrives at the 
conclusion that, with the exception of Brazil, Argentina, Sudan and 
Ivory Coast, all other debtor nations (including those in Latin 
America, the region with highest repayment needs) require to dedicate 
at most 13% of their exports to debt service in order to remain 
solvent. For Brazil, Argentina, Sudan and Ivory Coast, the figures 
are 15%, 16.4%, 22.8% and 15% respectively.
Multi-period models have also been used to analyse the 
determinants of developing country long-run creditworthiness. For 
example, Kharas (1984) builds a model where investment and (via the 
production function) output are determined endogenously with debt. In
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his model, the government borrows from abroad to invest and therefore 
increase the rate of growth of output. He finds that if the initial 
capital stock is high and the marginal propensity to save out of 
physical capital is sufficiently larger than the lending interest rate 
(hence, the growth of new borrowing is less than the interest rate), 
then the debt/output ratio will be bounded. Otherwise, accumulating 
further debt can put the economy on a path characterised by an 
ever-increasing debt/output ratio. A unique saddle path is derived 
where both capital and debt are growing suggesting that foreign loans 
are succesfully used only if (after some time) the growth of domestic 
capital increases faster than the external debt. In other words, 
long-run creditworthiness is associated with the path of 
ever-expanding capital stock.
Given the distinction between creditworthy and uncreditworthy 
paths, the Kharas model associates reschedulings with the likelihood 
of being shiftedVrom one region to another. He calculates the 
critical capital stock which is sufficient to maintain 
creditworthiness at any level of expected gross capital inflow and 
existing outstanding debt. The comparison between this critical 
capital stock and the actual capital stock is taken as an indication 
of country exposure.
The simplicity of the approach and the direct implications for 
government policy are the major attractions of this type of 
macro-framework. However, there are inevitable shortcomings.
Firstly, there is an absence of sovereign risk. Borrowers are 
implicitly assumed not to have any incentives to default and engage in 
activities that signal such behaviour. Debt crises arise only as a 
consequence of uncertainty about the future and lenders should always
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be willing to restructure the debt. Secondly, given that the lenders’ 
behaviour is taken as optimal, there is no attempt to address the 
issue of overlending and, therefore, most of the burden of the 
adjustment has to be borne by the borrower.
A different set of models tries to provide microfoundations to 
the international credit market and at the same time incorporates the 
potential risk of debt repudiation embodied in sovereign loans.
In general, models of this kind are framed in the following way. 
The borrowers’ behaviour is based on intertemporal utility 
maximisation and in choosing whether to repay or repudiate, they 
compare the burden imposed by current debt service obligations with 
the welfare loss due to penalties. Lenders understand that borrowers 
will make such comparisons and do not lend more than the borrowers are 
likely to find in their interest to repay. Key issues here are how to 
proxy penalties (when loans do not have a physical collateral) and the 
shape of the supply of loans.
Jaffe and Russell (1976) describe the characteristics of the loan 
market in situations where the borrowers’ willingness to pay is 
questioned. The spirit of this model seems to be embodied in most
models of international debt with risk of repudiation. Assuming an 
exogenous and arbitrary default penalty, they consider a two-period 
model with "honest* and "dishonest" borrowers. Honest borrowers will 
always repay but dishonest borrowers will default if the penalty is 
less than repayment. Competitive lenders can not distinguish between 
borrowers so they will provide loans ensuring that the debt service is 
less than the penalty. This condition establishes a debt ceiling. 
Since there is an inverse relation between the proportion of repaid
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loans and both the lending rate and the amount borrowed, if the credit 
ceiling binds then less loans are forthcoming when the interest rate 
is high.
The characteristics of the credit market implied by the Jaffe and 
Russell model are: the supply of loans exhibits a backward bending
portion, credit rationing can emerge in equilibrium, lenders and 
borrowers can both gain from using information on total debt and the 
threat of repudiation cuts lending short. Although the Jaffe and 
Russell model is designed in the context of a domestic credit market, 
its features are generally shared by most of the models of 
international debt with risk of repudiation (Eaton and Taylor, 1986).
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) make a seminal contribution to the
sovereign debt literature by constructing a model with endogenous
default penalty. A borrower country which repudiates its debts faces 
permanent exclusion from the private credit market. The benefits of 
default grow with the size of the outstanding debt. The costs are 
determined endogenously according to the variability and growth rate 
of the country borrower’s income and its own characteristics (risk 
tendency, discount rate, etc.) which in turn affect its future demand 
for loans. Lenders know the nature of the borrowers and perceive the 
borrowers’ disutility from exclusion of the credit market. This 
allows them to supply loans only if the cost of default exceeds the 
benefits. Thus, the credit ceiling is also endogenously determined.
Kletzer (1984) sets up a model with similar characteristics to 
that of Eaton and Gersovitz and explores the characteristics of loan 
contracts when creditors have alternative information about the
borrowers’ total debt service obligations. He concludes that a loan
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contract with observability of concurrent indebtedeness is a 
constrained Pareto-optimum that can not be dominated by an equilibrium 
without observability of concurrent indebtedeness.
Why do borrowers not repudiate? Why are they so keen to maintain 
their access to the credit market? Repudiation removes the 
possibility of smoothing consumption over time in the case of low 
income, makes it impossible to exploit future investment opportunities 
when there are not enough savings and finally, considering that banks 
intermediate in international trade transactions, repudiation might 
cause international trade disruptions.
In the event of repudiation, will lenders impose the penalty? 
How do we explain the following chain of events that characterise the 
1980s: arreas, default, renegotiation, and perhaps new loans?
Krugman (1985) develops a model with uncertain punishment cost. 
He suggests that although a defaulting country faces the possibility 
of serious penalties, the expected cost of these penalties does not 
seem to be sufficiently large to induce repayment. In a two-period 
model with initial indebtedness, the penalty takes the form of a known 
credit cut and a fixed cost which is unknown for lenders and borrowers 
when the repayment-defaulting decisions are made. This uncertainty 
cost may be interpreted as a measure of all actual uncertainties, say 
future export growth, terms of trade and political events.
Repayment of the old debt in the first period leads to a new loan 
and the repayment-defaulting decision is taken in the second period. 
Under these circumstances, it is possible to configure a loan market 
with non-repayment risk in the second period. It is evident that
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default in the first period might be avoided if new lending exceeds 
debt service. In other words, it might be in the interest of existing 
creditors to postpone debt servicing and avoid an immediate default. 
This action would preserve the option of being repaid in the second 
period. This, Krugman says, underlies the rationale of debt
rescheduling.
Similar to Sachs (1982, 1984), rescheduling in Krugman’s model 
might be interpreted as reflecting a time inconsistency problem. 
Ex-ante, lenders would like to be able to commit themselves to
imposing the sanctions if the country does not repay its debt; but 
ex-post such action is not optimal so that they refrain from doing so 
and prefer to renegotiate instead of losing all their claims. 
Consequently the ex-ante threat of sanctions is not credible.
Another appealing way of explaining rescheduling is proposed by 
Grossman and Van Huyck (1985). They apply the concept of reputational 
equilibrium and focus on debt as a contingent claim. In their model, 
the borrower’s objective function is to maximise utility of current 
consumption and the expected present discount value of future utility 
from consumption conditional on information available today. Actual 
consumption equals total national income less current debt servicing. 
National income has two components: a deterministic part and a
stochastic part. The deterministic part represents the return from 
the proceeds of investing (last period’s borrowing) in a concave 
risk-free productive technology. The stochastic part may reflect 
external threat or internal discontent. This allows them to 
distinguish between inexcusable (repudiation) and excusable (partial 
repayment due to bad states of the nature) defaults. Moral hazard and
problems of insolvency are absent from the outset since they assume a
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risk-free productive technology and symmetric information (the state 
of nature is equally uncertain ex-ante and equally verifiable by both 
lenders and borrowers).
Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral so they equate the 
expected value of debt servicing in the next period (conditional on 
all information available today) to the alternative risk-free return 
on the current amount lent to the borrower. In addition, it is 
assumed that lenders form their expectations rationally and that they 
know the utility function of the borrower. The country borrows for 
investment purposes, and through the expected servicing function
(which depends on the probability of the state of nature) pass some
risks to the lenders. Borrowers can only affect lenders’ expectations 
and their decision to lend now and in the future through their 
reputation which links current debt service and expectations of future 
debt servicing.
Under these circumstances, the country borrowers’ intertemporal 
problem is to choose the amount of debt and the actual and future debt 
servicing plan so as to maximise expected utility subject to their 
life budget constraint, the supply price of loans and the lenders’ 
belief about their trust worthiness. The .reputational equilibrium 
maximises the borrowers’ expected utility, provides efficient risk 
shifting and validates the lenders’ expectations about the borrowers’ 
choice of debt servicing plan. The solution is time consistent 
because the chosen debt servicing plan is proved to yield the highest 
expected level of utility.
The above approach is interesting because it interprets sovereign
debts as contingent claims where loans are used to finance investment
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as well as a device to facilitate effficient risk shifting. According 
to the model, excusable default does not preclude continued access to 
loans while inexcusable default leads to a credit cut.
Since the onset of the debt crisis, the market has seen 
successive reschedulings and also the development of a thin but active 
(secondary) market for selling and swapping commercial bank loan 
claims on developing countries. These events prompted researchers to 
analyse how an optimal rescheduling should proceed.
Gennotte et al. (1986) also emphasise the contingent claim 
aspects of sovereign loans. Motivated by the determination of optimal 
rescheduling policies and to a lesser extent by the unreliability of 
secondary-market-debt valuation, they design a methodology for valuing 
debt claims. The value of these claims is given by the discounted 
stream of expected future debt service payments and thus, depends on 
the magnitude and risk characteristics of the promised payments. 
Therefore, they suggest that (from the lender’s point of view) the 
optimal rescheduling policy (maturities, fees, spreads) is the one 
that maximises the value of this claim subject to both the borrower’s 
option of repudiating and the regulations imposed on lending exposure.
The country borrower owns assets (measured by its current 
reserves and its stream of future foreign exchange revenues) and owes 
a stream of promised repayments. Given that the possibility of 
repudiation drives a wedge between the face and market value of the 
debt, the strategy of the country borrower is to maximise the 
difference between the value of its assets and the market value of the 
debt. If the country repudiates, it suffers a penalty in proportion 
to its assets; hence repudiation is an option only if the penalties
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imposed for non-repayment are less than the market value of its 
claims. Since the incentives for repudiation are strong when the 
country is heavily indebted in relation to its wealth, a rescheduling 
postponing repayments until the country’s wealth recovers might remove 
the incentive to repudiate and at the same time maximise the amount 
recovered by the lender. Notice that the value of the debt is 
determined by the stream of promised future repayments which in turn 
depends on the underlying assets and the rescheduling policy adopted.
Trading in the secondary market has increased in recent years 
while prices of secondary market debt have been in continuous decline. 
These trends reveal both unsuccesful rescheduling practices and 
increasing expectations that the debt would not be repaid in full. On 
the one hand, commercial bank lenders started to get out of the crisis 
by decreasing their loan exposure relative to primary capital and also 
increasing their loss provisions (Sachs and Huizinga, 1987). Selling 
debt at a huge discount signals their view that there is little 
likelihood of the debt being repaid in full. On the other hand, 
developing countries are in a similar (or worse) situation compared to 
when the debt crisis started. Moreover, LDCs might be suffering from 
what Krugman (1988a) labelled a ‘debt overhang* problem. That is, the 
presence of an "inherited" debt which is larger than the expected 
present value of a country’s maximum future resource transfers.
These aspects led to an active debate about the costs and 
benefits of debt relief and, at the same time, encouraged welfare 
comparisons between different market-based debt-reduction schemes.
The stream of payments from a country borrower is affected by its 
debt burden. This debt burden distorts its incentives to perform well
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since most of the benefits of good performance will go to its 
creditors rather than to itself. Therefore, debt reduction provides 
incentives to debtor countries to make adjustment efforts (for 
example, increase investment) which will improve the welfare of both 
country borrowers and lenders. Borrower countries are said to be on 
the wrong side of the “Debt Relief Laffer Curve" (DRLC) when creditors 
increase expected payments by forgiving part of the country’s debt 
(Krugman, 1988a, 1988b).
The "pro-incentive" of debt relief is analysed by Corden (1988). 
He suggests that debt relief might have positive and negative effects. 
In some cases, future debt service obligations would increase 
investment (now) and this could be interpreted as an increase in the 
(current) adjustment effort. If that is so, debt relief provides 
disincentive effects.
Assume that a country borrower always meets its service 
obligations up to the limit of its "capacity to pay". In other words, 
if, say, its minimum level of consumption is not granted when 
repayment is due, then the only option for the country is to default. 
If this is the case, Corden argues that sufficient debt relief (today) 
might persuade the country to invest (today) and prevent creditors 
facing a default (tomorrow). He stresses that this positive effect 
depends on giving a meaningful concept to a country’s "capacity to 
pay".
Comparisons between different market-based reduction schemes have 
also been a focus of concern. Krugman (1988b) argues that straight 
debt forgiveness and market-based debt reduction schemes (such as debt 
buybacks, securitization and debt-equity swaps) are similar in the
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sense that they reduce the debt overhang. More precisely, such
schemes will benefit both creditors and debtors if the debtor is on 
the wrong side of the DRLC and hence the adjustment-incentive effects 
are sufficiently important.
Other papers (for example, Helpman, 1989; Froot, 1989) also 
supported the potential efficiency gains from debt reduction 
operations. In particular, Froot compares the outcomes of different 
market-based reduction schemes (buybacks, exit bonds and pure debt
relief) but also considers the different sources of funds used to 
retire old debt (i.e. the creditors themselves, exogenous foreign aid, 
the debtor’s future income and the debtor’s current endowment). If 
the debtor country is on the wrong side of the DRLC, Froot shows that 
the creditor’s preferred market-based scheme is a buyback financed by 
aid, followed by a buyback out of current resources or a buyback out 
of future receipts or exit bonds. The debtor’s preferred scheme is 
either a buyback out of aid or a buyback out of future receipts. Most 
important, Froot shows that countries that are liquidity constrained 
are more likely to be on the wrong side of the DRLC and that for them, 
a package containing partial debt forgiveness and new lending is
optimal.
Despite the merits of debt relief, we have not seen substantial 
debt forgiveness in practice. Krugman (1988b) warns about the 
difficulties encountered in making these schemes work. Debtor 
countries are normally prohibited from repurchasing their own debt at 
a discount because the use of international reserves for a buyback 
might impair the country’s ability to repay the remaining debt.
Classification of existing debt as "senior" debt also avoids the 
problem of moral hazard (buying debt at a discount could be a "reward"
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for not repaying before). Securitization might work if the new debt 
(bond) issued by the country is made senior to the existing debt and, 
at the same time, there is confidence that this new debt will be 
repaid. Debt-equity swaps might worsen a country’s foreign reserves 
through "round tripping", aggravate its fiscal position through the 
need for domestic borrowing and might led to inflationary pressures 
via money creation.
The increase in the secondary market price of the Bolivian debt 
after the buyback announcement led some commentators to question the 
extent of benefits that debt relief schemes would provide. Debt 
repurchase pushes the price of debt up and might harm debtors if the 
the average value of the remaining debt is larger than its marginal 
value (Bulow and Rogoff, 1988). In other words, debt repurchase would 
do very little to ease the debt burden if (after the repurchase) the 
secondary market price goes up and the remaining debt is large. 
However, if the country can negotiate a large proportion of its debt 
with the participation of all its creditors, then the debtor country 
might benefit not only from the debt reduction per se but also from 
its return to the international credit market (Sachs 1988).
Moral hazard may also obstruct debt forgiveness. A country 
borrower might misrepresent its private information in order to gain 
more debt relief. For example, once at the debt relief negotiation 
table, the debtor country might argue that there is no more scope for 
"belt-tightening" so a large debt write-off is required to increase 
investment. This issue is addressed by Froot et. al. (1989). They 
suggest that debt contracts should be made contingent on the "ability
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m . . . .  *to pay of debtor countries to remove this disincentive effect"''. The 
type of indexing would depend on the nature of the uncertainty faced 
by the lender and borrower. More precisely, if the uncertainty is 
about a variable that the lender and borrower can observe equally 
(say, future commodity price), then commodity price indexing is 
better. However, if there is uncertainty about some attributes of the 
borrower, debt contracts should be linked not only to variables 
outside the control of the borrower but also to variables under his 
control (for example, output).
The complexities of the international debt crisis lie, in our 
understanding, in the nature of the credit relations between lenders 
and sovereign borrowers and in the identification of both the 
incentives for borrowers to repay and the incentives for lenders to 
continue supplying new loans. This, in turn, might explain the delays 
in reaching a satisfactory solution to the debt crisis.
3.2. Estimating Country Risk
There are two main ways of assessing country risk. The so called 
non-statistical rating, is done by identifying key variables 
reflecting lending risk and weighting them so as to obtain a score for 
each country. This method of rating is widely used by financial 
journals and magazines. It is also quite common within the 
international banking institutions^". The statistical rating, widely
"'Contingent debt contracts to mitigate the moral hazard problem are 
also discussed in Genotte (1986), Krugman (1988) and Anderson et 
al.(1989).
“ Heffernan et al. (1985) conducted a survey of 122 international
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used among academics, is much more sophisticated and is based on the 
application of principal component, discriminant, probit and logit 
techniques.
The different criteria involved in these two methods of 
estimating country risk make comparisons difficult. Within the 
statistical rating, comparisons are also limited by the definitions of 
the variables used, country samples and time periods considered when 
applying the estimates. For these reasons, we prefer to devote our 
attention to describing how non-statistical ratings are produced and 
give a brief account of the problems encountered in assessing country 
risk using statistical techniques. Later, in chapter 3, we present 
(in the form of an applied survey) a comprehensive revision of the 
empirical work carried out in attempting to assess the determinants of 
debt arrears.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the non-statistical 
rating incorporates political risk variables while the statistical 
rating has concentrated more on economic indicators. The reason for 
this lies in the intrinsic nature of the political variables i.e. they 
are difficult to select, quantify and measure. However, some efforts 
have been made in trying to include them in statistical models (for 
example, Burton and Inoue, 1985; Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987 and Berg 
and Sachs, 1988).
Note as well that both ratings provide insights about default
banks in London in 1984. They found that banks used more than one 
method (statistical models, external appraisal service, spread sheets, 
etc.) when assessing country risk but most of them rely in their own 
"house economist" generation of country reports.
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risk. However, the statistical rating may also give some insights 
about repudiation risk through subjective judgments on the wide range 
of variables used in the analysis. The statistical rating is 
concerned with the probability of rescheduling and not with the 
probability of repudiation. In the last three decades, very few 
countries have repudiated their debts but many of them have 
rescheduled their debts especially in the 1980s. Rescheduling is 
intrepreted in a wide sense i.e. countries that have rescheduled or 
are in the process of doing so and, even more interesting, countries 
that might seek rescheduling in the near future. This suggests that 
the main concern is not the probability of rescheduling per se but the 
probability that a country might fall into debt arrears (Heffernan, 
1986; Saini and Bates, 1984).
3.2.1. Non-Statistical Rating
The most common country rankings are provided by Euromoney, the 
Institutional Investor and the International Country Risk Guide. We 
will treat them separately because their methodologies are different.
Euromoney ratings date from 1969 and were initially based on the 
average (weighted by level of loans and maturity) spread of a country 
active in the Eurocurrency market in a given year. The higher the 
average weighted spread, the riskier the country. Since mid-1982, 
Euromoney has widened its criteria and changed the way its rankings 
were computed. For example, in 1984, a weight of 50% was assigned to 
ease of access to all international markets (bond markets, floating 
rate notes, Euroloans, etc.), 30% weight was given to the terms 
(maturity and spread) obtained by the borrower country in a syndicated
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loan, and 20% weight to trade finance related aspects.
The Institutional Investor ranks countries on the basis of a 
survey. Banks are asked to grade country’s creditworthiness from 0 to 
100. The lower the score obtained by a country, the higher is its 
probability of default. These responses are then weighted mainly 
according to each bank’s loan exposure and some criteria (not 
revealed) related to scoring technique.
The shortcomings of the Euromoney and Institutional Investor 
scorings are well pointed out by Heffernan (1985). In the Euromoney 
ranking:
a) If the average spread over LIBOR changes in a particular year, then 
the rating will be biased in favour of the countries that borrowed 
before such a change;
b) Spread and maturities are not independent as the rankings suggest;
c) The rankings implicitly assume that lenders always adjust for 
higher risk by increasing the spread. This neglects the fact that, at 
some point, further increases in the spread would increase the average 
riskiness of the portfolio and thus, would lower their expected 
returns.
With repect to the Institutional Investor scoring:
a) The country grading relies on the bankers’ individual judgement. 
If they are heavily exposed to one country, then they might not make a 
fair judgement since the information would subsequently be available 
to the public;
b) Banks might have better quality information for countries where 
they are heavily exposed and their expertise does not necessarily 
cover all countries.
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The International Country Risk Guide ranks a country on the basis 
of a composite score and on the assumption that political risk and 
transfer risks are equally important (Krayenbuehl, 1985). The three 
main components for the evaluation are: political (50%), financial
(25%), and economic (25%) risk. The total score for political risk is 
100 and considers aspects such as political leadership. Financial 
risks are related, for example, to debt reschedulings and the maximum 
score is 50. Economic risks also score up to 50 and take into 
consideration problems like inflation. Of course, the absolute levels 
of the scores are unimportant as far as the rankings are concerned; 
what is important is the relative variability of the scores.
Perhaps assigning half of the total weight to political variables 
is excessive. Delays in repayment are more often attributed to 
economic and financial related variables than, say, to frequent 
revolutions. In addition, if political and financial risk are 
interrelated then the real weight to economic risk is reduced.
It is also interesting to describe how individual banks assess
country risk. The case of Lloyds BankA" will be illustrated. The
criteria used to assess country risk come from a risk-reward matrix,
its own country risk analysis and a country-specific fact sheet 
(Johnson, 1985).
The risk-reward matrix is a weighted measure of bank exposure 
which takes into consideration:
a) The type of borrower (reward is higher for private loans than for
A“At the end of 1984, Lloyds Bank was (after Midland Bank) the second 
largest British lender to Latin America.
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government loans);
b) The size of the loan (retail loans tend to have higher spreads and 
thus higher rewards than wholesale loans);
c) The geographical destination of the loan (foreign lending, as
opposed to domestic lending, is supposed to be more risky because of 
the bank’s better knowledge of the domestic market).
The country risk analysis is composed of judgemental and
statistical considerations, scoring up to 100 each. Judgemental 
aspects are based on the country’s fact sheet and a weight of 20% is 
assigned to domestic economic policy (e.g. coherence of policy, 
business climate); 30% to external economic policy (e.g. debt 
management, handling of liquidity crisis, investment policy); 25% to 
political characteristics (e.g. international position, type of 
government and durability); and 25% to political stability (e.g. risk
of local war, political and social tension). Statistical measures
include a variety of indicators (debt/GNP, GNP per capita, etc.) which 
are given equal weight. In addition, future scenarios are constructed 
based on a "strong" and "weak" solvency condition (which are linked to 
the debt/export ratio) using similar methodology to that of Congdon
(1985) and Cohen (1986).
An interesting aspect of the Lloyds Bank approach is the effort 
placed in distinguishing between the type of borrower and lender, 
suggesting that this relation will affect the risk assessment.
In sum, the main advantage of the non-statistical assessment of 
country risk lies in the variety of aspects considered in the 
analysis. This helps to provide a country-by-country case study. 
However, its major disadvantage is its dependence on subjective
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opinions made by the institutions involved in performing the
assessments. The statistical (or quantitative) approach to country 
risk estimation is less subjective but has its own problems and
limitations.
3.2.2. Statistical Rating
Saini and Bates (1984) identify the problems encountered by the
statistical country risk approach and in discussing them, we rely on
their work. These problems are related to the choice of the dependent 
variable, data availability, statistical techniques, model 
specification and ability to forecast.
If we are attempting an explanation of the causes of debt 
arrears, then what is the most adequate definition of the dependent 
variable? If rescheduling is interpreted as a way of renegotiating 
debt which has not been serviced, then the date of signature could 
indicate the time when a country was in repayment difficulties. 
However, delays occur between the time when the rescheduling is 
requested and its signature. Countries might have suspended debt 
payments sometime before the formal rescheduling is agreed and might 
still be in arrears while the process of renegotiation goes on. Feder 
and Just (1977, p.30), aware of this limitation, propose "...for cases 
where a rescheduling agreement was arranged after servicing 
difficulties were really apparent, a default is assumed to have taken 
place in the years in which significant arrears occurred*.
Although the Feder and Just definition has been frequently used,
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it has some drawbacks. Without data on country arrears1 "!, it is 
difficult to assess when a country is experiencing debt difficulties. 
Also it does not consider other types of loans (like bridge loans, 
higher tranche IMF loans) which might be substitutes for formal 
reschedulings and might be indicating repayment problems. Saini and 
Bates (1977) distinguish voluntary (transfers for development 
purposes) from involuntary (bridge loans, loans to avoid default) 
transfers and include only the latter in their dependent variable. 
Feder et. al. (1981) suggest additional refinements. They counted the 
year when the rescheduling was requested, years of serious debt 
arrears irrespective of whether a rescheduling was taking place and 
years when rescheduling was prompted by shortages of foreign exchange.
The lack of data availability can be solved in different ways: 
estimating missing data, reducing the sample of countries under study, 
using different coverage period for countries and using proxies for 
missing variables (Frank and Cline, 1971; Dhonte, 1975; Feder and 
Just, 1977; Feder et al. 1981; Kharas (1984) among others). Besides 
the problem of data availability and incomplete series, there is an 
additional problem in the interpretation of the variables because 
either the data presentation differs accross countries or there have 
been changes in the methodology over time.
Researchers have used different statistical techniques (principal 
components, discriminant analysis, probit and logit) when attempting 
to determine the causes of debt servicing problems.
4 *
AvThe World Bank has recently published data on interest arrears in 
their 1990-91 edition of World Debt Tables.
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Dhonte (1975) uses principal components to find groups of 
independent variables which will help to differentiate countries in 
relation to their debt involvement. From a chosen list of explanatory 
variables, the idea is to select subsets or components (i.e. linear 
independent combinations) and then obtain correlation coefficients by 
relating these components to the dependent variables. A drawback of 
this technique is that it is often difficult to ascribe clear economic 
or political meanings to each of the components; also there might be 
some problems in interpreting the relation between the dependent 
variables and the components.
Discriminant analysis has been used to determine the linear 
combinations (of indicators or variables) which best discriminate 
between two groups of countries (those having repayment difficulty 
problems and those that are not). One of the limitations of this 
method is the determination of the importance of individual 
explanatory variables. The “t “ statistics generally used in linear 
regression analysis can not be used because the discriminant 
coefficients are not unique due to violations of the normality 
assumption. Frank and Cline (1977), although recognising this 
problem, still use "t“ tests to exclude some variables from their 
model. Feder and Just (1977, p.26) in justifying the use of logit 
technique, pointed out another limitation of the discriminant 
technique “...while discriminant analysis assumes two completely 
different populations, the logit approach assumes a discrete event 
takes place after the combined effect of certain economic variables 
reaches some threshold level. The latter approach is especially 
suitable when several observations (of both default and non default 
years) for a given country are included ... it makes more sense to 
claim that, in a specific period, the country was pushed beyond this
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critical level, leading to rescheduling, than to claim that a country 
suddenly became a member of another species..."
Probit and logit regressions have often been used in the analysis 
of the determinants of debt arrears (Feder and Just, 1977; Saini and 
Bates, 1978; Feder et.al. 1981; Kharas, 1984; Cline, 1984, McFadden 
et. al., 1985 among other researchers). The difference between them 
lies in the assumed probability distribution for the errors. Probit 
assumes a normal error distribution while logit posits a logistic 
distribution which resembles the normal distribution except for the 
extreme ends (i.e. fatter tails). Amemiya (1981) and Maddala (1985) 
show that in the case of univariate dichotomous models, the probit and 
logit models usually give similar results and it is difficult to
distinguish between them statistically except in cases where the data 
is heavily concentrated in the tails due to the characteristics of the 
problem under study. However, they also warn that in the case of 
multivariate and multi-response models, logit and probit differ 
substantially and the choice will depend on how the joint or
conditional probabilities of two or more discrete dependent variables 
are specified.
Schmidt (1984) analyses the relative merits of different
statistical methods applied in the estimation of the probability of 
default. He concludes that logit analysis provided the best results 
and that (subject to the availability of recent data) it could also be 
useful in the search for early warning signals of debt difficulties.
Saini and Bates (1984) summarise the general weakenesses in the 
specification of models applied in assessing country risk:
a) The selection of independent variables excludes social and
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political factors which may give rise to repayment problems;
b) There is a lack of analysis of the role of supply conditions and 
lenders’ perception of the creditworthiness of the borrower;
c) Models should account for structural shifts of the parameters over 
time and also for the heterogeneous nature of the countries involved 
in the samples.
Fortunately, as we will see in chapters 3 and 4, recent work has 
taken the above criticims seriously. For example: the paper by Berg
and Sachs (1988) provides an interesting way of including social and 
political variables; Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) take seriously the 
interrelation between demand and supply in the sovereign credit 
market; and McFadden et. al. (1985) and Hajivassi1iou (1987) consider 
the problems raised by pooled samples.
The ability to predict debt repayment problems depends not only 
on how the model is specified, but also on the ability to forecast the 
value of the explanatory variables. Not only does incomplete data 
preclude statistical projections but also some variables (like 
inflation, money growth, exchange rates) are difficult to project 
especially in situations where borrower countries are going through 
unsucessful stabilisation programmes.
4. Conclusions
The past has taught us that default and disruption in the credit 
market are not new phenomena. What is new is the different nature of 
the participants in the credit market and the way debt is now managed.
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Bond holders lending at fixed interest rates have been replaced 
by multilateral agencies lending at concessional rates and these, in 
turn, have been replaced by private commercial banks lending at 
floating interest rates. The fact that bond holders were scattered 
made it difficult to renegotiate agreements in the event of repayment 
difficulties. In constrast, syndicated bank lending facilitates those 
renegotiations to prevent outright default but also makes borrowers 
more exposed to lending interest rate fluctuations.
In the past, the losses incurred by bond holders as a result of 
default meant that, for some time, country borrowers could not access 
the credit market. Whether sanctions were conscientiously imposed by 
lenders or were just a consequence of the effects of the 1930s 
depression and World War II is still a puzzle. Negotiations for 
arrears settlements took place after a default and contained 
substantial debt relief.
From the late 194.0s onwards, creditors and debtors meet when 
there is a serious outright default risk. The IMF participates in 
these meetings as an "arbiter" whose responsibility is to design and 
evaluate stabilization programmes for the economic recovery of the 
borrower country. The Paris Club serves as a forum to establish the 
general conditions for these agreements. Final agreements are reached 
on a bilateral basis. Defaults in the early 1980s have also been 
followed by credit cuts. These credit cuts seem to result mainly from 
the reaction of commercial banks who attempted to limit their heavy 
exposure on developing country loans, and to a lesser extent to the 
1980-82 world recession. Outright defaults are not a characteristic 
of the 1980s, but "technical" defaults and reschedulings are. At the 
onset of the debt crisis, the vulnerability of the international
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financial system to considerable debt servicing disruption might 
explain the banks’ preference for reschedulings with no elements of 
debt relief.
The debt-related literature explores the nature and interaction 
of lenders and borrowers when collateral can not be used as a 
guarantee for repayment and penalties are needed to enforce repayment. 
Penalties, in general, are modelled as permanent exclusion from the 
credit market. Rescheduling is welfare improving because the 
sanctions are not imposed and lenders keep the option of being paid in 
the future. This explains, at least partially, why debt reschedulings 
have been at the top of the bankers’ agenda. However, researchers 
pointed out that continuous reschedulings are not sustainable because 
they weaken the credibility of sanctions. One solution would be the 
granting of debt relief linked to an appropriate debt restructuring.
If one of the reasons put forward by bankers for not granting a 
straight debt write-down was the need to preserve “discipline" among 
borrowers, the actual practice of successive reschedulings (with no 
elements of debt relief) has not helped them to achieve this.
Reschedulings proved to be unsuccessful in restoring borrowers’ 
capacity to pay and bankers have increased their debt loss provisions. 
An active secondary debt market has emerged signalling lack of 
confidence that the debt will be repaid in full. This market has 
provided a menu of different options to achieve debt relief, for 
example buybacks, securitization and debt-equity swaps.
Researchers have debated the cost and benefits of these voluntary 
debt reduction schemes. They have suggested that for countries with
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debt overhang problems, these transactions can offer potential welfare 
gains for borrowers and lenders. However, there is still considerable 
controversy about the extent of debt relief that this market can 
provide.
As a final observation on why "debt fatigue" persists we can, 
perhaps, conclude this chapter by quoting Dornbusch (1984, p.533): 
"...Today debts are continuing to be serviced and the burden of making 
that possible has been placed by the international financial system, 
with the assistance of the IMF, squarely on the debtors. ... One 
might argue (or even believe) that this is essential to maintain order 
in the international financial system, but that of course raises the 
question of in whose interest the system works. For many who are 
paying the bill now there have been few benefits before and there are 
no obvious ones down the road."
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Chapter 2
International Sovereign Loans: Sone Theoretical Insights
1. Introduction
Cross border loans to sovereign borrowers (i.e. country 
governments) have an inherent risk attached derived from the lack of 
collateral to guarantee such loans and immunity from the legal 
process. In this context, the "sovereign risk hypothesis" is based 
upon the idea of debt transformation and interest rate risk, but not 
on complete loss risk since countries can not be liquidated or 
disappear like private firms (Kettle and Magnus, 1986; Cuddington and 
Smith, 1985; Plan, 1985; Sachs, 1984; Friedman, 1983; Sachs and Cohen, 
1982). In the case of an individual agent (i.e. firm, corporation) 
bankruptcy reflects negative net worth. Laws are provided to define 
this condition and creditors are compensated in accordance with the 
agent’s remaining assets".
Sovereign risk refers to the possibility that the government can 
choose not to adhere to past commitments with foreign creditors and 
can change domestic policies or laws in a way that severely reduces 
the real value of foreign loans to creditors. Lenders can not obtain 
legal remedies for breach of contract since contracts per se are not
"Bulow and Shoven (1978) suggest that whether a firm chooses to 
continue operating or cease operations depends on several variables 
besides its net worth position and the legal costs associated with 
bankruptcy. In general, a longer debt structure, an asset portfolio 
with a higher percentage of cash or liquid assets and a more variable 
future return will increase the circumstances under which a firm will 
continue operating.
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enforceable. A country’s ability to pay its debt is thus no guarantee 
that creditors will be repaid. Specifically, it is the borrowing
government’s willingness to repay that is critical to sovereign 
lending and unless private creditors are willing to coerce debtor 
governments into repayment, there is no explicit legal mechanism that 
can be used to avoid debt repudiation. This does not of course imply 
default will always occur; private creditors do have some ways of 
penalising defaulting debtors to ensure repayment.
Kaletsky (1985) asserts that sanctions may take two forms: 
Firstly, legal sanctions such as attachment of assets, assets seizure, 
etc. The cases of Iran (1980) and Argentina (1982) where external 
asset freezing for political reasons was imposed by the American and 
British government respectively, show the plausibility of imposing 
these types of sanctions. Another example, this time debt related, is 
the 1986 Peruvian experience of announcing maximum debt related 
payments of 10% of export earnings and converting international 
reserves into 700 tonnes of gold which were transfered from Swiss 
banks to the vaults of the Peruvian Central Bank ("The Guardian", 
26/02/86). Secondly, there is the possibility of non-judicial 
sanctions, that is retaliation in financial and trading flows (cuts in 
trade credits and other credit lines, trade boycott, trade embargo, 
tariff barriers, etc.)
From this list, the only type of potential sanction that private 
creditors can implement directly is a credit cut. Trade retaliation, 
seizure of assets, etc. need the intervention of the lender’s 
government and may induce adverse reaction from the international 
community.
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The aim of this chapter is to analyse the implications of 
sovereign risk using a simple two-period model, so as to shed light 
upon the behaviour of the international loan market and highlight that 
the intrinsic nature of the loan (i.e. sovereign) creates market 
inefficiencies.
As suggested before, in the absence of penalty cost, repudiation 
would always be optimal for the borrower. Thus, lenders in 
anticipation of the borrowers’ decision, will not lend in the first 
place. This is the classical chain store paradox of Selten (1978). 
Translating it to the context of sovereign international lending, the 
obvious (and counterfactual) implication is that neither borrowers nor 
lenders exist.
Modelling the form of repudiation punishment remains very 
controversial and an active area of research“. We will assume (a la 
Krugman, 1985) that a borrower who repudiates his debts will face 
permanent exclusion from the credit market (imposed directly by the 
lenders) and a stochastic repudiation penalty which takes the form of 
a loss of a fraction a of the borrower’s country output. This 
stochastic penalty may be interpreted as trade retaliation, 
international disruption, financial panic, seizure of assets, etc. and 
may cause harm to the borrower country if imposed"'. The punishment 
threat is made credible because borrowers recognise that lenders
“See among others, Sachs and Cohen (1982), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
and Gosh (1985) for a discussion on this issue.
"The model presented in this paper does not allow for international 
trade. However, it is possible to think about a borrower maximising 
utility defined on consumption subject to C=Y-I-G-X+M budget 
constraint.
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(supported by their governments) are unwilling to forgive past debts 
at least in the immediate future-".
The reason for making the indirect penalty the only uncertain 
variable is twofold. On the one hand, we want to emphasise "pure" 
repudiation incentives (unwillingness to service the debt) and not 
"involuntary" repudiation (willingness but inability to service the 
debt) or in the Grossman and Van Huyck (1985) terminology, inexcusable 
and excusable default. Secondly, given a finite horizon model, the 
possibility of punishment makes the terminal decisions non trivial.
The model possesses similar features to the one presented in 
Sachs (1982) and Kletzer (1985). It differs from the first mainly in 
the treatment of the penalty cost and from the second, in that it does 
not rely on information asymmetries to derive ex ante competitive loan 
contracts which are characterised by credit rationing. Imperfect 
information (moral hazard, adverse selection and incomplete 
information) will just add to the market inefficiencies. In addition, 
we reset the model in a bilateral monopoly context and include 
elements of bargaining in the international sovereign loan market.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the 
assumptions of our basic model, section 3 analyses the competitive 
market equilibrium while section 4 deals with the bilateral monopoly
"Lindert and Morton (1989) argue that most of the countries which 
defaulted on their debts in the 1930s were not consistently punished. 
Faithful and unfaithful repayers suffered from credit contraction 
caused by the worldwide crises. In the last fifty years, China, Cuba 
and North Korea have repudiated their debts and have faced isolation 
from western international markets. Nicaragua in 1980 took the 
punishment threat seriously and has chosen not to repudiate.
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market equilibrium. Section 5 presents some applications and provides 
some insights on debt restructuring. Finally, the last section 
presents the conclusions.
2. Assumptions of the Model
The following assumptions characterise borrowers and lenders:
1. The representative borrower lives two periods and inherits a debt
(D = D^ + D 2.) which must be repaid in the following two periods according
to a loan contract signed by his predecessor.
2. If the borrower does not repudiate in t=l, he gets a new loan L. 
At the end of the second period he chooses between servicing the debt 
(interest and principal corresponding to Dj and L) or repudiating.
The repayment of the inherited debt and the supply of new loans
are intended to capture the idea of borrowers’ "good will" and 
lenders’ confidence in the borrowers’ behaviour i.e. a grasp of 
reputation without having to introduce valid but complicated issues.
3. Loans can only be used for purposes of additional consumption i.e. 
the borrower can consume more today only at the expense of having to 
repay in the future. This use of funds has a double effect on the 
borrower: it gives him an incentive to service the debt and to obtain 
a new loan but a disincentive for repayment in t=2.
4. Let A (the fraction of the borrower’s output that is forfeited in
period t (t=l,2) if he defaults) be a random variable which takes any
value in the continuum [0,1]. Let be the density function of a
*
and assume it is continuous and differentiable. Also, let a be the 
fraction of the borrower’s output loss which will make him indifferent 
between repaying and repudiating.
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5. There is symmetric information between borrowers and lenders 
concerning the value of .■! to be realised. The sequence of 
information and decisions is as follows: At t = l, ,-h (but not /U) is
revealed and the borrower decides whether to repay or repudiate. If 
he decides to repudiate, he bears the penalties and makes no further 
decision of repudiating or repaying. If the borrower repays in t=l, 
he still has the chance of repudiating in t = 2. Once again, is
revealed before he decides whether to repay or repudiate in t=2.
6. Income in both periods, Y^, is certain and after debt servicing 
(principal plus interest) is at least as great as the minimal 
consumption necessary for the survival of the representative borrower. 
This assumption ensures ability to pay.
7. Output is not storable, so current output can only be used for the 
purposes of consumption and servicing the debt. The abcsense of 
savings and investment from the model is purely for simplicity.
8. The lending interest rate on past and new loans is known but can 
differ across periods. Let r denote the lending interest rate 
charged in t=l,2.
9. The representative borrower maximises an additively separable 
utility function defined on consumption. This objective function is 
of the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) type:
In t=l, the borrower’s objective function is:
U = ui(Ci) + p Eu*(C£)
subject to his budget constraint (which depends on 
his decision to repay or repudiate) 
where £ = 1/(1 + p) is the discount factor, p is the rate of time 
preference and E is the expectation operator.
10. Lenders acquire deposits at a non-stochastic 
competitively-determined interest rate r. They are risk neutral and
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maximise expected discounted profits.
3. Competitive Market Equilibrium
3.1. Borrower Behaviour
The borrower’s opportunity set changes depending on what he 
decides in the first and second period. The borrower solves the 
following problem:
Max U = ui(Ci) + p  Eu2 (C 2) 
subject to:
If the borrower repudiates in t = l: C =Y (1-/1 ) t = 1,2.
If the borrower repays in t=l but repudiates in t=2:
Ci=Yi + L- (1 + ri)Di and Cfi=Y£(l-^s).
If the borrower always services his debts:
Ci=Yi+L-(l+ri)Di and C 2=Y2- (l + r2.(L + D2 )) 
where D 2=(l + r,i)D2
The borrower’s problem is solved backwards because what happens 
in t=2 is contingent on what he decides in t=l.
If the borrower repudiates in t=l, he will not face any 
repudiation-repayment decision in t=2. In this case, his expected 
utility is:
1
E U l i . < i *  s u i [ Y i ( l - ^ i ) ] + ^ i u 2 C Y 2 ( l - . U ) 3 g ( ^ ) d ^ 2  ( 1 )
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If the borrower services his debts in t=l, then he has to decide 
between repudiating or servicing his debts in t = 2. The borrower’s 
problem as viewed in t=l and conditional on debt servicing in t=l is:
u j C Y j d - J j n s U i J d i l i  ( 2 )Max E U •• = ui[Yi+L-(l+ri)Di]+P|t I ) S: I
L, 0
1
_ I
us[Y£-(l + r*)(L + D£)]g(/ffi)d.:U 
*
The first order conditions for this problem are:
1
u [Yi+L-(l+n)Dj]-£(l+rc) u' CYft-tl+r*) (L+Dft) 3gC^fi)d,^5.*o (3a)
1
_ I . _ * . * 1 /    * i
bju2 [ Yj( l-.^s) ]g ( A*) - I u 2 [ Y £-(1+ r 2 ) (L + D j) ] g (/i £) |=0 (3b)
L -J * J
Equation (3b) then implies:
* _
.42= (1 + r 2) (D2+L)/Y£ (4)
which is the debt service (including amortisation) output ratio. It
defines the level of punishment that exactly pays off debt
*
obligations. Then the borrower repudiates if and only if 4j<
The corresponding probability of repudiating in t=2 may then be 
*
written as P2=G(^z) where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function
of g(.). It can be easily checked that bP2/br2* b!P£/D£>0 and
bP2/b:Yg<o. That is, the higher the debt service (amortisation and 
interest) to output ratio, the higher the probability of repudiating. 
For a given output, it also captures the double channel (new loans and 
past debts) through which an increase in r$ affects interest debt 
burden and in consequence, repayment prospects. This sheds some light
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on one of the causes of the 1982 debt crisis i.e. higher real interest 
rates which increased the service payment substantially.
Equation (3a) gives us the familiar expression
u (C i) = $( 1 + r ?.) (l-Ps)E u { C n ■: *) |, U = bu i /'be 1, U = bu 2 / bC s (5)
i.e. the marginal utility from borrowing in t=l equals the 
discounted (by the rate of time preference) marginal utility from 
repayment in t=2.
From equations (1), (2) and U ) ,  we can readily note that in like
manner the borrower will be indifferent between repaying and
*
repudiating at the beginning of t = l if =[ (l + rijDi-L]/Yi which can
be interpreted as the net outflow-to-output ratio. As before, the
*
probability of repudiating in t = l may be written as G (.--Ii) - Once more, 
SPi/bri, bP i / bD i > 0 and bPi/bL, bPj/bY^O. Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in L may decrease the probability of repudiating in period 
t=l. This result is interesting because lenders might lend L=(l+ri)Di 
in t=l, avoid non repayment and have the hope of being repaid in full 
in the next period. This helps to understand the rationale for the 
'financing" debt strategy followed right after the debt crisis.
If the borrower has not repudiated in t = 1, his demand for loans
is found by solving implicitly for L from FOCs 
*
L = L (Y i, Y j, n ,  r*, Dif D£) (6)
Substitution of (6) into (2) gives the maximum expected value 
function
* , * *
EU h . p !  = u (L , r £; Yi, Y£, ri, Di, D £) (7)
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which by assumption is continuous and differentiable.
The expected isoutility contours derived from (7) are, in (L,r£)
*
space, monotonically increasing up to L and monotonically decreasing 
thereafter. This is readily shown by setting E U j - 5* equal to some
constant value and totally differentiating (2) holding Yi, Y£, Di, Dj. 
and ri constant.
dL
w (L + D5)(l-P^)Eju tCgJ j*) (8)
dr 1
“ {EU U *
H i
u (Ci)-p(1 + ra)(I-P5 ) E f u ' (C j
so dL 1
—  I >0,
dr* I —
"!u *
dL
dr
! dL
— ! = and --
* 1— dr 0H U  ^
<0 
lu *
jL <L 1L = L | L > L
Note that for any given L, the effect of changes in r %
EU
>
is unambiguously negative i.e. o£U
dr *
<0; but for any given
rj, the effect of changes in the level of loans is ambiguous i.e.
*
5EUI .>0 if L<L . Intuitively, a decrease in interest rates always
dL Mi>/h
benefits him; however, an increase in the volume of loans (over 
borrowing over lending) may hurt him because the disutility from 
servicing the debt in t=2 could more than offset the utility gained 
from having the loan in t=l.
Proposition 1
The borrower’s demand for loans in (L,r*) space will be downward 
sloping if he is sufficiently risk averse so as to outweigh the change 
in the probability of repudiating due to an increase in the lending
70
interest rate. That is,
* 3 -(l-Ps)/(l + r?.)
dL if , r
-< o A * >  -----------------------------------------
dP" (1-P£.) (D« + L)
where Ac is the absolute risk aversion coefficient corresponding
* _. * * 
to t = 2 and h =(d.^*/6rc)g(.^). 
r
The above proposition can be proved by differentiating (5) and 
taking into account equation (4).
A slight manipulation of the above condition shows that 
fulfilment of the second order conditions is both necessary and 
sufficient to yield a downward sloping demand for loans1"1.
We are now in position to sketch the borrower’s expected 
isoutility contours and the corresponding demand for loans where 
U 0<Ui<Uj. and also where the positive effect of a decrease in r* is 
bigger than an increase in the new amount borrowed capturing the 
influence of the inherited debt on the borrower’s optimum decision 
(figure 1).
3.2. Competitive Lenders
Lenders maximise the expected present discounted value of 
profits. Expected profits conditional upon what happened at date t=l 
are:
If borrowers repudiate in t = 1:
“Second order conditions are checked in the appendix.
Figure 1
Expected Isoutility Contours and Deaand for Loans
L
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(1+r)(Di+fDs) (9)
*<A
where f=l/(l+r) is the discount factor and L = 0. 
If borrowers service their debts in t=l":
= f{ (1-P?.) (l + r?.) (L+D*)-(l+r) (L + D ?.)} (10)
Because lending is a natural course of action only if borrowers repay 
in t = l, the option of analysing the case where borrowers service their 
debts in t=l needs no major justification.
Risk neutrality and perfect competition in the credit market 
imply zero expected profits
(1-P£)(1 + r 5)(L+Dj) * (1 + r )(L + Do) (11)
i.e. expected gross revenue of supplying the loan equals the cost 
which lenders have to face irrespective of the repayment-repudiating 
decision of the borrower.
Under perfect competition and free entry, if L>0 and 0<P2<1» then
r£.>r. The difference between r* and r may be interpreted as the
repudiation premium (r is equal to the safe interest rate in a perfect 
capital market) which compensates for the risk involved in lending’.
This follows directly from (11). Let s=r*-r, then s=(1+r)P % f (l-Pg). 
If P£=0 then s=0 but if P* tends to 1, then s tends to infinity. The 
repudiation premium (s) is positively related to the repudiation
'Under the assumption of perfect competition in the loan market,
_ * 
outgoings equal expected receipts, i.e. (1 + r ) Dj* (1 + r j.) D* [ 1-G ( a ) ].
’See Edwards (1986) who analyses the determinants of the spread by 
relating it to the probability of non repayment.
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probability and what is more important, it is endogenously determined 
depending on the behaviour of lenders and borrowers.
Solving (11) for L gives the implicit market supply for loans
L = L(ri, r*s, D £, Y*. r) (12)
and its shape in (L.rg) space is derived by differentiating the zero 
expected profit maximisation condition
dL
dr
k \ H i  =0
(1-P?) (L + D 9.)-(l + r«) (L + D S) ^
(1 -P 2) (l + r£)-(l + r£)(L+ D*)^ - (1 + r)
(13)
* _ *  * * _ * _  *
where /i = ( 6/i ?./it) g ( A ?.) and A - ( b h j b r *  ) g ( jU) 
L “ r
Proposition 2
The competitive supply curve for loans is increasing up to
r* = ( (1-P*)/.-•! ]-l and decreasing thereafter, 
r
Zero expected profits implies that in (13) the denominator is 
negative while the numerator is positive (negative) for low (high) 
levels of L respectively, hence dL
dr* I
E 
L > 0
*
>0. By continuity,
there must exist a value for r« equal to r£ such that
dL j =0.
dr? i i *
E T m  >/h=0
IL > 0
The interpretation of this proposition relies on the relation 
between expected profits and the repudiation probability, both 
depending on the levels of L and r*. Select a point (L ,r 2) on the 
Ef=o locus. If L is very small, the probability of repayment is high
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and the repudiation premium (s) very low. An increase in L, for given
r, implies negative expected profits since the probability of
repudiation increases. A rise in r* is required to offset this
increment in the lending risk. Obviously, a rise in r % has a negative
impact on the probability of repayment but the net effect is still
positive. Then, as L and r* increase, loans are still forthcoming.
However, changes in r* affect the repudiation probability through two
*
channels: the new loan and the old debt. Eventually, an r$ is
reached such that further increments in L and rj raise the repudiation
*
probability and yield negative expected profits. After this r^, 
additional r £ increments can only be implemented with cuts in L.
*
Note that in Proposition 2, r*>0 if 1-P£>,jl (i.e. the probability
r
of repayment outweighs the effect of a change in the probability of
repudiating caused by a small change in r-j).
Figure 2 depicts the implicit competitive market supply for
*
loans. As rj rises above rj., L should decrease in order to compensate
for expected losses due to the effect of the change of r£. in the
repayment probability. In other words, lenders will not extend
credits beyond L at any lending interest rate. A higher repudiation 
premium could only be achieved at the cost of less loans, but cannot 
be increased forever since it affects old debts and in consequence,
the repayment probability.
The effects of an increase in r-£ and L on the repudiation 
probability are always positive but their contribution will differ
depending on the amount of new loans and the interest service
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Figure 2
Expected Isoprofit Contour
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corresponding to past debts
_ — * _ * —
fePj ra _ (L + D ) 9 ( H ) r£ > L_ _(l + ra)q( .^ s) L if r2D2 > L
o r 2  P 2 "  Y 2  P 2 < S l  P 2  Y 2  P £  <
Remark
Having derived the ex ante market equilibrium, it is possible to 
argue that at the level of the individual competitive lender, the ex 
ante supply for loans is perfectly elastic at the market equilibrium 
lending interest rate. Since the probability of repudiation perceived 
by borrowers and lenders is the same, the lender takes also the 
repayment probability (which is determined by the market equilibrium) 
as given. The lender’s supply of loans is given by
r 2=[(1 + r)/(1-P 2 )]-l and dL/dr*5®.
3.3. Market Equilibrium
The market has n lenders and borrowers where n is large, finite 
and fixed. Borrowers are perceived as equally risky and also, they 
are indifferent from whom they borrow. In other words, there are no 
asymmetries. In addition, it is assumed that no binding agreements or 
commitments are possible.
In the conventional setting of perfect competition, the market 
demand is derived by asking an individual how much he will borrow at 
each prevailing interest rate, and then aggregating over all potential 
borrowers. The market supply is constructed in a similar way. 
Equilibrium is found by superimposing these two sides of the market. 
Uith uncertainty, it is no longer possible to analyse these two sides 
of the market separately because the optimal behaviour of the
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borrowers depends on what lenders do and vice versa. Therefore,
demand and supply must be considered simultaneously (Heffernan ,1986; 
Cuddington, 1985; Krugman,1985).
The Nash or competitive market outcome is given by the 
simultaneous solution of equations (4), (5) and (11). An equilibrium 
may fail to exist or we may face the possibility of having multiple 
equilibria. Nevertheless, we assume that one exists and that it is
. n n,
unique. We label it N=(L ,r-£).
However, assume that a new loan is forthcoming only if borrowers 
repay (l + rtJDj., and that the decision whether to repay or repudiate in 
t=l depends on the borrowers. In this sense, borrrowers behave as 
Stackelberg leaders i.e. they maximise present discounted value of 
utility on the assumption that lenders will accept it and take it as 
given in maximising their own present discounted value of expected 
profits. Formally,
i.e. borrowers find the best available combination of (L,r*) that 
satisfies the implicit market supply for loans which may be 
interpreted as the lenders’ optimal reply. The solution to (14) is 
given by the tangency of the expected isoutility contour and the 
market supply for loans
u'(Ci)-^(l + r £) (l-Ps) Eu (C£ | ■ -,*) (L + D£)[(l-P2)-(l + rS) ^ )  (15)
MaxEU *=Ui(Ci)+£'iPsE[u?.(Cs) !-s . ■.*] + (1-P5.)E[u s (C«) h  V i*]| U 4 )
1 ' 1 MftOft \a * > A *
s.t. (1-Ps) (1 + r 2) (L + D a M l  + r) (L + D 2) =0
*
(L + D-2 ) (l-Pi)Eu (C (l+rs)[(l-Ps)-(L+D£)i ]-(l+r)
and using equation (11),
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u'(Ci)-p(l+r£) (1 - P 2) E u '(C* | , j*) (L + D£)[(l-Pa) - U  + r£)3*] (15’ )
^(L + D £) (1-P£)Eu_'(CS | j j*) (1 + r2) (L + D £) A
n n
which is positive for low levels of L implying that L<L and r ^ r s .  We
q q
label this equilibrium Q=(L .rs). The Stackelberg and Nash equilibria 
are graphed in figure 3. Equation (15’) suggests that at the 
Stackelberg solution, the slope of the market supply for loans and the 
borrowers’ isoutility contour is positive. Moreover, being on the
demand schedule implies that the numerator of the LHS is equal to zero 
which does not satisfy the above equation. This reinforces the 
argument that at the Stackelberg solution, the borrowers are off their 
demand for loans.
Definit ion: An ex ante loan contract defined in (L ,r 2) is a
competitive (Nash) equilibrium if no participants can gain by
deviating unilaterally from it. This Nash loan contract will be a
constrained Pareto optimum if no agent’s welfare can be improved
without decreasing that of another.
The Nash credit market equilibrium (N) entails no credit 
rationing but it is not optimal. The equilibrium Q is a constrained 
optimum since applicants get a smaller loan than they desire at the 
quoted interest rate or it may be the case that some applicants are 
denied loans even though for the lenders, borrowers are identical. 
Risk averse borrowers choose the lowest possible r* for which L>0 when 
maximising present discounted value of expected utility because of the 
uncertain cost of repudiation and the effect of high interest rates on
q
the debt burden. Lenders can not ensure repayment and for a given r %
q d
they will offer a low level of L (L <L ), otherwise their E(?)<0 and
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Figure 3
Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria
L
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thus, no loan is supplied. Credit rationing occurs due to the 
uncertain repudiation penalty, risk averse borrowers and the non 
monotonicity of the expected supply of loans.
This inefficiency may be also interpreted as arising from 
externalities (Glick and Kharas, 1986). From the perspective of the 
country as a whole, the lending interest rate rises with the volume of 
loans and has a negative effect on the repudiation risk associated 
with the aggregate stock of debt. Individual borrowers may not take 
into account the rising part of the supply curve which leads to an 
equilibrium associated with excess borrowing from the social point of 
view. A policy measure leading to reduced borrowing could be welfare 
improving.
The situation just described can also be contrasted with the 
efficiency wage hypothesis where involuntary unemployment is due to 
high wages and the labour market does not clear because a cut in wages 
may harm productivity and in consequence, increase labour costs (Katz, 
1986; Yellen, 1984). In the case of the model presented, lenders are 
not constrained in pursuing their optimal policy. The loan market 
does not clear at Q but the borrowers’ welfare is improved at the cost 
of “involuntary" credit rationing.
q q
In sum, at Q=(L ,r*)> lenders will not overlend and borrowers 
will be credit rationed because borrowers maximise subject to the zero 
expected profit condition and lenders use all the information 
available to avoid loan contracts in which the debt might not be 
serviced. Therefore, although Q is characterised by credit rationing, 
it is efficient.
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The equilibrium Q resembles what Kletzer (1984) called a 
constrained optimum with observability of concurrent indebtedness and 
what Krugman (1985) labelled equilibrium lending interest rate. At 
first sight, the comparison between both studies is confusing since 
the former assumes asymmetric information while the latter does not. 
Nevertheless, both studies may be partially reconciled if Krugman’s 
information symmetry is interpreted not only as equal (borrower’s and 
lender’s) uncertainty about the repudiation penalty but also common 
knowledge about the concurrent indebtedness. Indeed, one of the 
conclusions that arises from his study is that the equilibrium lending 
interest rate is characterised by credit rationing, but he does not 
derive the market demand for loans. Kletzer divides lenders into two 
groups: those with, and those without, observability of concurrent
indebtedness. He concludes that "observability" entails credit 
rationing in the sense that lenders are able to restrict the quantity 
of loans supplied at any lending interest rate. Therefore, in both 
studies, it is possible to infer that "non-observability" will give 
rise to market equilibrium with no credit rationing and a higher 
interest rate than the “observability" case.
Kletzer constructs an infinite period horizon model where 
uncertainty comes from the state of nature and the repudiaton penalty 
is interpreted as credit cuts; while Krugman works out a finite 
two-period model with uncertain fixed repudiation penalty so the cost 
of repudiation brings the uncertainty element into his model.
The uncertain indirect repudiation penalty plays a crucial role 
in finite period horizon models by means of enforcing a loan contract.
Credit cuts have no such force. Indeed, if L < (1 + r *_) D i + £( l + rg) D2* the
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overall net transfer always goes in one direction, from debtors to 
creditors, making the credit cut penalty less effective.
In infinite horizon models, exclusion from the loan market per se
may not guarantee debt servicing. With discounting and assuming a 
decreasing returns to scale production function, as the country 
develops, its needs to finance investment will decrease and so its 
needs to access the credit market (Eaton et al., 1986). Also the 
direct exclusion penalty becomes ineffective if it is possible to
predict a point such that after it is reached, the country borrower 
does not gain anything from transferring funds to his creditors. In 
such cases, only when some "flow" uncertainties (e.g. temporary 
shocks, income variations, terms of trade changes, etc.) are included, 
the penalty of credit market exclusion really binds.
4. Bilateral Monopoly Market Equilibiriua
International sovereign debt has been frequently described as a 
game between international banks, governments and official 
institutions (Eaton et al., 1986; Griffith-Jones, 1986; Kettle and 
Magnus, 1986; Sachs, 1984, 1982).
Pure competition (atomistic lenders and atomistic borrowers) 
lacks strategic considerations making the game degenerate (Friedman, 
1983; Weintraub, 1975). To have an infinite horizon model, three sets 
of players (government borrowers, lenders and their governments) with 
the possibility of coalitions and an oligopolistic market structure 
sounds more realistic but unfortunately very complicated. We confined 
our analysis to a simple two player finite horizon framework in order
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to provide some basic insights concerning international sovereign 
debt.
Consider the problem of a single risk neutral lender in the 
international credit market who confronts a single risk averse 
borrower. In this bilateral monopoly context, the extent to which the 
(L, r*) contingent loan agreement is a bargain between the lender and 
the borrower suggests that elements of conflict might be used in the 
analysis.
As before, loans are used only for consumption purposes and the 
finite two period game is defined as follows. There are two players: 
lender and borrower. The lender’s strategy is to maximise expected 
present discount value of profits, while the borrower maximises 
utility defined on consumption pending on his decision to repay or 
repudiate. The payoff functions are:
If the borrower repudiates in t = l: ui = ui[Y j. (1-.^ . j_) ], ?i = -( l+r)Di-
If the borrower repays in t = l: u i =ui [ Y i +L-(1 + r j.) D i ], - (r i-r) Oi.
If the borrower repudiates in t = 2: u^^ujtY;^ I-/!*) 3 * z :l ~ - (1 + r ) D* .
If the borrower repays in t = 2: u^ = u ;*[Y*-( 1 + r*) (L+D*) ], (r^-r) (L+D*)
In addition, complete information (common knowledge) and perfect recall are 
also rules of the game.
Under the assumption of repayment in t=l, the lender’s present 
discounted value of expected profits as viewed in t=l is:
Evr t - (ri-r)Di + p[ (l-P*) (l + rg) (L + D ^ J - d  + r) (L + Djj) ] (16)
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Maximisation over rg or (L) yields the optimal rg (or L) which 
substituted in the above equation gives the maximum value of expected
profits, say T. The shape of the isoprofit contour is given by
CL_
cr*
*
(1 - P ? ) (L+D?)-(l+r) (L + D ?.) .-i v , .
" r > „ (17)
-  . *  -  <
Ef=f (1 - P £) - (1 + rg) (L + D 2) ,4 -(1 + r)
suggesting the existence of a maximum level of L which satisfies f. 
Across isoprofit contours, the locus connecting the (L,r*) points at 
which equation (17) equals zero is the lender’s optimal reply (it may 
be interpreted as his "supply1 of loans) and its slope is derived by 
differentiating it with respect to L and rj. 
dl - * (18) 
= -[-2,i /-,! (1 + r*)-,! )<0 
A] r Lr “ Ldr _ _
_ _ * 
where * - (5“^*/DLb r *)g («*)
Lr
As in the previous section, if the borrower repays in t=l his 
problem is described by equation (2), the shape of his isoutility 
contour by equation (7) and the slope of his optimal reply (i.e. 
demand for loans) is negative under the assumption of sufficient risk 
aversion.
The lender and borrower behaviour is depicted in figure 4. The 
lender prefers high r* and low L, while the borrower prefers low r^ 
and high L. Thes opposing interests give rise to conflicts between 
the two players and indeterminacy of the equilibrium.
4.1. A Dominant Lender
The lender would like to move NW direction as far as he can.
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Figure 4
Lender and Borrower Optiaal Replies
L
r,X
L
Lender Borrower
86
Given the demand for loans (i.e. maximum level of utility at each 
quoted interest rate), the best (L ,r 2 ) the lender can achieve is 
determined by the tangency of the corresponding isoprofit curve with 
the demand for loans. Formally, the lender
MaxEf = (r t-r)D j + t (l-P?.) (1 + r*) (L + D?.)-(l + r) (L + Ds)
h > A
s.t. u'(Ci)=i?(l + r£)(l-Pa)Eu‘(Cft
h > i V
The solution is
(19)
( 1 - P s M  (L + Ds) (l--y)A* (D9.+L)[(l-P9.)-.^ (1 + r V ) ] 
r
(20)
- (1 + r 3) {(1 - P 9 ) A i_ - ^ (1 - 7 A 2 )) (l + r s)[(l-P£)-^ (Ds+L)]-(l + r)
*
where 7= (l + rg) (I-P9)/.•■! , and Ai and A 5 are the absolute risk aversion 
coeficients in t=l and t=2 respectively. The sign of the LHS of the 
above equation is negative, suggesting that the lender must be 
operating at high levels of rc (i.e. in the negative slope part of the 
isoprofit contour).
The loan contract (M) described by the above solution is not efficient 
because r* is too high and L is too low. The lender forces the 
borrower to pick a low level of L since he imposes a high r*.
4.2. A Dominant Borrower
The borrower seeks to achieve the lowest isoutility contour, so 
he wishes to move as far as he can in a S.E. direction. The lender’s 
optimal reply solves for the maximum levels of profits at any given L. 
The best (Ljr^) combination the borrower can get is determined by the 
tangency of his isoutility locus with the lender’s optimal reply. The 
borrower solves:
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P : E U : ( C ) + ( 1 ~ P V, ) E U y. [ C 5.
,u>
s.t. (1-P*) (L + D O - ( l  + r O  {L + D ^ ) A  =0
r
so
u (C 1 ) -f (1 + P -:) (1 + r ;:)Eu ( C v
(L + D;) (l-P;:)Eu (C£ ! ■ *)
* * 
(1 + r ^ ) + .
Lr
(2 1 )
(22)
The sign of the RHS of the above equation is negative and suggests 
that the borrower must be operating at high levels of L (i.e. negative 
slope part of the isoutility contour).
The dominant borrower market solution (B) is not efficient. The 
borrower selects a high level of L and the lender is pushed to charge 
a low level of r?. The best a very powerful borrower can do is to 
drive the lender to accept zero expected profits.
4.3. Bargaining
The situation just described contains elements of conflict and 
the final equilibrium will depend on the bargaining strength of the 
two parties involved. Before analysing some ways of obtaining the 
possible bargaining solution, we characterise the Nash solution.
From proposition 1 and equation (18), the optimal replies of the 
borrower and the lender slopes downwards. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium is that the optimal 
replies intersect at least once in the (L , r ^ ) positive quadrant. Note 
that in deriving the optimal replies we have assumed that the lender 
sets rj and the borrower sets L. The equilibrium is stable if the
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lender’s optimal reply is flatter than the borrower’s. This is 
guaranteed by the fulfilment of the borrower’s second order
conditions . The Nash equilibrium satisfies 5 ( E U K  -,*)/£l=0 and
*1 ’ 1 
*
iKEFj-, ^ -=*) /fer£ = CI simultaneously, and it is depicted as N in figure 5.
The Pareto negotiation locus (contract curve) is given by the
equality of the slope of the lender’s isoprofit curves and the slope
of the borrower’s isoutility curves:
_ *
-(l-Po) (1 + r 2 ) + (1 + rg) (L + D £ M l
(1-Pd (L + D d - d  + r?) (L + D * d  
~ r
u [ Y i - d  + r d D i + U - d l  + r d  (1-PdEu ( C ^ U  ,*) (23)
i ~_____ ~ ' _____  £ H s H  2
d L  + D d  (1 -P v.) u [ Y*- (1+rd (L + D d )
It slopes downwards in (L,rd space and lies to the left of the 
lender’s optimal reply". Notice that as a result of the 
externalities, the Nash solution is not a member of the contract curve 
i.e. such equilibrium does not belong to the efficient bargaining set. 
Moreover, the efficiency curve lies below the demand for loans because 
(23) holds only for positive slope values of the isoutility and 
isoprofit contours.
To construct the bargaining set, define the set H as the 
collection of all feasible cooperative outcomes. Assume that the two 
players may achieve any payoff (u,f) within the payoff space H of the 
game if they can reach an agreement. The players are free to use any
"See appendix where stability is also discussed. 
"See appendix.
Figure 5
A Doainant Lender, a Doainant Borrower and the Nash Equilibriua
N :Nash equilibrium
M rDominant lender
B :Dominant borrower
CC’:Contract curve
L
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randomised strategies which makes H a convex set and assume that H is 
compact.
Define the status quo (or autarky) point q=(u ) as the pay off
o o
each player will receive if they fail to achieve an agreement or more 
accurate, as a situation where none of the players can take unilateral 
actions to hurt the other". Assume that q is independent or regarded 
as given i.e. q is fixed. In more general bargaining models, q is 
treated as a dependent variable and it is computed with the final 
bargaining equilibrium outcome because the player’s choice of a 
disagreement action is guided by the effect of that action on the 
final cooperative outcome.
Ue graph the P payoff space and the set H in figure 6. Any point 
x f P such that x>q belongs to the negotiation curve. Let f be the 
minimal expectation or conflict point, then the efficient negotiation 
curve must be restricted to payoffs of at least utility or profit 
increments if bargaining happens. Thus CC may be termed the 
efficient bargaining or negotiation locus.
There is a range of possible bargaining equilibrium points that 
might be achieved by the borrower and the lender and its choice 
remains to be explained. Although the static axiomatic approach 
(originated by Nash) has been criticised among others by Binmore et 
al. (1985), it constitutes a good starting point when dealing with
"'It is possible to distinguish between the status quo and the 
conflict point. The usual meaning of status quo is the existing 
states of affairs but should be interpreted as a common point of 
reference to which the way of resolving the conflict is compared to. 
The choice of q may be regarded as a matter of modelling judgement 
(Gupta and Livne, 1986; Friedman, 1986; Binmore et al., 1985).
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cooperative outcomes.
4.3.1. The Nash (Fixed Threat) Bargaining Solution
The Nash solution"" is an element of H that maximises the product 
of the players’ gains from an agreement (figure 7)
Max E[G]=E[u(.)-u_] [?(.)-*_] (26)
and is represented by i.e. the tangency point between the upper
boundary CC and the hyperbola described by E[u(.)-u_] [~(.)-s ].
u 0
In the Nash bargaining game, the status quo point (q) has the key 
role of being the reference point to obtain the Nash solution, 
narrowing the sets of alternatives taken under consideration. In 
addition, the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
implies a priori exclusion of potential agreements from the payoff 
space since under such postulate, these payoffs would not be chosen by
""The solution must satisfy the following conditions:
1. It must be individually rational (i.e. each player must achieve at 
least the payoff he will get in case of no agreement) and Pareto 
optimal.
2. Symmetry and invariance to any positive affine transformation. The 
solution should be independent of the labelling of the players and 
independent of the scale chosen to represent the preference of each 
player.
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. Suppose that a solution
to H is found. Assume that another set H exists and that H and H
are related in the following way: they have the same status quo
(q=q ). H is contained in H and that the solution of H is an
attainable point in H. The condition of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives requires that the solution to H be the solution to H 
because q=q and HCH .
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Figure 7
The Nash (Fixed Threat) Bargaining Solution
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Figure 8
The Raiffa-HCalai-Saorodinsky Bargaining Solution
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the players (Friedman, 1986; Binmore et al., 1985).
4.3.2. The Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (RKS) Bargaining Solution
The Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is an alternative approach 
to that of Nash and takes into consideration two reference points to 
obtain the bargaining solution. It assumes that each player would 
like to have the largest payoffs available which are consistent with 
individual rationality. However, these ideal payoffs are not 
obtainable simultaneously but constitute the ideal reference point (or 
point of maximal expectations) and is located above the Pareto 
negotiation locus. The other reference point (which is assumed to be 
fixed) is given by the status quo position.
The RKS solution"" involves settling at the largest attainable
payoffs between the status quo and the ideal reference point, being
the solution proportional to such points and located on the efficient
negotiation locus (figure 8). Let R=(R ,R ) be such a solution which
I u
satisfies
"“Besides the condition of symmetry and invariance to positive affine 
transformations, the RKS solution satisfies:
1. Strong Pareto optimality i.e. there is no other alternative that 
can give more to one of the players without having to give less to one 
of them.
2. Ilonotonicity. For two different games, say A and B, with the same 
status quo and where the Pareto set of game A is included in B, if the 
maximum payoff to player 1 is the same in both games but the maximum 
payoff to player 2 in game B is larger than (or at least as large as) 
the maximum payoff he gets in game A, then the solution payoff for 
player 2 in game B should be larger than (or at least as large as) 
what he obtains in the solution of game A.
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u (R )-u if u(V -u )= u ( t )-u
U 0 u
(25)
U 0 U 0 0
(•yj 0
j(V - J  ) = J ( 7  )-T
J O  ' J0 0
and V=(V,V )> R= (R ,R ) 
u f u
then, VgH
In other words, the amount each player will receive is above his 
status quo payoff and it is proportional to his ideal payoff with the
attached to (25) guarantees that the solution would lie on the 
efficient bargaining locus.
Contrasting the Nash and the RKS solutions, the former states 
when a change in the game has no effect on the bargaining solution, 
while the latter tells us when a change benefits a particular player. 
Both solutions belong to the static axiomatic approach. They describe 
an actual bargaining equilibrium or solution but do not show how this 
equilibirum is actually reached. This shortcoming is reflected in the 
absence of an explicit bargaining procedure and the abstraction of the 
environment in which it operates (Binmore et.al, 1985). For example, 
delays in reaching agreements may be costly for the borrower and/or 
the lender and thus, influence the final agreement.
5. Applications
5.1. Increase in the Cost of Funds
proportionality held constant for both players. The condition
In the early 1970s the real lending interest rate was not only 
low but negative. This borrowers’ paradise changed in the late 1970s
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when real interest rates were not only positive but high (Dornbusch 
1985, 1984). If we add oil shocks, global recession and policy 
mismanagement, then we have the scenario of the 1982 debt crisis. We
can capture the effects of an increase in the cost of funds (r) on the 
level of loans (L) and the lending interest rate (rj).
In the competitive case, comparative statics applied to equations
(3a), (3b) and (11) yields dL , dr?.4 In the perfectly
— < 0 — -> 0
dr dr
competitive market the supply for loans shifts back and the demand for 
loans stays put. The contract curve shifts to the left reflecting 
lower levels of (L,ro) due to the increase in the endogenous
repudiation probability. The effect of an increase in r is similar to
a tax imposed on the supply side which can be decomposed into &rL and
£rD-£. For every lender, the former increases the marginal cost curve 
while the latter raises the average cost. The market supply contracts 
and the quantity of loans demanded decreases to offset the effects of 
the high debt service.
In the bilateral monopoly market, the effects of a change in r 
are analogous to a tax on expected profits because Di and D* were 
agreed in the past, the borrower sets (for any given rg) L optimally 
and the lender’s optimal reply describes (for any given L) the maximum 
price of loan that could be charged. The lender’s and the borrower’s 
optimal replies do not change, the position of the contract curve is 
not modified but shrinks because the lender’s isoprofit curves are 
"rescaled" upwards. If the feasible payoff set is contained in the
"'See appendix for details.
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original one, the solution to the larger set available in the smaller 
one and the status quo point is unchanged, then the Nash bargaining 
solution is the same However, the RKS outcome is different. The
maximal expectation or ideal point tilts in favour of the borrower, 
hence his solution payoff should be increased while the lender’s 
payoff solution should be decreased.
5.2. Debt Restructuring
We can not explain debt restructuring in our wi11ingness-to-pay 
model unless some other assumptions are included in the model. On the 
one hand, it is obvious that if income after debt repayment is larger 
than (or at least equal to) the country’s minimum consumption level, 
lenders will not accept a breach of the original contract. On the 
other hand, the inclusion of income uncertainty as an additional
assumption is not enough to explain debt restructuring. An ex ante
loan contract considering the probability of different states of
nature precludes debt restructuring from the outset.
In the context of our model, debt restructuring is an ex post
action and can be motivated by assuming not only income uncertainty 
but that the realisation of income differs from what borrowers and 
lenders expected, so income (net of minimum consumption) is less than 
the amount due.
In line with our model and to avoid extending it to a larger time 
horizon, assume that the borrower has been honouring debts and
receiving new loans so the "inherited" debt in t=l is the portion of
debt due corresponding to his own past loans. At time t=l, income
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turns out to be less than what was expected, say equal to the minimum 
consumption and the borrower can not service the debt. If the 
borrower does not repudiate, the lender either calls a default and 
punishes the borrower or starts the round of negotiations to 
restructure the debt.
It is evident that repudiation or a default declaration will not 
be pursued if there are other arrangements available. From the 
viewpoint of the borrower, repudiating or being declared in default 
leads to the same punishment. From the viewpoint of the lender, 
declaring the borrower in default or allowing repudiation yields the 
same cost.
There are two main ways of restructuring debt:
a) the lender refinances arrears either by extending a 'new" loan 
(equal to the amount not serviced) which in turn, has to be used by
the borrower to clear the arrears or simply, the arrears are rolled
over under the terms of the original agreement;
b) the lender agrees to reschedule the arrears and in doing so, 
changes the contractual terms of payments (maturity, grace period, 
interest rate, etc) and extends a "new" loan which may or may not be 
used to repay the part of the debt consolidated.
Lenders can avoid an immediate default by "involuntarily" 
advancing a loan to cover the portion due and also maintain the loan 
as a performing asset by retaining the chance of being repaid in t=2. 
The borrowers are better off because the penalties are not imposed and
the repudiation decision is postponed to the last period.
In this modified setting, if the borrowers repudiate in t=l the
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lenders will lose -(1 + r) (Di.+fD?.) = £. Lenders by advancing L=(l + n ) D ^
if £(L+D£)[(1+rc)(l-Pg)-(1+r)]>t can not be worse off than in the case 
of repudiation if (1 — Pj)>0 and the "involuntary" loan is less than the
total amount owed by the country. From the point of view of the
borrowers, Pi=0, net transfers are zero in t=l but they have to repay
(l + r-^ ) (L + D^) in t = 2 and their problem is similar to the one described
by equation (2).
This "debt roll over" scheme postpones repayment but does not
guarantee repayment. Borrowers are put into deeper debt in t=2 and if
expected income is not high enough, the probability of debt
repudiation increases"". If income is only influenced by the state of
nature (say by a multiplicative shift parameter 8 independently
distributed of 1 for all t), then the option of benefitting from good 
t
fortune underlies the rationale for debt postponement.
Debt rescheduling is also a way of postponing repayment leading 
to debt accumulation over time if the borrower is not given enough 
time and resources to earn the required foreign exchange and repay the 
debt. In our setting, the lack of relation between income generated 
and loans restricts the analysis of debt rescheduling. Assume that 
the realisation of depends not only on the state of nature but also 
on Li and that 5Yg/5Li>0. The borrower’s and the lender’s decision 
problem remain the same except that in the event of a bad state of 
nature, the lender has an incentive to provide fresh loans. The 
possibility of deciding upon the levels of L and r in t=l brings in
"^This is consistent with Lindert and Morton (1989) where extra 
lending does not remove repudiation incentives but raises it.
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the bargaining aspects.
Let t* be the locus showing the maximum losses of the lender in 
the case of no rescheduling and w* be the locus showing the borrower’s 
maximum benefits in case of repudiation (figure 9). Any point between 
both loci improves the welfare of any of the parties. This situation 
is basically the same as in the bilateral-monopoly-willingness-to-pay 
case and the selection of the final outcome may be analysed in similar 
fashion.
The shortcomings of the static axiomatic approach may be 
illustrated with the Nicaraguan 1980 debt rescheduling where timing 
and the political environment played an important role. The
Nicaraguan debt is relatively small compared to other Latin American 
countries. Creditors (and their governments) were more afraid that 
Nicaragua might move to the East sphere rather than repudiating, so 
they decided not to insist on the agreement to an IMF adjustment 
programme to start the round of negotiations. Nicaragua’s decision of 
not to repudiate may be explained by its favourable bargaining 
position and its perception of unbearably high costs if sanctions were 
applied.
The Nicaraguan rescheduling agreement of December 1980 involved very 
soft conditions i.e. interest rate capping, a very large proportion of 
arrears was rescheduled and the maturity structure of most of the 
amortisations were lengthened between nine to twelve years (Plan, 
1985; Milivojevic, 1985). This experience suggests that economic and 
political considerations might affect the status quo point and more 
insights would be gained by modelling debt restructuring in the manner 
of Binmore et al.(1985).
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Figure 9
Debt Restructuring
L
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The main debt strategy adopted so far is one of debt postponment 
where “new" lending is undertaken by commercial banks to refinance the 
portion of interest due. However, as we will see in chapter 5, it has 
not been succesful in improving LACs’ creditworthiness. Krugman
(1988) points out that the potential repayment of the country is not 
independent of its debt burden. Indeed, a country borrower might be 
discouraged from doing well if most of the benefits of improved 
economic performance are likely to go to foreign creditors.
6. Conclusions
The notion of sovereign risk relies on the absence of collateral 
and the non-existence of any explicit legal mechanism for deterring a 
government borrower from repudiating its external debts. In our
model, creditors have to make credible the threat that a borrower who 
repudiates debt obligations will be punished. The sanctions imposed 
are twofold, those directly implied by the lenders’ credit cut and an 
"autarky" sanction which can only be implemented by the government of 
the lenders’ countries of origin.
Assuming a “wi11ingness-to-pay" setting, the competitive market 
equilibrium is inefficient as a consequence of the non monotonicity of 
the supply of loans which arises from the own nature of sovereign risk 
and the endogenous probability of repudiation. We arrived at this 
result by assuming risk averse borrowers and risk neutral lenders. 
With specific forms of utility functions, the endogenous repudiation 
probability will depend not only on the debt-to-output ratio but also 
on the degree of risk aversion of the borrowers. The Stackelberg 
(i.e. constrained Pareto) solution responds to the debtors’ preference
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for low levels of lending interest rates (because it affects past and 
new loans) so as to reduce the probability of repudiation and avoid 
the penalty of not repaying.
Moral hazard, adverse selection and imperfect information have, 
of course, distorting consequences in the credit market. However they 
should be interpreted as extra complications that add to the already 
existing inefficiencies caused by the nature of the sovereign loan 
contract.
The introduction of the bilateral monopoly framework helps to 
illustrate the nature of the conflict in the credit market, bring in 
some bargaining aspects and provide some insights into debt 
restructuring.
The rationale for debt restructuring does not lie strictly on the 
distinction between illiquidity and insolvency because the net worth 
position of a country can not be calculated; but rather on the fact 
that neither repudiation nor default is optimal if the decision to 
take such an action can be postponed (Krugman, 1988, 1985; Plan, 1985; 
Heffernan, 1985). Otherwise, a deadweight loss for society will 
occur. The lender retains the prospects of being repaid at some stage 
and borrowers do not bear the penalties, yet have the option of 
repudiating in the future.
Although refinancing and rescheduling convey debt accumulation if 
repayments are not resumed soon, rescheduling has the attractive 
feature of flexibility (changes in interest rate, maturity, grace 
period, etc.) giving the chance of affecting repayment prospects, 
adapting them to the economic environment and minimising society
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losses. As we discussed earlier, successful rescheduling might 
involve a positive net transfer from the lender so as to increase 
potential output and the prospects of repayment.
However, continuous debt restructuring is not sustainable because 
it allows for the possibility of dishonest behaviour and decreases the 
credibility of the non repayment penalty. Can this be avoided? Since 
debt restructuring is an ex post action, it is not quite right to 
include the posssibility of debt restructuring in the design of the 
original ex ante optimal loan contract. Genotte (1986) suggested the 
design of contracts which are "ex post optimal" i.e. a contract to 
which lenders and borrowers adhere in any state of nature. Of course, 
it is not possible to design contingent contracts taking into account 
all possible states of nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
include contingent clauses which consider movements of key variables 
that might impair debt repayment and are not under the control of the 
borrower. There have been some steps forward in that direction. For 
example, the 1986 Mexican debt restructuring package links future 
rescheduling with sudden changes in the price of oil1".
""This rescheduling package protects Mexico against sudden external 
shocks through the provision of an automatic additional financing if 
the price of oil drops below $9 dollars per barrel. For more details, 
see the "terms sheet" or creditors’ agreement corresponding to 18 
October 1986.
105
APPENDIX
1. Borrower Behaviour: Second Order Conditions and Proposition 1
*
4 t;
Recall that ? % - gUs)d(/U), Ci=Yi+L- (1 + r i )Di if 4i>4j., and
C^=Y«-(1 + ro)CL + D^) if ^ ^ 2- Second order conditions1" evaluated at 
the point satisfying first order conditions are:
5 s E U
/ i t  M l = - p Y  u  [  Y  ^  ( 1  ~  2 )  3  9  ( ---i 2  ^  ^  0
542
S£eu |,
U ) h  = u" ( C O  + p d  + rs) U  u _ (C^) + (1 + r g) (1-P*)u‘ (Cs) >
£l =
1 <- 2
Ci 2
U A  2
rEu:;.)4 - 
a.1
2 ^ L J h > h
DL O t  2
>0
(1)
(2 )
(3)
Equation (2) can be written as
u M(C]) + m  + r £U  u (Cj) {1 + [ (1 + r 2) (l-Pj)/4 ]u'(C^)}
1 L 2 L £
*
or u" (C t ) + p( 1 + rv.) 4 u (C5.) {1 - >A5.>
1 " ’ “ L * “
(2a)
(2b)
where -I = ( O a * / OL) g (4 2)> ■'>'= (1 + r O  (1-P*) / -I , u" =Ci'U|/oC|:, u" =£“U*/dC£,
I I i £
and A 2=-u*(C 2)/u (C 2)
2 2
Then,
h^FU I * . *
1--- 1 4 t} 4 i <0 if 1 - yA2 <0 or A2H  / (1 + r 2) (1 -P 2) >°
- L
DL"
"'SOCs are sufficient for concavity of the value function. For strict 
concavity, the differential of the SOCs must be taken into 
consideration.
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i.e. the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in t=2 has to be 
greater than the ratio that captures the variation in the repayment 
probability due to changes in the amount borrowed. As the probability 
of repayment increases (decreases), the higher (smaller) needs to be 
the absolute risk aversion coefficient in order to avoid repudiation.
A more general condition may be obtained by slight manipulation
of equation (2),
* *
Ai-[3 /(1-Ps)]+(l+r2)A2>0 or Ai+(1 + r*)A* > I  ! (1-Pg)>0
where Ai and A* are the absolute risk aversion coefficients
*
corresponding to t = 1, 2 respect ively. Since •!i/(l-P*} is positive, 
risk aversion in both periods suffices to fulfil second order 
condit ions.
The slope of the borrower’s demand for loans is derived by 
differentiating FOCs with respect to L and r*,
dL
dr
- Bu (C*) {(1-P*) [1 + (L + D«) (l + r*)A*]-(l + r * M  ! (4)
u; ( C d  + m  + r d U  u j c £) + (l + r2)(l-P£)u"(C£)} j
u i: jj _i
* _ * _ *
where j. = { b j * / b r o )  g(/U) 
r
If SOCs are fulfiled, the denominator and numerator are negative.
Note that a negative numerator implies
A2> [ ^  / (1 + r £) (1 -P 2=) ]-[ 1 / (L + Dj) (1 + r £) ] >0 which is guaranteed by the 
SOCs.
2. Bilateral Monopoly: Stability and the Contract Curve
For the analysis of the stability of the Nash equilibrium, recall
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that the lender sets ra and the borrower sets L. The lender’s and 
borrower’s optimal reply are downward sloping. For stability of the 
Nash equilibrium, the lender’s optimal reply must be flatter than the
borrower’s. Comparing both slopes in absolute values, stability
requires not only A d O  but Aj_> 1 / (L + Dg). Intuitively, stability can be
analysed by beginning with a pair (L,ra) such that L>Ln and rg<r*
where (L , r a) is the Nash equilibrium solution. Convergence requires 
that the first movement be an L decrease and this is obtained only if 
the borrower’s optimal reply lies below the lender’s optimal reply.
Notice the important role played by the borrower’s risk aversion
coeff icients.
The equation of the contract curve has the same specification as 
the one derived for the competitive market, that is 
_ *
-(l-P£) + Cl + rs)(L + D £)A t +(1 + r ) _ u ’(Ci)+p(1 + r «)(1-P&)u'(Cj) (5)
II  ^ * -1 _ “
( L + D a ) C ( l - P a M i + r j d  ] £(l +d s )(i-P£)u '(C£)
r £
*   *
where Ci=Yt+L-(l + r if . d > d  and Ca=Ya- (1 + r a) (L + Da) if
slope in (L, rj) is negative. Given that the lender’s optimal reply
is flatter than the borrower’s optimal reply, the contract curve locus
lies to their left.
3. Comparative Statics
The effects of a change in r in the competitive market 
equilibrium can be found by recalling
1
u [ Y i +L- (1 + r 1 ) D i ]-£(l + r?.) u [Ya-d+ra) (L+Da]g(^2 )d:la=o 
* ^
(6)
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1
(1 + r }) (L + D;-]g( ; ) d,4' -(1 + r ) (L+Do) = 0 (8 )
Obtain a two equation system by substituting (7) into (6) and (8),
defining C : = Y j_ + L- (1 + r ^ ) D : and C2=Y2-(l+r2)(L+D2) and differentiating
with respect to L,r2 and r:
JdL + Wdr 2 = 0 (9)
QdL+2dr2=(L+D2)dr (10)
*
where u M (C j.) + p (1 + r 2 ) -^ u (C 2 ) [ 1 - )A 2 1 = J
- p u [ ( C 2) C (1 -P 2) (1 + ( L + D-2) (1 + r 2 ) A 2) ]=W
*
(1-P2)-(1 + r 2 )(L + D2) I -(1+r)=Q
*
(1-P2) (L + D O - d + r ^ )  (L + D 2 ) ] =2
r
and J<0, W<0, Q<0 (Q>0) and Z>0 (Z<0) for low (high) levels of L and 
r 2-
From equations (9) and (10) and using Cramer’s Rule,
dL W(L + 0 O  dr-- J(L+D*)_  = ------- < o and — =. = ----- =l_ >0 .
dr JZ-WQ dr JZ-WQ
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Chapter 3 
The Determinants of Debt Arrears:
An Empirical Study for Latin American Countries
1. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, debt service has been one of the main 
concerns of banks, governments and international institutions. 
Empirical studies of repayment problems have concentrated basically in 
two areas:
-Assessment of the causes of debt repayment difficulties with the aim 
of providing an early warning model".
-Analysis of the determinants of the spread (on Libor or U.S. Prime 
Rate) with the objective of exploring the lenders’ response to 
borrowers’ creditworthiness indicators".
Early studies chose independent variables on the grounds of 
"theoretical common sense", and then narrowed them down with the aid 
of statistical and econometric techniques. In the words of Heffernan 
(1985, p.390): "...this approach puts the cart before the horse: the
literature continues to lack a thorough analysis of the determinants 
of supply and demand for foreign loans."
Recently, efforts in not only searching for statistical 
relationships but providing behavioural underpinnings have been made,
i
"For a study addressing early warning of debt rescheduling, see 
Schmidt (1984).
“See Dewhirst (1986), Edwards (1986,1983), Burton and Inoue (1985), 
Feder and Ross (1982) among others.
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either by justifying the chosen variables from the borrower’s 
constraint or by specifying the borrower’s demand for loans and the 
lender’s supply of loans.
Within that context, not only has the definition of the dependent 
variable been modified (from probability of rescheduling to 
probability of arrears or non-repayment) but the underlying
econometric framework applied has been evolving. Early studies apply 
discriminant, principal components, probit and logit techniques. More 
recent studies attempt to incorporate explicitly the notion of market 
disequilibrium, first applied to sovereign loans by Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981).
The idea underlying the application of disequilibrium to the 
analysis of international sovereign debt lies in the relation between 
repayment, arrears, effective and notional demand and the supply of 
loans. A country can let debt obligations fall into arrears without 
any active action being taken because lenders consider that the
repayment problem is "acceptable" or not severe. On the other hand, 
the requirement of an IMF support loan programme and/or rescheduling
indicates that arrears are binding, hence action by the lenders and
borrowers is needed to attempt to solve the impasse. Both cases 
reflect excess demand in the credit market differing, in this sense, 
only in degree i.e. a "moderate* and "large" level of excess demand 
respectively. Thus, arrears are related to the concept of "effective" 
demand since borrowers are supply constrained, while situations of 
full repayment are linked to the concept of "notional" demand.
The term and nature of the disequilibrium merit some 
clarification. To characterise a situation of arrears as one of
Ill
disequilibrium may be confusing. If there is an excess demand for 
loans, lending interest rates should increase to clear the credit 
market. However, lending interest rates may fail to adjust because of 
the negative effects on the probability of repayment". The concept of 
"non-Walrasian"" equilibrium is a better description than 
disequilibrium because it incorporates the idea that lenders do not 
raise lending rates because it is rational for them not to do so and 
not because of any price stickiness or adjustment cost. Therefore, it 
is quantity rationing rather than price fixity which is of concern. 
Under this view, we follow Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), McFadden et al 
(1985) and Hajivassi1iou (1987) and prefer to let the agents bargain 
over the level of loans and treat the lending rate as exogenous 
(determined by the LIBOR or US Prime Rate and an "institutional"
spread).
Modelling the levels of spreads charged to borrowers focuses 
solely on the supply side and therefore assumes either continuous
excess demand or market clearing. The main objective is to show how
much lenders differentiate borrowers on the basis of the determinants 
of country risk which in turn is presumed to be reflected in the 
spread charged. Empirical studies do not report a very significant 
relation between spreads and the usual economic determinants of 
country risk”.
'This issue has been explored in the theoretical chapter where the 
probability of non repayment depends negatively on the lending
interest rate. Market imperfections (imperfect information, moral 
hazard, etc.) corroborate it. On related issues see Clemenz (1986) 
and Glick and Kharas (1986) among others.
4See Hahn (1978).
“See for example Dewhirst (1986), Edwards (1983) and Feder and Just 
(1977).
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Country risk has a broader meaning than sovereign risk*. In
spite of that, academics have treated them as equivalent on the basis
of the impossibility of quantifying and/or attaching probabilities to 
unmeasurable events. However, there is consensus that political 
aspects influence the decision to borrow in the international markets. 
The few researchers who have included political variables in their 
models found that either they did not perform well (eg. Burton and 
Inoue, 19S5) or that most of the economic variables tested were not 
significant (eg. Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987).
This chapter reviews empirical work carried out by different 
researchers in their attempts to assess the determinants of debt
servicing problems. Instead of merely surveying their models, we
prefer rather to highlight some of their results and comment on them
by re-estimating some of their regressions for LACs. The reasons for 
doing so are twofold. On the one hand, their results are not strictly 
comparable because of the different samples involved. On the other 
hand, by reviewing models with low prediction errors and highly
significant explanatory variables, we hope to trace variables that
might be included in our own model and identify the problems
associated with their econometric estimation.
The Latin American countries (as defined by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America) included in our study are Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the outset of the
"For a discussion on the definition and application of both concepts 
see Heffernan (1986) and Nagy (1979).
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1982 debt crisis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela were 
the major borrowers in the region. In terms of debt and debt-service 
ratios, not only these countries but also Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay were among the most highly indebted 
countries.
Throughout the re-estimations, unless otherwise stated, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 
1 in the year where the borrower country encountered debt repayment 
problems and 0 otherwise. We constructed three different dependent 
variables according to how repayment problem was defined:
a) arrl is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the year of 
signature of a rescheduling with commercial banks and/or official 
creditors, and 0 otherwise;
b) arr2 is also based on the year of a rescheduling signature but the 
year is modified if arrears happened before their signatures. That 
is, it takes into consideration the year that precipitated a
rescheduling;
c) arr3 is defined as arr2 but, in addition, includes Stand-by higher
tranches and Extendend Fund Facility loans. The former allows the IMF
member country to borrow much more than 25 percent of its quota (first 
tranche) subject to agreement on a stabilisation programme. Both
types of credit are primarily given to ease balance of payments 
problems and as from early 1970, IMF conditionality has been seen as 
an assurance that the member country would carry out a stabilisation 
programme that would enable it to repay its foreign debts*. This is 
our preferred dependent variable because it captures the refinements 
proposed by Saini and Bates (1984) and Feder et al.(1981).
‘See Pastor (1987).
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The time period chosen for this study is 1971-86. The starting 
year corresponds to the systematic account of debt indicators by the 
World Bank. The final year is associated with the increasing 
popularity of debt conversion schemes although the secondary market in 
traded debt was still very limited. This alternative way of dealing 
with the debt problem reflects past unsuccessful rescheduling 
agreements and the increasing perception that full repayment is 
unlikely.
We start our survey by reviewing Schmidt (1984) who explored the 
capability of different statistical methods in signalling rescheduling 
problems. We also present the basic logit model tested by McFadden et 
al (1985) and Citron and Nickelsburg (1987). We do so because they 
included an alternative definition of the dependent variable and/or an 
interesting selection of regressors. Section 3 looks at models which 
are explicitly framed in disequilibrium fashion. In all of the above 
sections, absolute values of the “t" statistics will be given in 
parenthesis. Section 4 summarises and concludes our investigation. 
The data appendix provides data sources and definitions of variables 
for the panel data used in this study.
2. Logit Models
Most sovereign debt models have been estimated using probit or 
logit techniques'. Disequilibrium models in the estimation of
'To explore the causes of debt servicing difficulties, 
discriminant analysis and principal components were also 
applied. See Schmidt (1984), Abassi and Taffler (1984), 
Dhonte (1975) and Frank and Cline (1971).
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international debt problems have been introduced recently.
The structure of the probit and logit equations" can be readily
understood just by taking the bivariate discrete case. Let 
*
y . = £’ x . + u . (1)
1 1  l
*
be the regression to be estimated. The value of y is not observable,
but what we observe is a dummy variable of the form 
*
y = 1 if y. > 0 (2)
i
y = O otherwise
From (1) and (2) we get
Prob (y . =1) = Prob (u.> - 8 ’ x.) (3)
l 1 1
= 1 - F (- £’ x . )
l
so the likelihood function is
L = II F(-0’x.) 11 [ l - F M ’x )] (4)
i i
y . =0 y .=1
i i
The functional form of (4) will depend on the assumptions made about
u in (1). If the cumulative distribution of u is logistic, we have 
i l
a logit model
 ^ exp(-£’x.) 1
F(-p’x . ) _____ ; i_ ______________________  (5)
l = =
l + exp(-£’x ) l + exp(£’x )
i i
If we assume that u. is INtO,?") then
l
exp(-t~/2) dt (6)
and we have a probit model.
^See Maddala (1983) and Amemiya (1981) among others.
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Several studies apply logit and probit techniques to the analysis 
of debt servicing difficulties'^"1. Typically, researchers employ a 
binary (1, 0) dependent variable related to instances of reschedulings 
or no rechedulings. The list of regressors incorporates liquidity as 
well as long run creditworthiness indicators.
We start our survey by reviewing the Schmidt paper which explores 
the capability of different statistical methods in signalling 
rescheduling problems.
2.1. Schmidt (1984)
After examining the experience of 52 developing countries from 
1974 to 1978 ("warning" years), Schmidt concluded that the logit 
method seems to predict better than univariate methods, multiple 
discriminant analysis and cluster analysis. From a data set of 21 
independent variables (chosen by inspecting the literature on 
international sovereign debt and taking into account restrictions on 
data availability) and executing a stepwise multiple discriminant 
analysis for 1974-1978, he arrived at the five best combinations for 
each year. For comparison purposes, he entered the same combinations 
when he applied logit. He found, using a cut-off probabi1ity1 ~ of 
0.31, that the 1977 and 1978 estimations gave lower type I (predicting
“"See for example Feder and Just (1977), Mayo and Barret (1978), Feder 
et. al. (1981), Cline (1984), and Kharas (1984).
■^Through minimisation of error percentages, he obtained a cut-off 
probability of 0.31 for the separation of rescheduling and 
non-rescheduling countries. A non-rescheduling country was one that 
exhibited a computed probability less than 0.31.
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a rescheduling when it did not occur) and type II (predicting no 
rescheduling when it occurred) errors than the previous years. 
Therefore, he remarked that for an "early warning model", the results 
of the logit analysis were satisfactory on the whole if relatively 
"fresh" data was used in the estimation.
The independendent variables used by Schmidt in the 1977 
regression are: debt from suppliers/total debt, total reserves minus
gold/imports, outstanding debt/gross domestic product, interest 
payments/gross domestic product. For 1978, the annual rate of growth 
of outstanding disbursed and undisbursed debt and the ratio of 
interest payments to average outstanding debt were entered instead of 
outstanding debt/gross domestic product and interest payments/gross 
domestic product. The dependent variable was constructed using the 
information on multilateral debt rescheduling provided by the OECD 
(1981). It took the value of 1 in the event of a rescheduling and 0 
otherwise.
Table 1 reproduces Schmidt’s results for 1977 and 1978. The 1977 
model gave the lowest error percentages and Schmidt also showed that 
the estimated coefficients were relatively stable over time. We also 
test its robustness. We re-estimated his logit model after redefining 
the dependent variable as arr3 and lagging all the independent 
variables one year to cope with the problem of simultaneity"". We 
re-estimated it with (model I) and without (model II) the ratio of 
OPEC current account to OPEC gross national product (ca/gnp OPEC) to
""When we re-estimated the model defining the dependent variable as 
arrl and using contemporaneous regressors, only the debt/gdp ratio was 
found statistically significant. This result is not reported.
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Table 1 
Probability of Signing a Rescheduling
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: Probability of Signing a Rescheduling
1977 1978
Independent Variables:
constant 2.005 1.681
(suppliers credit/debt)100 0.083 0.086
(reserves/imports)100 -0.189 -0.140
(debt/gdp)100 0.135
(interest/gdp)100 -4.672
annual growth of debt including undisbursed 0.107
interest payments to average outstanding debt -1.093
Sample Size 52 52
Type I Error 11 11
Type II Error 5 7
Source: Schmidt (1984).
Notes : Standard errors, *t " statistics and percentage correctly 
predicted were not reported in the paper by Schmidt.
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include the second oil shock"'. The cut-off probability to compute 
type I (classifying a country as having repayment problems when it did 
not) and type II (classifying a country as not having repayment 
problems when it did) errors is 0.50. The results of our logit 
estimations are reported in table 2.
The asymptotic “t" statistics for all the variables are highly 
significant in both, model I and model II. The interpretation of the 
signs of the estimated coefficients is as follows:
A positive value for the ratio of suppliers credit to total debt 
means that suppliers will not reduce their credits to LACs as would 
financial lenders in case of disruption. This may be because 
suppliers’ credits are trade related and, in general, they are repaid 
on time.
- A high value of the ratio of reserves to imports enables the country 
to use more international reserves to repay its loans. Therefore, we 
expect a negative sign.
- A country with a high debt to gnp ratio may encounter financial 
problems, thus increasing the probability of non repayment.
Contrary to Schmidt’s finding, the interest payment/gnp ratio has a 
positive sign. He suggested that high interest rates are not an 
indicator of higher risk. However, it is well known that the interest 
payment/gnp ratio is a measure of the debt burden, so the higher this 
ratio is, the higher the probability of repayment problems.
- The current-account-to-gnp ratio of OPEC countries has the correct
"'We also tested the model using a (1,0) dummy variable to take care 
of the oil shock instead of the OPEC current account/gnp ratio. Both 
variables, in turn, were significant and had the expected signs but 
the OPEC current/account ratio predicted better than the oil shock 
dummy.
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Table 2 
Latin American Countries:
Probability of Arrears, Rescheduling and INF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable : arr3
1975-1986
Independent Variables: 
(all lagged one year)
Model I Model II
constant
(suppliers credit/debt)100
(reserves/imports)100
(debt/gnp)100
(interest/gnp)100
ca/gnp OPEC
-1.9092 
(3.908) 
0.0589 
(1.754) 
-0.0264 
(2.495) 
0.0263 
(2.252) 
0.4257 
(2.438)
-1.0382 
(1.894) 
0.0951 
(2.542) 
-0.0354 
(3.146) 
0.0199 
(1.716) 
0.3537 
(2.086) 
-0.0772 
(3.122)
Sample size 
Log likelihood 
Correct predictions (%) 
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
209
-104.76
77.51
11.38
38.37
209
-98.96
77.51
15.48
32.56
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sign, that is, the higher the ratio, the higher the funds recycled in 
the financial markets and hence, more funds are available for lending. 
The inclusion of this variable improves the value of the log 
likelihood, reduces the type II error, but increases the type I error. 
An inspection of the predicted probabilities for both sets of 
equations reveals that the reduction in type II error is due to 
corrections in the probability of non-repayment of oil importing 
countries. Unfortunately, the increase in type I error seems not to 
be related to the high indebtedness of oil exporting countries.
Concerning the size of the estimated coefficients, models I and 
II predict that the interest/gnp ratio has a substantial effect on the 
logarithm of the odds that a country will fall in arrears. That is, 
42.57 and 35.37 respectively. In model I, a unit increase in the 
suppliers’ credit/debt ratio, holding other variables constant, 
changes the log-odds ratio by 5.89 (9.51 in model II); while a unit 
increase in the reserves/imports ratio decreases the log-odds ratio by 
2.64 (3.54 in model II). Similarly, the effect of a change of a unit 
increase in the debt/gnp ratio changes the log-odds ratio by 2.63 
(1.99 in model II). The predicted effect (in model II) of a unit 
increase in the OPEC current account/gnp ratio is to a change the 
log-odds ratio by -0.08.
The calculated “quasi-elasticities""" for the probability of
z "The "quasi-elasticity" is calculated at the point of means of each
of the independent variables according to [ c M ’2jx £ J/ox. ](x, /p.) =
l l lk ik i
—— ■: - — — — th
;{exp (iJx d  )/[l + exp(Lx o )]"}£ i (x /p ) where x is the k element 
i i i' i ikj ik l ik
« th
of the mean vector of explanatory variables x , D is the k element
i ik
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arrears and the suppliers credit/debt ratio, the reserves/imports 
ratio, debt/gnp ratio and the interest/gnp ratio are 0.20, -0.39, 0.54 
and 0.57 for model I (and 0.32, -0.51, 0.40, 0.46 for model II). The 
“quasi-elasticity* for the OPEC current acount/gnp ratio id -0.34. 
That is, a 1% change in any of the above mentioned ratios will lead to 
change of less than 1% in the probability of arrears. Nonetheless, 
the probability of arrears is relatively more responsive to changes in 
the interest/gnp ratio in model I and to changes in the 
reserves/import ratio in model II.
To analyse the overall stability of the coefficients, model II 
was run for different sample periods (table 3). Not only does the 
precision of the estimates fluctuate from one sample period to another 
(which is not surprising since it depends on the sample correlations), 
but the value and sign of the coefficients do as well. A likelihood 
ratio test to determine the usefulness of estimating by pooling the 
data (1975-1986) instead of breaking it into three periods (four years 
each), yields a chi-square statistic of 38.64 with 10 degrees of 
freedom, leading to a rejection at the 0.005 level! Surprisingly, 
over time, the model predicts the countries with repayment problems 
better than the ones with no repayment problems. Indeed, in the last 
period, the type I error becomes enormous while the type II error is 
very small. Table 3 thus strongly suggests the possibility of 
misspecification in the Schmidt model.
Accepting the usefulness of the logit technique in the estimation 
of debt repayment problems and searching for a better specification
of P and p is the mean value of the predicted probabilities, 
i i
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Table 3 
Latin American Countries:
Probability of Arrears, Rescheduling and IMF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
Independent Variables: 
(all lagged one period)
1975-1978 1979-1982 1983-1986
constant
(suppliers credit/debt)100 
(reserves/imports)100 
(debt/gnp)100 
(interest/gnp)100
Sample size 
Log likelihood 
Correct predictions (%) 
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
0.417 1.594 -0.459
(0.351) (1.619) (0.522)
0. 134 0. 172 0. 103
(2.209) (1.806) (1.030)
-0.088 -0.083 -0.140
(2.292) (2.354) (0.942)
-0.508 0.060 0. 109
(0.262) (1.940) (0.807)
-0.508 -0.041 0.298
(0.418) (0.106) (1.434)
72 71 66
-24.99 -27.08 -33.36
84.72 84. 51 74.24
3.33 8.70 82.35
75.00 28. 00 6. 12
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than the Schmidt model we next review papers which have included 
alternative definitions of the dependent variable and, at the same 
time, provided an interesting selection of exogenous variables 
(capital flight, political instability, etc.).
2.2. McFadden, Eckaus, Feder, Hajivassiliou and O ’Connell (1985)
McFadden et al. analysed data for 93 developing countries over 
the period 1971-82. The dependent variable used in this study is very 
precise. It is defined to be a rescheduling or debt restructuring, 
IMF higher tranche support, arrears on principal exceeding 1* of debt 
outstanding and disbursed or arrears on interest exceeding 0.1% of 
debt. In a logit model"" they capture demand and supply effects by 
associating repayment problems with variables related to the demand 
for new credit and to lenders’ perception of creditworthiness. They 
show that the probability of repayment problems is positively related 
to the imports/gdp ratio, debt/exports ratio and the debt service due 
(interest, amortization and arrears)/exports; and negatively related 
to the reserves/gdp ratio, real per capita income and the real growth 
rate of gdp. In addition, they include a dummy variable (0 for 
countries with flexible exchange rates or with pegged rates equal to 
the rate of growth of the real exchange rate) to reflect the 
possibility of capital flight. This variable was found to be
""It refers to their basic model which afterwards is reformulated to 
explore the effects of previous repayment problems, the influence of 
the degree of openness of the countries and world variables that might 
affect the supply of credit. The variables found significant are then 
carried over to their full model of repayment problems where level 
data on new loans and arrears are used to identify the demand and 
supply of new loans and the limit on arrears.
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insignificant, but appeared with the expected sign.
They carry out two further exercises. Firstly, they test the 
model for non-poor countries"" and find the effects of the 
reserves/gdp ratio and the debt service due/exports ratio 
insignificant for this group. These ratios are associated with 
short-run liquidity problems of generating foreign exchange flows to 
cover current account deficits. Therefore, they suggest that non-poor 
countries are affected by longer-run creditworthiness. Secondly, 
including all the LDCs considered in their study, they break the 
sample into two periods (1971-75 and 1976-82) and find substantial 
differences in the coefficients. They conclude that the coefficients 
of the model are not stable over time. Table 4 reports their results.
We re-estimate their model after first redefining some of the 
variables. Our dependent variable is arr3, instead of debt service 
due we use debt service repaid" and instead of dividing the reserves 
and imports by gdp we divide by gnp. We omit the exchange rate regime 
dummy variable and use the Cuddington measure of capital flight"'. 
Table 5 presents results excluding the capital flight proxy, while 
table 6 includes it.
"'Countries with GNP per capita below 500 US dollars were excluded 
from the sample.
"'Unfortunately, we could not gain access to the confidential files on 
arrears of the World Bank.
"'He calculates capital flight by adding the errors and omissions to 
short term capital items selected invidually for each country. This 
"hot money" or short term capital flow approach has been criticised by 
Cumby and Levich (1987). Nevertheless, we use the Cuddington series 
mainly because of data availability.
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Table 4
Probabilities of Significant Arrears, Rescheduling or IHF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: Significant Arrears, rescheduling or IMF support
ALL COUNTRIES NON POOR
Independent Variables:
1971-82 1971-75 1976-82 1971-82
(lagged one year)
constant -1.242 -0.629 -1.614 -1.351
(5.12) (1.44) (4.97) (3.70)
reserves/gdp -2.196 3.271 -6.418 0.059
(2.16) (2.43) (4.73) (0.07)
import s/gdp 1. 512 -2.067 3. 193 0.924
(3.11) (1.85) (5.02) (1.61)
debt/exports 0. 523 0.613 0.519 1.110
(4.10) (2.51) (3.33) (4.35)
debt service due/exports 1. 437 -0.377 2.306 -0.577
(2.14) (0.25) (2.88) (0.61)
real gnp p .c ./1000 -0.500 -0.237 -0.677 -0.712
(3.04) (0.91) (2.95) (3.30)
real growth of gdp -5.673 -6.863 -4.355 -6.695
(3.43) (2.39) (2.04) (3.15)
dummy real exchange rate 0. 839 0. 162 1.383 0.083
regime (1.58) (0.18) (2.13) (0.11)
Sample size 728 273 455 47
Log likelihood -415.4 -149.8 -249.8 -251.
Correct predictions (%) 72.25 73.99 72. 31 77.
Type I error (%) 29.60 27.27 31. 15 27.
Type II error (%) 17.36 25.90 26.43 22.
Source : McFadden et al (1985).
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Table 5 
Latin American Countries:
Probabilities of Arrears, Rescheduling or IHF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
ALL LACs
1975-85
SELECTED LACs'
1975-85
Independent Variables 
(all lagged one year) 
constant
reserves/gnp
imports/gnp
debt/exports
debt service/exports
real gnp p.c./1000
real growth of gdp
-2.546 
(3.511) 
-6.691 
(1.544) 
2. 193 
(3.455) 
1.411 
(3.736) 
1. 165 
(0.553) 
0. 099 
(0.361) 
-0.174 
(4.153)
-1.785 
(0.765) 
-9.670 
(1.080) 
9.593 
(1.843) 
1.488 
(2.039) 
-2.496 
(0.725) 
-0.398 
(0.806) 
-0.208 
(2.705)
Sample Size 
Log Likelihood 
Correct predictions (%) 
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
208 
-95.49 
80. 77 
12.50 
30.00
77
-35.75 
83.12 
9.52 
25.71
Notes : "The Cuddington capital flight estimates include Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela for the 
period 1974-84. The heading “Selected LACs" includes only 
those countries.
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Table 6
Selected Latin Aaerican Countries1: 
Probabilities of Arrears, Rescheduling and INF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
Independent Variables:
(all lagged one year) 
constant
reserves/gnp
imports/gnp
debt/e xports
debt service/exports
real gnp p . c . /1000
real growth of gdp
capital flight/gnp
1975-1985
-1.735 
(0.733) 
-7.778 
(0.845) 
9.457 
(1.803) 
1.391 
(1.890) 
-2.038 
(0.593) 
-0.624 
(1.173) 
-0.157 
(1.828) 
16.470 
(1.375)
Sample size 
Log Likelihood 
Correct predictions (%) 
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
77
-34.69
81.82
11.09
25.71
Notes : "Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.
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For all LACs, the coefficients have the correct sign except for 
the real gnp per capita. However, only the ratios of imports to gnp,
debt to exports and real gdp growth are significant. Exclusion of the 
insignificant variables does not substantially change the value of the 
log likelihood nor the percentage error in the prediction (not 
reported). We test a similar model using a subsample of LACs that had 
experienced capital flight. Almost the same pattern is observed, 
except for the debt-service-to-exports ratio (incorrect sign but 
insignificant) and the real gnp percapita (correct sign but 
insignificant).
Notice that the reserves/gnp ratio and the debt service/exports 
ratio are associated with short run liquidity problems and that all 
LACs are middle income countries1"'. Our results suggest that middle 
income countries are affected by longer-run creditworthiness factors, 
and thus corroborate those of Cuddington et al.
Considering all LACs, the model predicts that, ceteris paribus, a 
unit change in the imports/gnp ratio will change the log-odds ratio by
2.19. A unit change in the debt/exports ratio will change the 
log-odds ratio by 1.41 while a one point increase in the percentage of 
real gdp growth will decrease the log-odds ratio by 0.17. The 
"quasi-elasticities" with respect to the imports/gdp ratio, the 
debt/exports ratio and real growth of gdp are 0.46, 1.05 and -0.32 
respectively.
""Middle income" refers to countries in which 1984 GNP per capita is 
more than 400 US dollars. Haiti with GNP per capita of 320 US dollars 
in 1984 is the only low-income Latin American country. To preserve 
the integrity of other low-income classifications, the World Bank 
includes Haiti in the "middle income" group. See World Debt Tables 
(1985-86 edition).
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In the case of the subsample of LACs, the effect of a unit change 
in the imports/gnp ratio on the log-odds ratio is 9.59, much higher 
than for all LACs taken together. A one point increase in the 
percentage of the real growth of gdp decreases the log-odds ratio by 
0.21. Once again, this effect is higher than when we considered all 
LACs. The effect on the log-odds ratio of a unit change in the 
debt/exports ratio is 1.49. The “quasi-elasticities" associating the 
probability of arrears with the imports/gnp ratio and the real growth 
of gdp are 1.19 and -0.43 respectively. A 1% increase in the 
debt/exports ratio increases the probability of arrears by 1.12%.
Inclusion of the capital flight/gnp ratio as an additional 
explanatory variable in the subsample of LACs does not change the
pattern of results. Again, despite having the correct signs, 
variables reflecting short run liquidity problems and real gnp per
capita do not perform well. Surprisingly, the capital-f1ight-to-gnp 
ratio is significant only at the 17% level. It affects the log-odds
ratio substantially (a one unit increase in this ratio changes the
log-odds ratio by 16.47) and its calculated "quasi-elasticity" is
0.11. However, these results should be interpreted with some care 
because of the difficulties encountered when estimating the magnitude 
of the capital flight effect. The Cuddington capital flight series 
are not adjusted for trade misinvoicing and consider only short-term
ft y.
capital movements rather than both short and long term^'. Biases due 
to measurement errors are thus a distinct possibility.
With regard to the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, the
^'Refer to footnote IS, Gulati (1987) and Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (1986).
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effect of a unit change in the imports/gnp ratio on the log-odds ratio 
is 9.46 while a one point increase in real gdp growth decreases the 
log-odds ratio by 0.16. The log-odds ratio changes by 1.39 when the 
debt/exports ratio increases by one unit. In terms of
"quasi-elasticities", a 1% change in the imports/gnp ratio changes the 
probability of arrears by 1.17%. A 1% increase in the real growth of 
gdp decreases the probability of arrears by 0.21%. The probability of 
arrears changes by 1.04% when the debt/export ratio increases by 1%.
2.3. Lanoi (1986)
Lanoi critically reviews the outcomes of 15 studies in which
statistical techniques (typically logit and discriminant analysis)
were applied. Acknowledging that a comparison among them is somewhat
misleading (the studies vary considerably), he lists 42 independent 
variables which were found significant in at least one study. From 
this set, only 7 variables were found significant three times or more. 
These variables are: the ratios of debt service (interest payments) to 
exports (ix), debt to gdp or debt to exports (dg or dx), debt
amortisation to total outstanding debt (1/aml), reserves to imports
(rm); the inflation rate (p) and the share of investment in gdp
(inv/gdp). Lanoi classifies the first four variables as financial
indicators and the three others as debtor’s economic performance
indicators.
Most of the ratios just mentioned are quite popular. We give a 
brief explanation of some of them:
a) The debt amortisation to total outstanding debt ratio (the inverse
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of the "average* maturity of loans) reflects the debtor’s short-run 
flexibility in lowering its debt service commitments by a temporary 
reduction in borrowing. Thus, a low value of this variable increases 
the probability of arrears.
b) The inflation rate is related to the macroeconomic management of 
the country. If devaluation is not kept in line with inflation, the 
real exchange rate appreciates, imports increase while exports 
decrease. This might lead to a build-up of external debt with
adverse consequences for repayment prospects.
c) The share of investment in gdp represents the proportion of gdp 
allocated to the accumulation of real assets (as opposed to 
consumption). The higher this share is, the higher the future
productive capacity of the economy and in consequence, more resources 
should be available to service the debt.
We estimate an equation of the form
Y = f (ix, dg, 1/aml, rm, p, inv/gdp, u) (7)
+ + - - + 
where u is the error term. In addition, we consider the oil shocks
and the world recession"". Table 7 presents the outcomes of the logit
equation estimated for the period 1971-86.
""First we tested the model in its original form and found all 
variables had the expected signs but inflation and the debt 
amortisation/debt outstanding were statistically insignificant (model 
III in table 7 reports the results after excluding the insignificant 
regressors). We then proceeded to include the proxies for oil shock 
and world recession. The proxy for world recession is the real rate 
of growth of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Canada, while the effects of the oil shocks are 
entered as OPEC current account to gnp. We tried also the rate of 
growth of all OECD countries and a dummy variable for the oil shocks. 
The results reported correspond to the best fit.
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Table 7 
Latin American Countries:
Probability of Arrears and Significant IVfF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
Independent Variables:
(all lagged one period)
constant
debt service/exports 
debt/gdp
debt amortisation/debt outstanding
reserves/imports
inflation
investment/gdp
ca/gnp OPEC
real growth of OECD
Sample size
Log likelihood
Correct predictions (%)
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
1971-1986
I II III
0.687 0.513 -0.797
(0.785) (0.690) (1.204)
11.568 11.085 13.278
(3.363) (3.274) (4.133)
4. 078 4. 229 4. 183
(4.172) (4.517) (4.766)
-1.982
(0.681)
-2.660 -2.575 -3.034
(2.248) (2.204) (2.535)
0.121
(0.990)
-7.699 -7.968 -7.796
(2.697) (2.811) (2.825)
-0.048 -0.051
(1.962) (2.083)
-0.321 -0.326
(3.427) (3.509)
289 289 289
-115.98 -116.63 -123.78
82.01 82.35 79.58
8. 25 7. 73 9.28
37. 89 37.89 43. 16
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All the variables exhibit the correct sign but the inflation rate 
(percentage change in CPI, 1980=100) and the inverse of the average 
maturity of loans (amortisation/debt outstanding) are insignificant. 
Contrary to McFadden et al’s findings, variables associated with short 
run liquidity problems (in the present model, the reserves/imports 
ratio and the debt service/exports ratio) are important in explaining 
debt repayment difficulties.
In all three models, the size of the effect of a unit increase in 
the debt service/exports ratio on the log-odds ratio is relatively 
large compared to the other regressors. It is followed by the 
investment/gdp ratio, the reserves/imports ratio, the OPEC current 
account/gnp and the real growth of OECD countries. Although (among 
the three models) there are no sharp differences in the calculated 
"quasi-elasticities", they are relatively smaller for model II. In 
model II, a 1% increase in the debt service/exports ratio increases 
the probability by 0.48%, a 1% increase in the debt/gdp ratio 
increases the probability of arrears by 0.73%. A 1% increase in the 
reserves/imports ratio changes the probability of arrears by -0.36%, a 
1% increase in the investment/gdp ratio changes the probability of 
arrears by -0.96%. The "quasi-elasticities" of the probability of 
arrears with respect to the OPEC current account/gnp ratio and the 
real growth of OECD countries are -0.21 and -0.57 respectively.
Brandford and Kucinski (1988) and Darity (1986) signal 1979 (last 
quarter) and 1980 as benchmarks in the reverse of the international 
lending trend. To test for the usefulness of breaking the sample in 
two, we estimate model II and III for 1971-79 and 1980-86 (see table 
8). The likelihood ratio test (for the validity of pooling the data) 
in model II yields a chi-square statistic of 7.69 with 7 degrees of
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Table 8 
Latin American Countries:
Probability of Arrears and Significant INF Support
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
MODEL II
1971-79 1980-86
Independent Variables 
(all lagged one year)
MODEL III
1971-79 1980-86
constant 0.878 -0.009 0.374 -0.765
(0.808) (0.008) (0.397) (0.709)
debt service/exports 11.534 9.658 11.808 10.442
(1.700) (2.051) (1.748) (2.505)
debt/gnp 2.222 4.612 1.841 4.095
(1.191) (3.461) (1.018) (3.581)
reserves/imports -7.945 -1.659 -8.782 -2.034
(2.574) (1.247) (2.898) (1.615)
investment/gdp -8.318 4.213 -7.712 -5.795
(2.080) (0.918) (2.004) (1.393)
ca/gnp OPEC -0.014 -0.087
(0.433) (2.085)
real growth OECD -0.148 -0.375
(1.061) (2.355)
Sample size 169 120 169 120
Log Likelihood -59.51 -53.27 -60.10 -58.36
Correct predictions (%) 85.80 80.83 86.39 79.58
Type I error (%) 1.41 23.08 0.70 26.92
Type II error (%} 81.48 16.18 81.48 19.12
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freedom. This implies a rejection at the 50 percent level of 
significance but not at the 30 percent level. For model III, the 
calculated value is 10.65 with 5 degrees of freedom, exceeding the 
critical chi-square at the 5 percent but not at the 10 percent level. 
This suggests that in the case of model II we are better off 
estimating over the whole sample period, but perhaps not in model III.
Model III in table 8 shows that there is no reversal of the signs 
of the parameter estimates (except for the constant term) from one 
subperiod to the other. The debt service/exports ratio and the 
debt/gnp ratio become very significant while the reserves/imports 
ratio and the share of investment in gdp lose explanatory power. The 
model predicts much better countries with no repayment problems than 
countries with repayment problems over the period 1971-79. Overall, 
the model performs better in the second subsample than in the first.
Moreover, the results of model III in table 8 suggest that most 
of the repayment problems during 1971-79 were not caused by the usual 
debt burden indicators. In addition, the increasing tendency of the 
share of investment in gdp and the low type I error might be 
signalling expectations of increased resources for debt repayment in 
the future. Notice that after 1980, real LIBOR rates were positive 
and high, and since most of the debt was contracted at variable
interest rates, LACs experienced not only the burden of interest
payments but also the consequences of a period of heavy borrowing,
i.e. the claims of the rest of the world on LACs’ resources increased
substantially. It is interesting to note that in spite of the 41 
billion dollar decrease in imports in 1985 with respect to 1980, the 
reserves-to-import ratio during the second subperiod is marginally 
significant. Therefore, it seems that the squeeze in imports was not
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enough to cope with the new debt situation.
2.4. Citron and Nickelsburg (1987)
They proposed and estimated a model of country risk for foreign 
borrowing. That is, they incorporated in addition to economic
variables, a political instability variable in the analysis of 
international sovereign debt.
They assume that goverments maximise the following objective 
function
Max U = U(G,D,") (7)
{G , D } + + -
s.t. p g +e d =p (x -m )+t p y +e Ar
where
P
E
(X-M)
T
R
Y
government expenditure 
debt repayment
shift variable representing political instability 
domestic price level 
exchange rate
trade balance or current account 
income tax rate
level of international reserves 
gross domestic product
The welfare cross derivative (W ) and the marginal welfare
GD
function for G and D (W and U ) are assumed to depend on J.
G 0
Therefore, in politically unstable scenarios, the ruler weighs debt 
repayment against expenditure. That is, he might decide not to repay 
on schedule and direct resources to calm those who might attempt to 
overthrow him.
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For a range of values of if, maximisation of (7) yields an 
interior solution for 6 and D. But if the level of political 
instability is very high, the optimum is a corner solution with 
repayment equal to zero. Assuming that a stochastic element is
embodied in (7), the corner solution is modelled as the probability of
hitting the corner. Citron and Nickelsburg assume that this 
probability follows a logistic distribution and estimated
F (p ’ f (. )) = {1 + e x p C - f  C A(x -M) , &R, Ay, v f ] }_ 1 (8)
w h e r e  the left h a n d  s i d e  is d e f i n e d  as the p r o b a b i l i t y  of d e f a u l t  a n d 
f is a f u n c t i o n  derived f r o m  the g o v e r n m e n t a l  d e c i s i o n  ru l e s .
The countries in the sample had different degrees of political 
stability (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Sweden) and the model 
was estimated for the period 1960-1983. The dependent variable 
(default) was defined to be a condition under which a country
renegotiates the terms of a loan because it claims an inability to 
repay on schedule. However, they suggest that the differentiation of 
complete default, moratoria and rescheduling would improve the 
predictive power of their model. The change in gross domestic 
product, change in current account balance, change in international 
reserves plus IMF credit were drawn from IFS. The political
instability variable was constructed as a five year moving aggregate 
of the number of changes in governments accompanied by changes in 
policy. Table 9 presents their results.
The estimated coefficients obtained by Citron and Nickelsburg
have the expected sign but only the change in reserves and IMF credits
and the political instability variable are significant. Notice that
the type II error is substantial and that the classification failed
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Table 9
Estimated Default Probability Model
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: Default
Selected Countries" 
1960-1982
Independent Variables:
constant 
change in gdp
change in current account/1000 
change in reserves and IMF credits/1000 
political instability index
Sample size
Correct predictions (%)
Type I error (%)
Type II error (%)
Source : Citron and Nickelsburg (1987)
Notes : ‘'Includes Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Sweden.
- 2 . 2
(3.41)
- 0.1
(1.00)
- 0 . 1
(0.50)
- 0.8
(2.66)
0.48
(2.82)
110
80.00
2.53
47.61
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mostly for Argentina and Brazil which are relatively more unstable 
than the other countries taken in the sample.
We re-estimated their model using our LACs data bank for the 
period 1971-1985 (table 10). We use a very crude version of political 
instability, that is a five year moving aggregate of changes in the 
head of government For the dependent variable, we use our
constructed dichotomous variables in turn: arrl (1 if rescheduling
occurred and 0 otherwise), arr2 (1 indicates the year of arrears and 0 
otherwise) and arr3 (1 signals the year of arrears and/or high tranche 
IMF Stand-By agreements and/or IMF Extended Fund Facility loans; the 
variable took the value of 0 if none of the mentioned events 
occurred). The change in the gross national product is used instead 
of the change in gdp.
The proxy for political instability and the change in gross 
domestic product have the correct sign and are very significant. 
Besides that, however, the overall result is not very encouraging. 
The change in reserves plus IMF credits is very significant but has a 
positive sign instead of the expected negative sign. A reduction in 
international reserves is, in general, an indicator of financial 
problems and hence, should increase the probability of non-repayment. 
In general, modifications in the definition of arrears do not change 
these results. However, a broader definition of arrears decreases the 
type II error.
““This variable was constructed through our own research. It would 
have been better to consider the changes in policies instead of 
changes in head of governments, but that would require separate 
research since our sample is composed of 19 countries.
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Table 10 
Latin American Countries: 
Probability of Repayment Probleas
Method of Estimation: Logit
1971-85
Dependent Variable: arr 1 arr2 arr3
Independent Variables:
(all contemporaneous)
constant -2.267 i o IO o -1.172
(7.902) (6.559) (5.105)
change in gnp/1000 -0.053 -0.073 -0.096
(2.673) (3.044) (3.157)
change in current account/1000 -0.009 0.017 0.019
(0.022) (0.423) (0.491)
change in reserves and 0. 785 0.616 0.547
IMF credits/1000 (3.138) (2.544) (2.229)
political instability index 0. 272 0.447 0.399
(2.091) (3.304) (2.985)
Sample size 238 238 238
Log likelihood -90.04 -122.62 -134.12
Correct predictions (%) 85. 29 75.22 71.01
Type I error 1.49 3.47 3.80
Type II error 88.89 81. 54 78.75
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In all cases, the effect of a unit increase in the change in gdp 
on the log-odds ratio is negligible as are corresponding 
"quasi-elasticities". A unit change in the index of political 
instability changes the log-odds ratio by 0.27, 0.44 and 0.40 when 
arrl, arr2 and arr3 are used as the dependent variable. The 
"quasi-elasticities" relating the probability of arrears and the index 
of political instability are 0.25%, 0.46% and 0.32% respectively.
We regress the same model using arr3 as the dependent variable 
and include the OPEC current account/gnp ratio""'1 and the real growth 
of the five largest OECD countries as additional independent 
variables.
The first column of table 11 reports our results when all the 
independent variables are contemporaneous. The change in the current 
account has the correct sign but is insignificant. The change in gnp 
remains very significant and has the expected sign. Still of some 
concern is the fact that the change in reserves plus IMF credits is 
very significant and has the incorrect sign. The second column in 
table 11 shows the results when all the independent variables are 
lagged one year. Surprisingly, except for the index of political 
instability, none of the explanatory variables originally proposed by 
Citron and Nickelsburg are significant. What holds true is that in 
both cases (contemporaneous and one year lagged regressors), the index 
of political instability is very significant as well the proxies for 
oil shocks and world recession. In addition, there is a substantial 
improvement in the type II errror.
“ 'Alternatively, we tried dummy OPEC. The results remain almost the 
same when using ca/gnp OPEC or dummy OPEC. We report the regressions 
with ca/gnp OPEC because they predicted better.
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Table 11 
Latin American Countries: 
Probability of Repayment Probleas
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: arr3
1971-1985
Independent Variables: (contemporaneous) (all lagged one year)
constant 0. 242 0.781
(0.621) (2.028)
change in gnp/1000 -0.078 -0.013
(2.781) (0.854)
change in current account/1000 -0.005 -0.021
(0.134) (0.556)
change in reserves and 0.567 0. 117
IMF credits/1000 (2.277) (0.791)
political instability index 0.417 0.383
(2.677) (2.569)
ca/gnp OPEC -0.145 -0.133
(5.268) (5.344)
real growth OECD -0.236 -0.350
(2.754) (4.064)
Sample si2e 238 238
Log likelihood -113.99 -127.58
Correct predictions (%) 77.31 70. 59
Type I error (*) 11.39 16. 11
Type II error (%) 45.00 51.68
144
When using contemporaneous regressors, the effect on the log-odds 
ratio of a unit increase in the change of gdp is negligible. The 
effect on the log-odds ratio of a unit increase in the index of 
political instability is 0.42, larger than a unit increase in the real
growth of OECD countries (-0.24) and a unit increase in the OPEC
current account/gnp ratio (-0.15). In terms of "quasi-elasticities", 
a 1% change in the political instability index increases the 
probability of arrears by 0.32% while a 1% increase in the OPEC 
current account/gnp ratio decreases it by 0.61%. The
“quasi-elasticity" corresponding to the real growth of OECD countries 
is -0.38.
When we entered all regressors with one year lag, the effect of a 
unit change of the political instability index on the log-odds ratio 
is 0.38 and the "quasi-elasticity" is 0.29. With respect to the OPEC 
current account/gnp ratio and the real growth of OECD countries, the 
effect on the log-odds ratio is -0.13 and -0.35 and the 
"quasi-elasticities" are -0.57 and -0.58.
In spite of the outcome of the estimation (i.e. most of the
economic variables do not perform well), there are useful lessons. 
Whatever definition of dependent variable is used, the proxy for 
political instability was very significant. Citron and Nickelsburg 
argue that this result seems to confirm their position that in an 
unstable political environment, new governments would tend to increase 
expenditures and are less likely to meet debt obligations as 
scheduled. This might be true but it is also plausible that a
government which will soon be leaving office would engage in more 
expenditures (reputation and image, or simply corruption) passing the 
burden of the debt to their successors. Finally, an overall criticism
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is the fact that the variables are not adjusted for country scale.
3. Disequilibrium nodeIs
Recalling the useful general framework proposed by McFadden et al 
(1985), the logit models reviewed in the previous section (except for 
Citron and Nickelsburg) could be implicitly interpreted as having an 
underlying disequilibrium structure. In this section, we survey 
models which are explicitly framed in a disequilibrium context. First 
we explore the seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and their 
estimation of demand and supply regimes; then we turn to models 
(McFadden et al, 1985) where it is not possible to identify demand and 
supply separately.
3.1. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
They develop a stochastic model of international borrowing with 
an endogenous default penalty. The punishment for non-repayment is 
permanent exclusion from the credit market. Countries borrow to
smoothe consumption, so the cost of repudiation is higher, the higher
their income variability and the higher the retaliation from the
international community. Risk neutral lenders know all the borrowers’
relevant characteristics and the structure of the repudiation 
incentives so they will not lend beyond the point where the borrowers’ 
benefits of default exceed the cost. The lending interest rate does 
not play the role of a market-clearing device since a heavy borrower 
will not pay the price if he defaults and default is more likely the 
higher is his debt outstanding. The level of debt may be determined
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either by the borrower’s demand for credit or by a credit ceiling 
imposed by the lenders. Therefore, they argue, it is not appropriate 
to estimate a single relation between debt and a set of independent 
variables if the sample contains countries whose debt levels are 
determined by different regimes.
They estimate the following disequilibrium model
d , .
B = f x + u 
t i
C , XB = g ( x ) + u 
t it
d c
B = min (B , B ) (8)
t t t
where B : amount the country wishes to borrow
u , u
-;t
credit ceiling imposed by the lenders 
observed debt
vector of country characteristics 
random errors
Both demand and supply regimes are hypothesised to be functions 
of the percent variability of exports^, ratio of imports-to-gnp, the 
growth rate of gnp , total real gnp, total population, the real level 
of debt to public institutions (other governments, international
“ T o r  the periods 1964-1970 and 1968-1974 for each country, they ran a 
regression of the log of real exports on a constant and time.
Variability of exports was defined as the standard error of this
regression.
““For the periods 1964-1970 and 1968-1974 for each country, they ran a 
regression of the log of real gnp on a constant and time. The growth
rate of gnp was defined as the coefficient on time.
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organisations, etc.) and a dummy (0 for 1970 and 1 for 1974).
Only is observed and it is not known whether any particular 
d c
belongs to B or B . They use the maximum likelihood methods of 
t t
Maddala and Nelson (1974) to estimate the parameters of f(.) and g(.) 
jointly. We reproduce Eaton and Gersovitz’s results for 45 LDCs in 
table 12
From the borrower’s point of view, the higher the real growth 
rate of income, the higher his desired debt i.e. some of the future 
higher income is consumed today. But higher growth might or might not 
raise the credit ceiling. A borrower with increasing income might 
fear less from the future effects of default punishment, thus 
decreasing the credit ceiling. The variability of exports is also 
significant and has the expected sign (the higher the export 
variability, the higher the cost of default if the punishment takes 
the form of, for example, a trade embargo; hence the more the country 
can borrow).
In the case of the imports-to-gnp ratio, the supply regime 
exhibits the correct sign (the higher this ratio is, the higher is the 
cost of default i.e. disruption of financing trade). In the demand 
regime, the imports to gnp ratio is included to incorporate 
transaction effects since some debt is used to finance trade. The 
significant and negative sign of this ratio in the demand regime is 
characterised by Eaton and Gersovitz as "an anomalous result". 
Another surprising result is the insignificant effect of real gnp in 
the demand regime.
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Table 12
Private Debt of Less Developed Countries
Method of Estimation: Switching regression, sample separation unknown 
Dependent Variable: Real public debt (including undisbursed) with
maturity over one year to private creditors (logged)
1970 and 1974
Independent Variables: 
constant
exports variability
imports/gnp
log real gnp
log population
gnp real growth rate
log real debt to public inst
dummy OPEC
B (supply regime)
-4. 48 
(2.25) 
4.88 
(2.52) 
4.35 
(2.88) 
1. 18 
(6.46) 
-0.64 
(3.54) 
- 0 . 12 
(2.60) 
0.63
(3.14) 
-0.57
(2.14)
B (demand regime)
13.5 
(3.20) 
17.0 
(2.93) 
-  8.8 
(3.07) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
0.67 
(3.14) 
-0. 19 
(0.55) 
0.09 
(0.17)
Sample size
Log likelihood
Estimated of error variance
81
- 95.2 
0.705
Source: Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
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Debt to public institutions might act as a substitute for private 
loans in the context of the demand regime. However, in the supply
regime, private lenders might regard a high value of debt to public 
institutions as a signal of confidence in the borrowers. This 
variable has the correct sign but is not significant in the demand 
regime, while it is very significant in the supply regime.
Eaton and Gersovitz, using a cut-off probability of 0.50, 
conclude that most of the countries for 1970 and 1974 are more likely 
to be supply constrained.
Morgan (1987) re-estimates the Eaton and Gersovitz model for the 
same countries but for the years 1977 and 1981. He finds that export 
variability is insignificant in the supply regime and only marginally 
significant in the demand regime. The imports-to-gnp ratio is 
marginally significant in the supply regime and insignificant in the 
demand regime. Real gnp growth is not significant in either of the 
regimes. The only significant variables in both regimes are real gnp 
and debt to public institutions. Comparing the change in the 
probabilities of belonging to one or the other regime, he concludes 
that the developing countries in the sample were less constrained in 
the late seventies/early eighties than in the earlier part of the 
sevent ies.
To analyse the trends in the data, Morgan re-estimates the Eaton 
and Gersovitz model for individual years (1970, 1974, 1977 and 1981). 
The importance of the coefficients (their signs and values) changes 
from sample to sample. Therefore, he doubts whether the model 
describes the period 1970 to 1981 well and suggests that the model 
should be modified to account for structural changes in the world
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economy (oil shocks, the expanded role of private lenders, the
increased usage of short term loans, etc.). None the less, he 
believes that apart from some drawbacks, the theoretical base of the 
model is good arid that a re-specification of some of the variables 
would improve the fit.
There are some problems in models with unknown sample separation
worth mentioning"'. Problems might arise because we are asking too
much from the data when we do not know which observations are on the
demand and on the supply side. One of the statistical and
computational problems when estimating this class of models is
unboundness of the likelihood functions"1 unless some restrictions are
imposed on the error variances. To bound the likelihood function,
Eaton and Gersovitz assume that the errors (u and u ) are
it jt
*?- *
independently and normally distributed with common variance (=7"=?“). 
Violation of this assumption leads to inconsistent parameter 
estimates.
The particular form of the “minimum condition* depends on the 
source of disequilibrium and how rationing takes place. The one 
described in equation (8) assumes continuous market disequilibrium and 
constrains the observations to lie on the supply or on the demand 
curve. Under the assumption of price fixity, the market is almost 
always in disequilibrium and hence the application of the “minimum
2 * S e e  Maddala (1986, 1985).
" A s  the variance goes to zero, the likelihood function tends to 
infinity. Thus, in practical work, succesive iterations produce
higher and higher values of the likelihood function without 
converging. See Maddala (1986, 1985), Quandt (1978) and Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1975).
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condition" is somehow justifiable. However, it does not escape from 
the limitation of not considering observations off the demand and 
supply schedule. This becomes relevant for example, in debt crises or 
credit market breakdowns.
We test the Eaton and Gersovitz model by applying it to data on
LACs for 1970-1985 (table 13). The dependent and independent
variables are the same as theirs except that
- we use our dummy variable "arr3" which conveys information on 
arrears and IMF support loan programmes to help us classify 
observations among the two regimes"' and
-instead of a dummy variable to take into account the oil shocks
we include the OPEC current account to gnp ratio. World activity is
Ft O
captured by the rate of growth of selected OECD countries"".
According to Eaton and Gersovitz, both desired debt and the 
credit ceiling should be positively related to income, with a unitary 
income elasticity if borrowers have constant relative risk aversion. 
The estimated income elasticities in both regimes are significantly 
positive but greater than one.
The credit ceiling is negatively related to export variability,
"'It is not always the case that a switching regression model with a 
regime classification observation (OR) is better than a model with no 
regime clasification observation (NOR). If the separation variable is 
observed without error, both NOR and OR are consistent but NOR is less 
efficient than OR. If the classification variable is not exact, then 
the OR estimator is inconsistent while the NOR estimator is consistent 
since it does not use the classification variable. This issue is 
explained by Hajivassilou (1986) and Lee and Porter (1984).
"'See footnote 19.
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Table 13
Private Debt of Latin Aaerican Countries
Method of Estimation: Switching regression, sample separation known
Dependent Variable: Real public debt (including undisbursed) with
maturity over one year to private creditors (logged)
1970-1985
B (supply regime) B (demand regime)
Independent Variables 
constant
exports variability
imports/gnp
log real gnp
log population
gnp real growth rate
log real debt to public inst
ca/gnp OPEC
real growth of OECD
-4.096 
(12.683) 
-0.660 
( 0.612) 
1. 138 
( 2.913) 
1. 544 
(12.940) 
-0.870 
( 4.283) 
-12.682 
( 5.172) 
0. 747 
( 7.373) 
-0.026 
( 2.491) 
-0.013 
( 0.339)
-4.512 
(8.394) 
2.062 
(1.185) 
0.492 
(0.904) 
1.537 
(6.965) 
-0.772 
(2.666) 
-1.334 
(0.252) 
0.602 
(3.573) 
0.044 
(2.605) 
0 . 112 
(1.779)
Sample size
Standard deviation of residuals
99 
1. 024
205 
1. 156
Log Likelihood -563.03
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although the coefficient is statistically insignificant. This 
negative sign might be explained through two arguments which are not 
strictly related to default punishments. Lenders might perceive the 
non-repayment problem as one of illiquidity rather than one of 
solvency; or the more predictable the country’s foreign earnings are, 
the more confidence they have that their loans will be repaid. The 
amount a country wishes to borrow is likely to increase with the 
variability of exports. The estimated coefficient in the demand 
regime is positive but marginally significant.
The elasticity with respect to public debt is positive in both
regimes. From the borrower’s point of view, public debt does not seem
to be a substitute for private debt but rather is complementary. 
Among other variables, creditworthiness might be associated with the 
amount of loans the country borrower is able to raise. Therefore,
lenders might feel more confident lending to countries with high
official or multilateral debt. On the other hand, lenders might also 
expect creditor governments to favourably intervene in case of
non-repayment.
The ratio of imports to gnp has a significant positive effect in 
the supply regime, but is insignificant in the demand regime. We find 
that the amount the country wishes to borrow is not significantly
related to the growth rate of income, but to the credit ceiling.
Higher income growth might make borrowers fear future default
punishments less, so an inverse relation between income growth and the 
credit ceiling is plausible.
The variables reflecting oil shocks and cyclical factors are 
significant and with the expected sign in the demand regime. The
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significant and negative effect on the credit ceiling of the OPEC 
current-account-to-gnp ratio is difficult to justify since we would 
expect high average loans as a consequence of petrodollar recycling.
Finally, we estimated the same model for three subperiods 
(1970-74, 1975-79 and 1980-85). The model seemed to be fairly stable, 
but the determinants of the credit ceilings were better explained than 
the motives for b o r r o w i n g . In particular, for 1970-74, none of the 
variables significantly explained the country’s desire to borrow, 
although they had the expected signs. Overall, it is possible to 
conclude that except for the coefficient on export variability, our 
results give support to the Eaton and Gersovitz default cost-benefit 
hypothesis.
3.2. McFadden et al (1985)
They test a three regime model where the probability of 
non-repaynment is determined by the level of excess demand for new 
loans.
A borrowing country has an intertemporal welfare function and 
sets policy to maximise this objective, weighting the benefits of 
consumption and investment financed by current account deficits 
against the cost of financing these deficits. If the punishment 
associated with arrears is not severe, the borrower will not adopt
‘"The calculated chi-square statistic was 18.84, less than the 
critical chi-square at 25 percent level and 36 degrees of freedom. 
The value of the log likelihood improved over time, that is, the 
explanatory variables gained significance over time.
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domestic policy measures to avoid a repayment problem. Lenders supply 
loans according to their assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness.
In the same vein as Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), McFadden et al
assume that demand and supply are not equilibrated by adjustments in 
the interest rate spread. Even though the interest rate spread is
considered as an indicator of scarcity and creditworthiness, it is not 
optimal for either lenders or borrowers to agree to high spreads which 
may cause debt repayment problems in the future. Thus, spreads may
not rise to market clearing levels.
If the supply of new loans exceeds demand, the observed 
transactions lie on the demand curve and the debtor experiences no 
repayment problems. If demand exceeds supply on the other hand, the 
country borrows only the quantity voluntarily supplied by the market 
or may go into arrears i.e. a form of involuntary lending.
It is well known that not all countries in arrears are 
immediately involved in debt restructuring programmes. Moreover, 
lenders do not impose retaliation actions on the borrower as soon as 
repayment stops'". The novelty in McFadden et al’s model is the 
existence of an arrears limit. Below this limit, lenders find it more 
costly to request debt restructuring than to tolerate the arrears. It 
is only if such an arrears limit is exceeded that lenders find it 
worthwhile to start renegotiation procedures.
*
Let L denote the arrears limit which triggers debt restructuring
"See S. Griffith-Jones (1987).
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(IMF arrangement, debt rescheduling, etc); N , the demand for new 
s
loans; N , the supply for new loans; N, the observed new debt; A, the
observed arrears; and an indicator -5=1 if rescheduling and 6=-l
* * d s
otherwise. Define A , desired arrears, as A = N -N . The three
regime model is specified as follows
* . d
Excess Supply: A \0, N = N , A = 0, o=-1
* . * s d s 
Moderate Excess Demand: 0<A \L , N = N , A=N -N , G=-l
*
Large Excess Demand: A >L, 5=1
d s
The demand (N ) and supply (N ) for new loans and the arrears limit
*
(L ) is comprised of a systematic component (D, S and L respectively) 
and an unobservable component. The econometric model is derived by
d s
specifying the distribution of the unobservable components of N , N 
*
and L , and the functional relationship between the systematic 
components and the observed country variables. Given that the 
probability of repayment problems and debt restructuring depend on the 
systematic components indicating excess demand (i.e. D-S and D-S-L 
respectively), it is not possible to identify demand and supply 
separately. However, it is possible to derive the equations
describing the probability of observing each of the three regimes and 
hence, relate them to the observed outcomes of the country through 
specification of the functions D, S and L.
McFadden et. al. test the model for 822 country-year observations 
over the period 1970-82 using limited dependent variable techniques. 
The demand for new loans is found to be strongly increasing with the 
debt service-exports and the imports-gdp ratios and decreasing with
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respect to real gnp per capita. The supply of new loans is negatively
related to past repayment problems (proxied by an index of the number
of reschedulings and IMF agreements since 1970) but, contrary to the
conventional belief, positively associated with the debt-to-exports
ratio. Lenders, they argue, do not guide themselves by current
judgments of creditworthiness, but on the strategic position or export
potential of borrower countries. Also, institutional reasons might
affect the lenders’ decision to call a default or keep on supplying
more loans. The limit on arrears is significantly explained by the
debt-service-to-export ratio and the proxy for past repayment
problems. These suggest that lenders guide their actions through the
percentage of payment due and will not increase the arrears limit if
the borrower has a history of repayment problems. Finally, they find
a significant positive correlation (0.28 with asymptotic t=4.79)
between the demand and supply of unobservables, with most of the
shocks arising from the demand side ( v =1.28 with asymptotic t=8.90
d
versus -J =0.47 with asymptotic t = 20. 28) . 
s
Hajivassi1iou (1987) questions the robustness of the McFadden et 
al three-regime model. In particular, he pays attention to the panel 
nature of the data used to test it. One of the problems encountered 
in the use of panel models is the temporal dependence of unobservable 
variables which can cause serious misspecification. Temporal 
dependence can arise due to country heterogeneity that persists over 
time (countries differ in terms of history, financial development, 
etc) and serial correlation induced by the learning process that 
relies on the history of repayment problems as a predictor of debt 
repayment problems.
Being aware of such problems, Hajivassi1iou first tests the
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robustness of McFadden et al’s model using a trinomial nested logit 
model. Then, he attacks the problem of unobserved country
d s
heterogeneity by allowing the vector of disturbance terms (u , u )
it it
to have an error-component structure: an i.i.d. normal random vector
d s d s
(E , £ ) and a country-specific normal random vector (T- , " )
it it i i
d s
uncorrelated with (£ , £ ) for all i and t.
it it
When he estimates this generalisation of McFadden et al’s model, 
however, he finds that the signs of their estimated coefficients are 
confirmed. He finds a significant positive correlation (0.18 with 
asymptotic t=3.83) between the demand and supply of unobservables with
d
most of the shocks arising from the demand side (J_=0.94 with
s . .
asymptotic t=2.38 versus l _=0.45 with asymptotic t=20.97J.
Country-specific unobservables are important with the demand-side
_d
country effect having a standard v =0.37 (t=7.53) and the supply-side 
s
effect with o' =0.11 (t=6.43). In general, changes in the asymptotic t 
statistics of the independent variables due to random effects 
estimation are in the range of 10 to 25 percent. The proxy for past 
repayment problems was found to be still significant, though its 
significance was lowered. Therefore, the importance of past repayment 
history seemed not to be affected by country heterogeneity.
4. Conclusions
The regressors found significant across the models re-estimated 
for LACs are: the interest-service payments/export ratio, the
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international reserves/imports ratio, the investment/gnp ratio, real 
income growth, OPEC current account/OPEC gnp ratio, real income growth 
of OECD, the history of repayment problems and the index of political 
instability.
Excepting Citron and Nickelsburg, the logit models surveyed 
include variables associated with both lenders’ and borrowers’ 
behaviour. Although it is true that the determinants of repayment 
problems should include the perceptions of all agents, it is not 
possible to disentagle them. For example, the debt to exports ratio 
affects repayment problems positively. The higher this ratio is, the 
higher the demand for loans and the higher the probability of 
repayment problems. We expect lenders to curtail their loans unless 
they perceive that exports are temporarily too low. If the latter is 
the case, then we might find that the ratio is insignificant or even 
has a negative coefficient.
Disequilibrium models provide a way of tackling the above problem 
by allowing for the possibility of examining reactions of lenders and 
borrowers to a given variable. Interestingly, the same indicator may 
differ in importance and sometimes even in sign depending on whether 
the participant is a lender or a borrower (see the Eaton and Gersovitz 
model for example). Furthermore, lenders might let a borrower fall
into arrears without taking any retaliatory action so the next step is
)
to investigate the determinants of the arrears limit which triggers a 
rescheduling or an IMF agreement. McFadden et al and Hajivassi1iou 
provide us with some answers on this. That is, an action for solving 
the impasse of non-repayment is undertaken when the debt service to 
export ratio is high and when the borrower does not exhibit a good 
repayment record. However, the impact of political variables which
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carry an important weight with regard to the attitude of bankers (and 
also borrowers) is not addressed. The analysis of political variables 
as one of the determinants of debt re-arrangements is also motivated 
by the Citron and Nickelsburg’s paper.
Problems of misspecification (due to the panel nature of the 
data) and parameter stability were highlighted in this survey. As 
pointed out by Hajivassiliou, countries differ in past history and 
economic structure and this should be taken into account when 
assessing the causes of non repayment. Also, variables explaining 
past debt trends might not be adequate to interpret the current
non-repayment issues because of the change of the lending source (more
from private lenders instead of official and multilateral sources). 
Furthermore changes in the economic conditions in developed countries 
may affect the probability of non repayment in less developed 
countries. This may prove useful in predicting the duration of debt
crisis and helpful in the design of debt relief arrangements.
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APPENDIX 
Data Definition and Sources
Dependent Variables:
arr3: This arrears (0,1) dummy variable was constructed from our own
investigation. Firstly we listed dates, amounts and type of lender of 
external debt restructured. Then, if the events precipitating a debt 
restructuring happened in a different year, we proceeded to shift the 
dates according to information provided by the Economic Survey of 
Latin America (Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
or ECLAC or CEPAL), IMF Occasional Papers on external debt 
restructuring and international capital markets developments, Jorge, 
Salazar-Carrillo and Higonnet eds. (1983, 1985), Kisic et al (1985), 
Plan (1985) and Milivojevic (1985). This constructed variable was 
validated with the list of non defaulters presented by Dhonte (1975), 
Feder and Just (1977), Hardy (1982), Palmer and Gordon (1985) and 
Canto (1986). Data for multilateral debt relief agreements with 
official and private creditors was assembled using the information 
provided by the World Debt Tables of the World Bank, OECD, IMF and 
Kisic et al (1985). Stand-by Arrangements (SBA), Extended Fund 
Facilities (EFF) and Compensatory Financing Facilities (CFF) were 
compiled from IMF Annual Reports and checked using the data presented 
by Korner et al (1986) and Pastor (1987).
arr2: As arr3 but excluding IMF stand-by and Extended Fund Facility
loans.
arr 1 : Dummy variable taking into account only the date of signature
of a multilateral debt agreement with commercial banks and official
162
creditors. See above.
Independent Variables:
All variables (unless stated) are in million U.S. dollars. The 
debt related ratios correspond to long and medium government and 
publicly guaranteed debt outstanding and were collected from World 
Bank Debt Tables. Although data for short term debt for some 
countries has been recently published by the World Bank in the 1985-86 
World Debt Tables, we have not included it because of missing data for 
years before 1978 and lack of disaggregation between types of 
creditors.
suppliers* credit/debt: percentage of debt outstanding and disbursed
from suppliers to total debt outstanding and disbursed. Source:
World Bank, World Debt Tables (WBDT).
reserves/imports; a) International reserves (excluding gold).
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments. b) Imports
of goods and services. Source: WBDT.
debt/gnp: a) End period debt outstanding and disbursed. Source:
WBDT. b) Gross national product. Source: WBDT.
interest/gnp: a) Interest payments to official and private creditors
in the current period. Source: WBDT. b) Gross national product as
above.
reserves/gnp: See above.
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imports/gnp: See above.
debt/exports: a) Debt as above, b) Exports of goods and service.
Source: WBDT.
debt service/exports: a) Interest and principal repayment in the
current period. Source: WBDT. b) Exports as above.
capital flight/gnp: a) Capital flight defined to include short-term
capital outflows by the private non bank sector plus net errors and 
omissions from the balance of payments. Source: J. Cuddington (1987), 
"Macroeconomic Determinants of Capital Flight: An Econometric
Investigation" in D. Lessard and J. Williamson eds. Capital Flight and 
the Thirld World. b) gnp as above.
real gnp per capita: Gross national product per mid year population
at 1980 market prices (U.S. dollar per capita). Source: 
International Monetary Fund, Output Statistics, Supplement 8 1984.
Alternatively, we used gnp per capita and converted it to real terms 
applying the 1980 U.S.A. gnp deflator. Source: gnp from WBDT, mid
year population from World Bank, World Tables and U.S.A. gnp deflator 
from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
1987 Yearbook (IFS87).
interest/export: See above
debt amortisation/debt outstanding: This is the inverse of the
average loan maturity, a) Debt amortisation includes current year 
principal repayments to private and official creditors. Source: 
WBDT. b) Debt outstanding as above.
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inflation: Percentage change over the previous year of the consumer
price index (1980=100). Source: IFS87.
investment/gdp: Share of total investment to gross domestic product.
Source: IFS87.
dummy OPEC: (0,1) dummy variable which takes the value 1 in 1973-74
and 1978-79.
OPEC current account/OPEC gnp: OPEC member countries current account
and gross national product. Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical
Bulletin, 1985.
real growth of OECD: Growth of real gnp/gdp in the OECD area in
percentages. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, June 1988.
change in current account: Approximated by the change of the balance
of trade over the previous year. Source: WBDT.
change in reserves and IMF credits): Percentage change over the
previous year, a) Reserves as above. b) IMF credits are the 
country’s use of Fund credit within the IMF General Department. 
Source: IFS87.
export variability: Similar to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), for the
periods 1964-70, 1965-71, 1966-72, 1967-73, 1968-74, 1969-75, 1970-76,
1971-77, 1972-78, 1973-79, 1974-80, 1975-81, 1976-82, 1977-83,
1978-84, 1979-85 and for each country, a regression of the natural 
logarithm of real exports on a constant and time was performed. 
Export variability was defined as the standard error of this
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regression. Source: exports from WBDT.
log population: Natural logarithm of mid year population. Source:
WT.
log real gnp: Natural logarithm of real gnp (1980=100). a) Gross
national product in million of U.S. dollars. Source: WBDT. b)
U.S.A. gnp deflator (1980=100). Source: IFS87.
gnp real growth rate: Two different measures were used. For our
applied survey, we follow the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) procedure. 
That is, for the same periods as for export variability and for each 
country, a regression of the natural logarithm of real gnp on a
constant and trend was performed. Gnp real growth rate was defined as 
the estimated coefficient on time. Source: gnp from WDT. Unless
otherwise explicitly stated, we also used the percentage change over 
the previous year of the gdp at 1980=100 prices. Source: IFS87.
log real debt to public institutions: Debt outstanding (including
undisbursed) to official creditors deflated by the U.S.A. gnp deflator
(1980=100). The variable was then logged. Source: WBDT and IFS87.
log real debt to private institutions: Debt outstanding (including
undisbursed) to private creditors deflated by the U.S.A. gnp deflator 
(1980=100). The variable was then logged. Source: WBDT and IFS87.
political indicators: See appendix in the next chapter. Source: A.
Banks (1980, 1986) Political Handbook of the World.
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Chapter 4
Political Variables and Debt Arrears
1. Introduction
Most of the models we surveyed in chapter 3 suggested the 
presence of a systematic relation between macroeconomic variables and 
repayment problems. Except for Citron and Nickelsburg (1987), they 
did not attempt to include political variables which, in addition, 
explain the occurrence of debt servicing problems. This is surprising 
because it is recognised that political processes influence the way 
countries manage debt repayment. Indeed, political factors are taken 
into account in creditworthiness analysis performed by bankers.
The analysis of the politics of debt problems should 
simultaneously relate international and domestic politics*. The size 
of the outstanding debt, the political and strategic importance of the 
debtor, the formation of debtor cartels and the threat of repudiation 
are, among others, counted as possible factors affecting the 
international bargaining positions and outcomes between lenders and 
borrowers. At the negotiating table, the main issue is the amount of 
the loan and the terms of debt service. The agreement is summarised 
in a repayment profile which assumes macroeconomic projections and 
hence, implementation of domestic macroeconomic policies and 
structural adjustments. In practice, it turns out that intentions 
differ from implementation, debt servicing problems arise and
*See for example, Haggard and Kaufman (1989), Pastor Jr. (1987) and 
Kahler ed. (1985).
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borrowers have often been criticized for their lack of commitment to 
agreed economic programmes.
It is well known that stabilisation and adjustment policies have 
different consequences for each social group and political 
consequences for the government in power. They influence the design 
of a program and constrain governments in carrying out their 
intentions. However, as suggested by Haggard and Kaufman (1989), to 
analyse the choice of a policy decision we need to consider not only 
social conflicts but also the institutional setting where it is 
formulated and implemented.
It is not our intention to assess the international bargaining 
position of the creditors and debtors, forecast political upheavals, 
wars, etc. or model the political decision making process inherent in 
the resolution to fall into debt arrears. Subject to these caveats, 
this paper modestly aims to develop a statistical model of debt 
repayment problems which includes economic and political factors. In 
particular, we want to examine the incidence of unstable governments 
and the type of regime. Our sample consists of Latin American 
countries as defined by ECLA (with the exception of Cuba) for the 
period 1971-1986.
Including fixed country effects, we found that economic and 
political variables explained debt servicing problems. Short run and 
long run creditworthiness indicators as well as oil shocks and the 
income growth of industrialised countries affected debt repayment. 
From the political point of view, our results suggested that political 
instability (measured as the successive changes in government) and a 
history of military intervention were counter-productive with respect
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to debt related issues.
After briefly reviewing previous research in the area, section 3 
presents the basic framework of the model and the hypothesis to be 
tested. Section 4 deals with the empirical specification while 
section 5 examines the results. Finally, section 6 discusses the 
implications of our findings.
2. Previous Studies
Although economic and political variables are commonly cited as 
factors explaining debt servicing problems, empirical research to date 
has rarely included them as explanatory variables. In this section we 
review some studies that try to relate the behaviour of sovereign
borrowers and/or lenders to economic as well as political indicators.
Burton and Inoue (1985) identified interest rate differentials 
(average spread over Libor) as the appropriate proxy for bankers’
perception of country risk associated with sovereign loans. They 
assessed how far an awareness of potential default for economic and 
political reasons is actually reflected in interest rate
differentials. They assumed that bankers are mainly influenced by the 
most recent events and thus lagged the economic and political
variables one year. The political instability variable is represented 
by a simple arithmetic combination of assassinations, general strikes, 
guerrilla warfare, government crisis, purges, riots, anti-government 
demonstrations and coups d ’etat over the three years preceding the 
year t-1. After estimating their empirical model for 58 LDCs over the 
period 1972-77, they concluded that the critical determinants of
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interest rate differentials on LDCs’ external debt were the size of 
the loan, the loan maturity and the ratio of foreign exchange to 
monthly imports. The political instability index was found to be 
insignificant with the wrong a priori sign. In sum, their results 
implied that country risk factors played a very small role in the 
determination of the interest rate differentials.
The following comment could be made on the Burton and Inoue work. 
The way the political instability index was constructed assumed that 
each event had the same weight and same effect in the countries under 
study. This variable is measured with error and the estimated 
coefficient should be expected to be biased (downwards) and 
inconsistent. No attempt was made to correct such bias by
formulating, for example, a weighted average according to the 
particular characteristics of each country and the risk experience of 
the lenders with the sovereign borrower.
Another model of country risk incorporating political and 
economic factors is the one of Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) which we 
surveyed in the previous chapter. In contrast to Burton and Inoue, 
their model is derived from optimising behaviour of the 
government-borrower welfare function. They hypothesised that when 
governments are changing frequently, the marginal benefit of default 
relative to alternative policies becomes positive. This is so because 
during times of political instability, the cost of increasing taxes 
for debt repayment may sharply increase the probability of government 
collapse. Thus, in such circumstances, default provides a less costly 
way of adjusting the government budget. The political instability 
index was proxied by a five years moving aggregate of the number of 
changes in governments accompanied by changes in policy. A logit
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equation was fitted for five countries (3 LDCs and 2 DCs) over the 
period 1960-83. They found that their political instability indicator 
was very significant though the only significant economic variable was 
the change in reserves and IMF credits.
When we estimated the Citron and Nickelsburg model using our LACs 
data, we also found the change in gdp had the expected sign and was 
significant. However, the type II error (predicting a
non-rescheduling when in fact a rescheduling took place) was very 
high. After trying alternative definitions for the dependent variable 
and using contemporaneous as well as a one year lag in all regressors, 
our results suggested that the proxy for political instability is an 
important determinant of debt repayment problems.
Recent studies have tried to link political instability of 
developing countries to their accumulation of external public debt,
private capital outflow, income distribution and debt repudiation. 
Alesina and Tabellini (1988) developed a theoretical model where two 
social groups (defined as "capitalist" and "workers") behave
non-cooperatively. Each group, once in office, will attempt to 
redistribute income to their constituency by means of economic
policies. Uncertainty over which group will hold office in the future 
generates political risk which in turn, affects the current decisions 
of economic agents and the government, and hence the probability of 
debt repayment. Private capital flight is explained as an insurance 
against the risk of future taxation. The desirability of capital 
controls depends on the nature of the government i.e. the government
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representing the capitalists never finds it optimal to impose capital 
controls while the government representing the workers always imposes 
some restrictions on capital movements. Overborrowing occurs if the 
government does not internalise the future cost of servicing the debt. 
For example, if the capitalist government knows that with some 
probability the debt will be serviced in the future by the workers’ 
government, then the capitalist government overborrows. Therefore, 
political polarisation may lead to overaccumulation of public debt and 
private capital flight. The costs of repudiating (measured by the 
country loss of output and seizure of private assets held abroad) have 
different distributional implications for the two types of 
governments. It is likely that it is less costly to repudiate for 
workers’ governments; thus the model suggested that repudiation is 
more plausible if a workers’ government unexpectedly gains office.
This idea was carried forward by Berg and Sachs (1988) in their 
attempt to relate the probability of debt rescheduling and the 
secondary market valuation of LDCs debt to structural country 
indicators. Using a cross-section probit model, they associated the 
pattern of rescheduling with the country’s trade regime (the degree of 
outward orientation), political variables that affect effective 
political management (the degree of income inequality and the share of 
agriculture in gnp) and the level of real gnp per capita. This model 
was fitted to 24 observations including only commercial borrowers and 
commercial reschedulings as defined by the World Bank. The dependent 
variable took the value one when countries rescheduled their debts 
with commercial banks between 1982 and 1987. They found that their 
four explanatory variables pefectly discriminated between reschedulers 
and non-reschedulers. To test for a larger sample (35 LDCs) they 
created a measure of outward orientation for the missing data. This
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time, the regression correctly predicted 89 percent of the cases and 
the trade regime variable was found to be statistically insignificant 
while the other regressors remained significant. The insignificance 
of the outward orientation variable is explained by measurement error 
bias.
Political instability in Berg and Sachs was not measured 
directly, but instead indirectly as they tried to identify structural 
economic variables that might contribute to it. Their interest was 
focussed on variables that matter for effective policy management. In 
this context, income inequality and the share of agriculture in gnp 
might be interpreted as proxies of social pressure and conflicts.
We are aware, as Berg and Sachs were, that it is not possible to 
construct accurate measures of the political determinants of country 
performance. The paper by Burton and Inoue also illustrates how 
difficult it is to build a measure of political instability. However, 
it is a common belief that too many changes in regimes during short 
periods, interrupt ions of constitutional or elected mandate, switches 
from right to left regimes, etc. disrupt debt repayment schedules. 
These qualitative variables are related to social conflicts and the 
setting where the policy is formulated and thus help to capture how 
viable a policy decision is. The advantage of working with such 
indicators is that they are directly observed and may be approximated 
using moving aggregates and dummies.
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3. A flodel of Debt Servicing Prcblens
3.1. General Framework
In our theoretical chapter we developed a two period 
willingness-to-pay model where the only source of uncertainty is the 
repudiation penalty. The basic framework was of the form:
d d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
L = L (Yi, Y«, ri, r*, Di, Dj) (1)
LS = LS (Y 2» ri, r S, r y D 2 ) (2)
where 
d
L
s
L
Yi and Y 2 
r 2 and r 2
D 2=(l + r,i)D2 is the inherited debt owed in period 2
The probability of repudiation was determined by the uncertain 
penalty cost and derived from the borrower’s utility maximisation. 
Obviously, the higher the penalty, the lower the probability of 
repudiation. If it is assumed that the repudiation penalty is 
uncertain, then for a given level of output it follows that the higher 
the debt-to-gnp ratio, the lower will be the consumption in the next 
period and therefore the higher will be the incentive to repudiate. 
If lenders can anticipate this result, it is in their interest to
is the demand for loans in period 1 conditional upon 
repayment in period 1
is the supply of loans in period 1 conditional upon 
repayment in period 1
are output in period 1 and 2 respectively
are the interest paid on debt in period 1 and 2
respectively
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supply loans so as to avoid repudiation. Therefore, the probability 
of repudiation takes into consideration both the behaviour of the 
borrowers and lenders.
For empirical purposes the model is limited. It is an 
"all-or-nothing* model in the sense that the borrower repudiates, the 
penalty is imposed and the market breaks down. However, the 1980s 
have been characterised by debt restructuring rather than debt 
repudiation. Nonetheless, our model provides some explanation of the 
use of the debt to gnp ratio as a long run creditworthiness indicator.
As we suggested before, one way out of this problem is to assume 
additional sources of uncertainty. Debt repayment problems happen 
because loans have been agreed in the past using all the information 
available at the time of signature. But repayments are due in the 
future and the borrowers might find themselves in a position where 
repayment is not possible because of say, too high interest rates 
and/or lower output and foreign exchange than expected. Since it is 
not possible to design contracts contingent on all states of the world 
and borrowers care about their credit reputation, a situation of 
arrears may be defined as one of ex-post excess demand for loans. 
Moreover, if borrowers and lenders prefer debt roll-overs to arrears, 
then the one period ahead ex-ante demand for loans would be derived 
from utility maximisation conditional upon the repudiation penalty and 
expectations of future repayment. In this context, arrears are never 
an ex-ante borrower’s choice, but part of the next period inherited 
debt which modifies the resource budget constraint.
The lender’s response to an arrears problem differs depending on 
the amount involved, expectations about future repayment and the
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reputation of the debtor. If there is no prospect of future 
repayment, the lender might declare the loan "value impaired* and 
consequently, call a default and impose retaliatory actions*. If 
expectations of future repayment outweigh the expectations of 
non-repayment and the costs incurred in payment delays, then he might 
adopt one of the following attitudes. Either behave in a passive 
manner because renegotiation costs outweigh the cost of temporary 
delay payments" or restructure the debt and lend involuntarily. 
Testing for the determinants of debt restructuring involves 
considering variables that led to an arrears limit, and also, 
variables that capture confidence in future repayment.
These diverse ways of facing an arrears problem also have 
different implications for the credit market. Severe market break 
down occurs when lenders call a default or borrowers repudiate their 
debts. In both cases, penalties are expected to be imposed, but their 
type and duration might vary. In the former, the market break down 
might be seen as temporary until negotiations are resumed and a 
solution reached. Since outright repudiation is the borrower’s
refusal to accept liability for interest and/or capital repayment
forever (or until a new government renews debt servicing and reaches 
an understanding with its creditors), the spell of market break down 
is expected to be permanent or at least to last a considerable time. 
By contrast, in cases of a low level of arrears or debt restructuring, 
the credit market still functions. Any market break down would be
temporary because the debt will be rolled-over and lending practices
*This has been the case of the IMF, private lenders and Peru since 
1985.
'See Griffith-Jones (1987) and McFadden et al. (1985).
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soon restored.
If the repudiation penalty binds so that borrowers always
recognise their debts, and assuming that both debtors and creditors
prefer some debt arrangement rather than end lending activities, then
*
it is possible to define levels of arrears (A ) which are compatible 
with the continued functioning of the credit market. Let” 
d d
L = D+£ (3)
s s
L = S+£ (4)
where D, S are the systematic components of the demand (L ) and 
/supply (L ) for new loans depending on the observed state of the
d s
country (i.e. history and characteristics) and £ , e are random 
components. Then arrears may be defined as the excess demand for 
loans
* d s d s , „
A = L -L = D-S+ £ -£' (5)
We did not have access to the confidential World Bank files on
*
levels of arrears, so we treated A as an unobserved variable and
constructed a dichotomous (1, 0) dummy variable to account for the
year when a country was in arrears. Therefore, we assume that there
is an underlying response variable A defined by equation (5) so
*
A = 1 if A >0 (6)
A = 0 otherwise
and from the relations (5) and (6) we get
"We borrow from the the standard econometric framework of McFadden et 
al. (1985).
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* s d
Prob(A = l)= Prob(A >0)=Prob[£ -t <(D-S)] = F[(D-S) ] (7)
s d
where F is the cumulative distribution of ( £ -£ ). The likelihood 
function is
L = II F (D-S) II [l-F(D-S)] (8)
A=1 A=0
To formulate an econometric model we need to specify the 
functional form and dependence of the systematic components on 
observed variables and the functional form of F( ) which in turn, 
depends on the assumptions made about the random components. 
Approximating the distribution of the random variables in equation (7) 
by the normal or logistic distributions yields the probit or logit 
model of repayment problems.
Incorporating country specific effects [a ) and assuming that the
l
the random components follow a logistic distribution, we have a
standard logit model of the form
* d s d s , , _
A =D-S + t = s + n * x +i -£ (5’)
it i it
Prob(A =1 
it
l  =  n  f  (
)=F(5’x +a.) (7’)
2. x it l
i ' x .  +a.) II Cl-F (p'x +ff.)] (8 *)
it l it l
A. =1 A. =0
it it
where F (£’ x +a ) = exp(£’x )/l+exp(£’x + £ ))
it i it i it i
= l/l+exp(t* x +s ) 
it i
and 1-F(tf’x +£ ) = exp(£’x )/l + exp(ff’x + a  )
it i it i it i
for i = l......... 19
t = 1971....   1986
As in chapter 3, the sample period is 1971-1986 and we include
all Latin American countries. Assuming that the observations from
different countries are independent, a is a vector of incidental
i
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parameters, P is a vector of structural parameters common to all 19 
countries and x includes all the economic and political variables of 
the model as well as the history of repayment problems of the 
countries in the sample.
The model does not allow for separate identification of demand 
and supply because the systematic part depends only on excess demand, 
that is D-S. We postulate that the excess demand for loans is a 
function of economic and political variables and the borrower’s 
history of repayment problems. Note that we are not including the
forecast errors nor the political decision making process so the model 
should be interpreted as one of arrears pressure ie. potential arrears 
rather than actual arrears.
We lagged all the independent variables one year to reduce the 
problem of simultaneity, because while economic and political 
variables may exert pressure on arrears, at the same time they may 
also be a consequence of it. A one year lag also captures the
assumption that the arrears are influenced by economic and political 
information available at the time of its assessment.
3.2. Explanatory Variables
3.2.1. Economic Indicators and History of Repayment Problems
After comparing the results of the studies discussed in the
survey, we selected the variables which were found significant in most
of our estimations for LACs. Since their influence on debt-servicing
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problems have been discussed earlier, we will just list them and 
briefly recall their expected association with debt arrears:
a) Interest-service payments/exports ratio: It measures the share of
foreign exchange earnings from exports released for interest payments. 
Higher values of this ratio implies greater risk of debt problems and 
thus, a deterioration in repayment prospects.
b) International reserves/imports ratio: This measure captures import
sustainability when there is a shortfall in export earnings. High 
ratios are associated with low repayment problems.
c) Debt outstanding and disbursed/gross national product ratio: It is
an indicator of debt capacity. The higher the ratio, the higher the 
claims of the rest of the world on the resources of the borrower 
country and hence, the higher the probability of repayment problems.
d) Investment to gross national product ratio: It proxies the share 
of production allocated to the accumulation of real assets as opposed 
to consumption. It raises the productive capacity of the economy and 
increases the amount of resources available to service the debt in the 
future.
e) Real income growth: It might be argued that borrowers with high
real income growth fear less from repudiation penalties and hence, 
repayment prospects are low. However, for countries (such as LACs) 
which are heavily dependent on foreign capital, high real income 
growth is more likely to be negatively related to the probability of 
non repayment.
f) OPEC current account/OPEC gross national product ratio: This is a
proxy for petro-dollars recycled from the surplus of oil producers. 
Therefore, we expect it to be negatively associated with debt arrears.
g) Real income growth of industrialised countries: It allows us to
take into consideration not only the 1975/76 and 1981/83 world
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recession but also the dependence of the rate of growth of exports 
from developing countries on the rate of growth of output of developed 
countries. He expect a negative relation between the probability of 
arrears and the real income growth of industrial countries,
h) The history of repayment problems: We include the cumulative count
of rescheduling signatures and IMF support since 1970. We expect 
countries with a long rescheduling history to be more prone to have 
repayment problems. The expected sign of the IMF support history can 
be either positive or negative. Positive because it reflects 
continuous balance of payments problems in the borrowing countries so 
lenders might perceive those countries as highly risky. The negative
association is plausible if we think of IMF loans as substitutes for
multilateral and commercial loans or a precondition for debt 
restructuring.
3.2.2. Political Indicators
For the period being studied, table 1 shows that most of the LACs 
were characterised by alternations between civilian and military 
regimes, coups and prolonged periods of military rule.
Table 1 is self explanatory. We then ask, what is the relation
between debt repayment problems and political instability?
Haggard and Kaufman (1989) linked debt servicing and domestic 
politics through the viability of implementing macroeconomic and 
structural adjustment measures. Their analysis ran in two 
interrelated levels. Firstly, they explored how competing social 
groups (business-government, unionised workers from the public and
181
Table 1
Latin Afterica: Changes in Governaents, 1970-86
Cumulative number of: changes in coups years of
presidents military
civil mil government
Argent ina 4 6 3 11
Brazil 1 2 0 15
Bolivia 3 11 7 15
Chile 1 1 1 1
Colombia 4 0 0 0
Costa Rica 5 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 4 0 0 0
Ecuador 3 2 1 7
El Salvador 3 4 1 10
Guatemala 2 4 1 12
Haiti" 0 2 1 16
Honduras 3 3 2 12
Mex ico 3 0 0 0
Nicaragua" 0 3 1 15
Panama 2 2 0 13
Paraguay v 0 0 0 17
Peru 2 1 0 11
Uruguay 4 1 1 14
Venezuela 3 0 0 0
Source: See Appendix
Notes: "The dictator Duvalier ruled until he was deposed by General 
Namphy in 1986.
"Dictator General Somoza ruled until 1979. He was deposed 
after a civil war and Nicaragua was governed by the FSLN.
In 1985, Daniel Ortega was elected president.
'General Stroessner assumed power by coup d ’etat in 1954 and 
had been "elected" president five successive times. The Co­
lorado Party (dominated by Chaco War veterans) consistently 
supported his regime.
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private sectors, and rural sector) influence the way policy decisions 
are made. Secondly, they analysed the effects of three institutional 
variables: the type of regime, political-electoral cycles and the
strength of the administrative apparatus.
The identification and operationalisation of variables applicable 
to interest conflicts is very complex. The belief is that the 
opposition might undermine the government in power if it does not have 
strong support from other groups. Protests, strikes, etc. create 
political instability, affect the implementation of policies and 
consequently the prospects of debt repayment. Any measure of social 
conflict should consider the possible consequences (income 
distribution, working hours lost, etc.) of a policy implementation, 
how different groups are represented in the political arena and the 
formation of different alliances.
Ways of capturing social conflicts which undermine the political 
effectiveness needed for succesful macroeconomic management were 
proposed and tested by Berg and Sachs (1988). They identified income 
inequality and the share of agriculture in the national product. We 
explore the possibilities of using those indicators in our 
investigation.
Using the 1986 GNP per capita classification of the World Bank, 
all the countries in our sample except Haiti are middle income 
countries1-'. Venezuela has the highest GNP per capita followed by
"Middle income countries are those which had GNP per capita above 425 
U.S. dollars. To preserve the regional classification of other lower 
income countries, Haiti with GNP per capita of 330 U.S. dollars in
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Argentina, Panama, Uruguay, Mexico and Brazil. For countries where 
data is available, table 2 shows the extent of income inequality. The 
percentage share of household income of the top quintile is not less 
than 50% while the lowest quintile receives not more than 5%. The 
pattern of income distribution is also very skew. The panel nature 
of our sample and the lack of appropiate census data precludes us from 
including such a variable in our model unless we make strong 
assumptions like constant income distribution during the period of 
study, irrelevance of the census date although some countries have 
gone through major economic changes, etc. He also explored other 
variables such as sectoral real wages, working hours lost due to 
strikes etc. as proxies for degree of conflict. Unfortunately, the 
data was unreliable and/or incomplete.
The share of agriculture in the national product was included by 
Berg and Sachs to offer some measure of the extent to which 
governments can derive their political support from rural sectors 
rather than urban interests since in the urban sector, people are 
better organised and more politicised. In fact, they found that the 
occurrence of violent coups was negatively related to the share of 
agriculture in national product after controlling for the level of per 
capita income. Since the number of coups is directly observed, we 
instead preferred to include it directly.
If coups are useful to proxy dissatisfaction with the previous 
government, a broader alternative measure is the successive changes in 
government. This will, in addition, reflect an overemphasis of short 
term economic policies. Needless to say the more frequent the changes
1986 is considered by the World Bank as a middle income country.
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Table 2
Ten Latin Anerican Countries:
Percentage Shares of Household Incoae by Quintlles
Date of 
Census
Quinl
(low)
Quin2 Quin3 Quin4 Quin5
(high)
Top 1C
Argentina 1970 4.4 9.7 14.1 21.5 50. 3 35.2
Brazi1 1972 2.0 5.0 9.4 17.0 66.6 50.6
Chile 1968 4.4 9.0 13. 8 21.4 51.4 34.8
Costa Rica 1971 3.3 8.7 13. 3 19.9 54.8 39.5
El Salvador 76-77 5.5 10.0 14.8 22.4 47.3 29.5
Honduras 1967 2.3 5.0 8.0 16.9 67. 8 50.0
Mexico 1977 2.9 7.0 12.0 20. 4 57.7 40.6
Panama 1973 2.0 5.2 11.0 20. 0 61.8 44.2
Peru 1972 1.9 5.1 11.0 21.0 61.0 42.9
Venezuela 1970 3.0 7.3 12.9 22. 8 54.0 35. 7
Source: World Development Report 1980 and 1988
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in the head of government, the less stable a country is and hence the 
greater the likelihood that it will be perceived as very risky by its 
creditors.
Canto (1986) argued that a fairly short planning horizon 
engenders instability and the only policies adopted will be those 
whose realised benefits exceed the realised costs during the 
government’s term. As a result, governments will try to capture the 
maximum amount of resources during their expected term without taking 
into consideration the effects its policies will have on the economic 
activity beyond its expected tenure. Therefore, there are strong 
short run incentives to pursue a myopic strategy. In the long run, 
the effects of this myopic behaviour are detrimental because they are 
likely to result in accumulated debt with the government in office 
unable to meet its international obligations.
The hypothesis of Citron and Nickelsburg (1987) differs slightly 
from the one just presented but has the same connotations. The
problem is not of a short sighted government but its desire to remain 
in power. When governments are changing frequently, the marginal
benefit of non-repayment (relative to alternative policies) is
positive because the proceeds from non-repayment are used as means to 
increase government expenditure which if reduced might lead to a 
government collapse.
Irrespective of the motives of the government incurring large 
deficits, the link between fiscal indiscipline and international debt 
servicing problems is well known. As already suggested, large
government deficits may reflect not only policy mismanagement but also
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an unwillingness on the part of governments to restrict certain
aspects such as corruption and buying the support of the opposition to 
avoid a decline in legitimacy". Unfortunately, consistent and
comparable data on LACs budget deficits is not available.
One implication of the above discussion is that budgets might be 
exploited for short term political and personal advantage rather than 
long term economic and political strategy. This is more plausible if 
the governing political party does not expect to be re-elected since 
the cost is transferred to its successor. We test this hypothesis 
indirectly by constructing two dummy variables: one takes into
account the changes in the head of government irrespective of his
political affiliation; the other considers changes in the head of
government accompanied by changes in the ruling political party.
The institutional setting where the policy is formulated provides 
a rough indicator of the “success" of its implementation. We 
concentrate on the influence of the regime type.
Given the country resource constraint, it is said that 
authoritarian governments must have a high degree of internal 
consensus which eases the carrying out of stabilisation or adjustment 
policies. In addition, the direct control of the military apparatus 
helps to ensure that such policies will be enforced. If so, lenders 
would be more inclined to lend to military regimes since expectation 
of repayment might be perceived to be higher than in democratic or 
multiparty regimes. In other words, it is the nature of the regime 
(democratic versus military) which influences repayment prospects.
"See Sachs and Berg (1988) and Sachs ed. (1987).
187
There is no clear evidence if democratic or authoritarian regimes 
were more successful in implementing adjustment policies and thus, 
improving repayment prospects. Haggard and Kaufman (1989) argued that 
such categories might be too broad to be used as an analytical device. 
They suggest subdividing each category into weak and strong before 
relating them to economic outcomes. This might be true but we found 
it too difficult to apply their characterisation to our data without a 
very deep knowledge of the organisation of the government in each 
country. Instead, we attempted the following crude classification: 
democratically elected governments, military and military-dictators. 
Countries with military-dictators in our sample are Haiti, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay.
On the other hand, military regimes and dictators are also viewed 
as corrupt, abusive and repressive. The successive negation of human 
rights to manage austerity programmes brought internal manifestations 
of protest which had a strong impact in the international community. 
Military regimes remained in politics until their image was totally 
discredited and their power deteriorated. To capture such an effect, 
we include the cumulative years of military and dictatorship regimes. 
In addition, to proxy the international community (lenders included) 
we incorporated a "back to democracy’ dummy which takes the value of 1 
when a democratically elected government suceeded a military or 
dictatorship government. We expect the former to have a positive 
effect on arrears and the latter a negative effect because of the 
lender’s desire to avoid encouraging political protest. This might 
lead to a civil war and a leftist regime which in turn might 
jeopardise any prospects of debt repayment.
Governments with different political inclination have different
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attitudes towards debt repayment. As stated earlier, Alesina and 
Tabellini (1988) analysed the relations between governing political 
groups ("workers" or "capitalists"), accumulation of external debt, 
capital controls and private capital outflow, income distribution and 
repudiation of foreign debt. They argue that each group will 
redistribute income in favour of its own constituency. Left wing 
governments are more inclined to impose capital controls than right 
wing governments. Capital flight is expected to be high when a right 
wing government fails to keep power and gives way to a left wing 
regime. Debt repudiation is an option for both groups depending on 
the perceived repudiation penalty and the level of the outstanding 
debt. Assuming that the penalty is seizure of assets held abroad, 
then it is very costly for right wing governments to repudiate while 
this option is more likely to be observed if a left wing government 
unexpectedly holds office.
Despite the fact that the model designed by Alesina and Tabellini 
refers to repudiation incentives, it is also true that left-wing 
governments are less inclined to follow orthodox IMF stabilisation 
programmes and place the burden of adjustment on the workers. The 
behaviour of lenders is not modelled, but it is plausible to assume 
that the higher the political risk, the less will loans be granted 
because creditors will prefer a credit cut rather than raise the 
interest rate spread. Therefore, we expect to find a positive 
relation between arrears and leftist regimes.
There are several difficulties in operationalising a concept like 
the type of political regime. Mainly, the difficulty arises in the 
unavoidable subjective evaluation attached to the regime in question. 
Take for example, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Internacional) in
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Mexico. This political group is classified by A. Banks (1986) as 
center-left but as middle-of-the road conservative or reformist by J.
Sheahan (1987). Perhaps one of the reasons for such differences is
that the former considers the historical formation and aims of the 
group1 while the latter links it to attitudes such as concern with 
market efficiency, reliance on market forces, social reforms, etc. 
Nonetheless, to have a reference about the kind of regimes might be
preferable to lumping all the countries together in one group as if
the differences do not matter.
4. Empirical Specification
Bearing in mind that all regressors are lagged one period and 
omitting country and time subscripts, our logit model is of the form
Prob(A=l) = f(dcountry, int/export, res/import, debt/gnp, 
real growth gdp, inv/gdp, ca/gnp OPEC, 
real growth gnp OECD, rescheduling history,
IMF history, index of gov changes, party-head, 
head, military history, back to democracy 
civil-mil-dictator, right-left)
where:
Prob (A = 1) Probability of arrears (arr3)
dcountry fixed effect country specific dummy
!The PRI has its roots in the Mexican revolutionary period. It was 
founded as Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929 and redesignated as 
Partido Revolucionario Mexicano in 1938. It took the name Partido
Revolucionario Internacional in 1946. Since its foundation, the main
objective of the party has been to carry forward the work of the 1910
revolution. See Banks (1980, 1986).
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int/export 
res/import 
debt/gnp
real growth of gdp
inv/gdp
ca/gnp OPEC
real growth gnp OECD
rescheduling history
IMF history
index of gov changes
party-head
head
military history
civil-mil-dictator
back to democracy 
right-left
interest service payment to exports ratio
international reserves to imports ratio
outstanding debt to gnp ratio
real growth of gdp (1980=100)
investment to gdp ratio
OPEC current account to OPEC gnp ratio
real gnp growth of OECD countries
cumulative count of rescheduling signatures
since 1970
cumulative count of SBA higher tranche and 
EFF since 1970
moving aggregate of changes in the head of 
of the government
dummy for changes in the political party 
in office
dummy for changes of presidents 
cumulative years of military and/or 
dictatorships since 1970 
dummy for years of military and/or 
dictatorship regimes
dummy for years of "back to constitution" 
dummy for right to left regime grouping
Detailed definitions and sources of the dependent variable, 
economic variables and the indicators of history of repayment problems 
were given in the data appendix of the previous chapter.
We constructed proxies for the political variables to try to 
capture not only the effect of continuous changes in the head of 
government but also switches from one type of regime to another. We 
did so based on the information on presidents, coups and attempted 
coups, governing political party and political inclination of the 
government in office compiled from A. Banks (1980, 1986) and presented 
in the appendix. Next, we detail the way these proxies were built.
Index of gov changes: We tried both of the following specifications.
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The first one is a five years moving aggregate of changes in the head 
of government i.e. Citron and Nickelsburg type of political 
instability. The second is a variation of the former. Instead of 
five years, we take the term election (e.g. 6 years for Argentina, 5 
years for Peru, 4 years for Guatemala, etc.) to construct the moving 
aggregate. We started counting from the closest year to an election 
of a constitutional president. If such an event lagged with respect 
to 1970 more than a term election, then the counting started 
arbitrarily in 1970. We labelled it election term moving aggregate.
Despite being less restrictive than the simple five years moving 
aggregate of changes in the head of government used in our applied 
survey, the election term moving aggregate is only a crude measure of 
political instablity because it does not take into account the timing, 
nature, and changes of economic policies during the period"'.
Party-head: Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a change in
the head of government and political party took place and zero 
otherwise.
Head: Dummy which takes the value of 1 if a change in the head of
government (irrespective of the political party) took place and zero 
otherwise.
Military history: This is simply the cumulative count of years of
military and dictatorship regimes since 1970.
"As stated in our applied survey, a study of changes and effects of 
economic programmes would be a research in its own right.
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Civi1-mi 1-dictator: We constructed two dummies. The first one is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 0, 1, 2 in the years of
democratic, military and dictatorship regimes respectively. Countries 
with dictators are Haiti under Duvalier, Nicaragua under Somoza and 
Paraguay under Stroessner. The second dummy takes the value of 1 in 
the years of military and dictatorship regimes and zero otherwise. 
That is, it treats military and dictatorship governments as 
equivalent. We labelled this dummy, civil-mil.
Again, note that the military and/or dictatorship presence 
proxies are crude measures. They do not consider the cohesiveness of 
the elite which is a crucial factor in determining if a regime would 
be able to implement stabilisation policies, nor makes direct 
reference to the success or failures of the stabilisation programmes.
Back to democracy: Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a
democratic elected government succeeded a military or dictatorship 
government and zero otherwise.
Right-left: We classified the regimes into four groups, from right
(to which we assign a value of 1) to left (to which we assign a value 
of 4). The intermediate categories correspond to center-right and 
center-left. The only countries included as left are Chile in the 
Allende period and Nicaragua after 1979 because of their Marxist 
political leadership.
Besides the one lag common to all regressors, we included an 
additional lag in the investment to gdp ratio because it provided a 
better fit without modifying the basic results. By the same token, we 
used the real growth rate of selected OECD countries (United States,
193
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Canada) instead of 
the OECD total; we included the election term moving aggregate instead 
of the five years moving aggregate as our index of government changes 
and the civil-military dummy instead of the civil-military-dictator 
dummy.
Finally, it should be noted that we performed, without success, 
an alternative series of regressions using different empirical 
specifications and combinations of the political variables. In 
particular,
-since the index of government changes is highly positively correlated 
with the change in the head of government (head) and the cumulative 
number of coups and attempted coups from 1970 (70cumcoup), we tested 
the model using either head or 70cumcoup and both instead of the index 
of government changes.
-we tried a coup dummy variable (1 for coup and 0 otherwise) as an 
alternative to 70cumcoup
-we entered the dummies head and party-head with a one year lag to try 
to capture the end of the electoral term in which incumbent 
governments might spend more to leave a better political image or 
simply to have a "windfall gain" and enrich themselves, passing the 
cost to their successors.
5. Enpirical Results
Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of this model using 
293 observations because of missing variables for Argentina (1985), 
Nicaragua (1984 and 1985) and Haiti (from 1978 to 1985). Model I 
presents the unrestricted version of the model under the assumption
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Table 3 
Latin Aserican Countries:
Probability of Arrears and Significant IHF Support (1971-86)
Method of Estimation: Logit
Dependent Variable: Probability of arrears
Independent Variables (all lagged one year):
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Argentina 0. 268 0.019
(0.122) (0.010)
Bolivia 0. 572 -0.014
(0.246) (0.007)
Brazil -1.549 -1.754
(0.586) (0.792)
Chile 1.468 1.440
(0.817) (1.119)
Colombia 2. 566 2.593
(1.313) (1.428)
Costa Rica 1.455 1.256
(0.842) (0.752)
Dorn Repub 0.549 0.712
(0.309) (0.463)
Ecuador 2.233 2.210
(1.208) (1.339)
El Salvador -4.335 -4.001
(1.926) (1.950)
Guatemala -0.896 -1.190
(0.463) (0.719)
Haiti 2. 984 2.595
(1.774) (2.164)
Honduras 1.877 1.563
(1.008) (1.045)
Mexico -0.026 0. 500
(0.011) (0.278)
Nicaragua 1.481 1. 106
(0.716) (0.612)
Panama 1.854 1.498
(0.803) (0.797)
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Paraguay -11.873
(0.080)
-12.186 
(0.082)
Peru 2. 463 
(1.127)
2.430
(1.642)
Uruguay -0.044
(0.026)
-0.027
(0.020)
Venezuela
constant
2. 225 
(1.047)
-0.009
(0.009)
2.565 
(1.341)
int/export 12.809 8.692 12.832
(1.838) (2.235) (1.871)
res/import -4.825 -3.524 -5.014
(2.114) (2.638) (2.237)
debt/gnp 3. 712 4.112 4. 133
(1.772) (3.184) (2.061)
(inv/gdp) -8.780 -5.785 -8.369
(1.827) (1.879) (1.710)
real growth of 
gdp
-0.124 -0.118 -0.112
(2.344) (2.684) (2.208)
ca/gnp OPEC -0.090 -0.053 -0.084
(2.591) (1.962) (2.543)
real growth of 
OECD
-0.291 -0.243 -0.292
(2.341) (2.350) (2.427)
rescheduling 
hi story
0. 464 0.559 0.513
(1.554) (2.370) (1.946)
IMF history -1.018 -0.232 -1.034
(2.500) (1.288) (2.686)
index of gov 
changes
0. 762 0.226 0.769
(2.315) (1.277) (2.352)
party-head -0.871 
(0.775)
-0.687 
(0.710)
head 0. 589 
(0.544)
0. 750 
(0.827)
military
history
0. 256 -0.022 0.241
(2.241) (0.407) (2.189)
civi1-mil -0.511
(0.589)
0.465
(1.005)
0.643 
(0.746) 
9.040 
(2.468) 
-3.527 
(2.668) 
4.440 
(3.373) 
-6.204
(1.981) 
-0.106
(2.531) 
-0.048 
(1.842) 
-0.244
(2.391)
0.523
(2.335)
-0.271
(1.549)
0.231
(1.372)
-0.005 
(0.109)
democracy
(2.203) (1.655) (2.282) (1.758)
right-left 0.224 0.279
(0.526) (1.041)
Sample size 293 293 293 293
Log likelihood -92.06 -108.34 -93.11 -109.51
Correct predictions (*) 87.71 87.03 87.71 86.01
Type I error (*) 5.67 5. 15 5.67 5.15
Type II error (*) 25.25 28.28 25.25 31.31
Absolute values of the "t" statistics are given in parenthesis.
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that the peculiarities of each country are independent, while model II 
shows it without the country dummies. The likelihood ratio test was
used to determine the usefulness of estimating the model with fixed
country specific effects. The calculated value of 32.56 with 18
degrees of freedom exceeds the critical chi-square at 2.5% level of
significance (rejecting the null hypothesis of no country fixed 
effects) but not at the 1% level. This cast doubts about whether the 
omission of country dummies yields unbiased and consistent estimates. 
El Salvador and Haiti are the countries showing very significant 
country specific effects'.
We find the probabilities of arrears to be significantly 
increasing in the interest-service payments/export ratio and the debt 
to gnp ratio, suggesting the need for new loans to finance debt 
accumulation. The negative relation between the probability of 
arrears and the reserves/import ratio reflects lenders’ perception of 
borrowers’ creditworthy position rather than the borrowers’ perception 
of the non-repayment penalty. Real income growth and the
investment/gdp ratio are important determinants of the probability of 
repayment. Also their estimated coefficients seemed to be associated 
more with the reliance on loans to achieve growth than with the Eaton 
and Gersovitz type of repudiation penalty perception.
"El Salvador is one of the lowest real income per capita countries in 
Central America, while Haiti has the lowest real income per capita in 
Latin America. We tested our general model including this variable to 
explore its importance. The estimated coefficient of real income per 
capita had a surprising positive coefficient (0.014), an insignificant 
"t" statistic (0.253) and did not help much to decrease the importance 
of the El Salvador and Haiti country effects.
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The proxy for oil shocks and the real income growth of OECD 
countries were also found to be very significant and with the expected 
sign.
As expected, the history of reschedulings is a strong indicator 
of future repayment problems. On the other hand, the negative and 
significant coefficient of the IMF history regressor suggests that 
these loans are substitutes for multilateral or commercial loans 
and/or a precondition for lending. This does not disregard the fact 
that lenders perceive countries with successive balance of payment 
problems as less creditworthy. Both effects might be present but the 
former outweighs the latter.
Proceeding to political indicators, the significant positive
relation between the index of government changes and the probability 
of repayment problems supports the political instability and non 
repayment pressure hypothesis.
The dummy variable signalling changes in the head of government 
turned out to be positive but insignificant. The positive sign 
suggests that new presidents find themselves in a difficult situation 
due to the debt left by their predecessors and to the unpopularity
that immediate adjustment measures might cause. The dummy variable
accounting for changes in the head of the government and political
party is found to be negative although insignificant. This negative 
relation considers the behaviour of the party group and thus might be 
suggesting that presidents are less short-sighted if the party in 
power regains office. We also tried an additional lag in both dummies 
to account instead for the end of the electoral cycle, but the results 
were similar to the ones presented and are not reported.
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The dummy for military and dictatorship presence is 
insignificantly negative. However, debt service problems strongly 
increase with the cumulative count of years of military and 
dictatorship rule. The signs of both estimates support the commonly 
held view that although authoritarian regimes might be perceived by 
lenders as more creditworthy than democratic ones, over time, 
authoritarian regimes tend to lose this reputation due to corruption 
and the use of force to control political upheavals. This in turn, 
threatens the prospects of debt repayment. In fact, the dummy 
accounting for "back to democracy" is significantly negative. Note 
that this variable captures only the euphoria of the change"" and does 
not capture whether a military or democratically elected government is 
more inclined or not to incur debt repayment problems. As argued 
earlier, although the dummy for years of military and dictatorship 
presence has the expected sign, it can not be counted as one of the 
variables explaining debt service problems.
The variable accounting for right-to-left political regimes has 
the correct sign giving support to the Alesina and Tabellini argument. 
However, it is insignificant which is not surprising. The variable is 
likely to be measured with error because of the procedures applied in 
its construction, hence one should expect the estimated coefficient to 
be inconsistent and biased towards zero.
Model III shows that the accuracy of our prediction is similar
" ‘Instead of the "back to democracy" dummy, we tried a "democracy 
accommodation" dummy which took the value 1 in the year of the change 
from military to civil regime and also in the following year. The 
estimated coefficient of this variable was found to be negative but 
insignificant corroborating the euphoria effect.
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after dropping all economic and political explanatory variables found 
insignificant in model I. Moreover, the likelihood ratio statistic is 
2.11, well below the critical chi-square at 5 percent level and four 
degrees of freedom.
For completeness, model IV presents the results with no country 
specific effects. As expected, the likelihood ratio test between 
Model III and IV rejected the null hypothesis of no country specific 
effects at the 5 percent level of significance.
It is difficult to give an obvious interpretation of the country 
background dummy. A positive estimated coefficient might be 
reflecting the country bias in meeting debt obligations, creditors’ 
lack of confidence in the prospects of future repayment, difficulties 
in maintaining the political status quo, etc. This is so if we recall 
that in our model arrears are assumed to be carried forward as part of 
the inherited debt. On the other hand, a negative relation implies a 
non repayment attitude or perhaps, a more compliant attitude by 
lenders to avoid jeopardising their own investment. In our preferred 
regression, the dummy appeared to be positive for the majority of the 
countries. Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Uruguay (countries with strong military presence until at least 1985) 
were the ones with negative coefficients. Country specific fixed 
effects were found to be very significant only for El Salvador and 
Haiti and marginally significant for Peru.
Peru, has experienced two periods of center left governments, 
firstly from 1968-74. with very strong state intervention in the 
economy and secondly, the Alan Garcia’s regime with the particular 
feature of limiting international debt repayments. Perhaps the Peru
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dummy is picking up those effects. In fact, when the type of 
political inclination variable is included, the Peru dummy loses 
significance.
In contrast with the case of Latin America as a whole, where the 
increase in external debt came primarily from private creditors, 
around 75 percent of Haiti’s debt outstanding is from official 
creditors. From 1975 to 1978, the Inter-American Development Bank 
lent Haiti about 60 percent of its multilateral loans. As a 
consequence, Haiti acquired its debt with the usual favourable 
implications for both the interest rate charged and maturity period. 
This in part explains its history of no debt restructuring in the 
1970s and early 1980s despite having the lowest income per capita in 
the sample. Therefore, the debt burden itself seems not to offer an 
explanation of the significantly positive Haiti dummy. However, the 
particular characteristics of the Haiti economy (e.g. exporter mainly 
of coffee and cocoa, very underdeveloped industry and highly dependent 
on foreign direct investment, a reputation for mismanaging public 
projects, poltical elite’s use of state finance, etc.) might explain 
its propensity to fall into debt service problems. In El Salvador, 
private commercial loans are also relatively modest. Its trade relies 
heavily on the United States and neighbouring members of the Central 
American Common market. Political problems between right and left 
wing groups rapidly escalated in 1979 and the possibility of a civil 
war grew. Bilateral loans more than trebled in 1980 compared to 1975, 
mainly to finance internal military activities. It is probable that 
its proximity to Nicaragua and the well known attitude of the United 
States in Central American affairs might explain the strong negative 
El Salvador dummy though it is still puzzling.
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To explore the importance of political indicators, we estimated 
model III without them. Comparing such results with our preferred
regression, type I and type II errors were similar. However, the
value of the log likelihood ratio (12.36) was above the critical
chi-square for 3 degrees of freedom, rejecting the null hypothesis
(estimated coefficients of the political variables are zero) at the 1 
percent level.
With regard to the size of the estimated coefficients, table 4 
(column 1) shows the important effects of country liquidity and long 
run creditworthiness indicators on the log-odds ratio. The results 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, a high interest/export ratio 
substantially raises the probability that the country will be in 
arrears. Similarly, as the reserves/import ratio decreases, the
probability of a country falling into arrears increases but the
magnitude of this effect is less than that of the interest/export
ratio. Other variables remaining constant, a high investment/gdp
ratio decreases the probability that a country will be in arrears; an 
increase in the debt/gnp ratio also decreases this probability. Real 
growth of gdp, the proxies for OPEC surplus, world demand and history 
of repayment problems all have a significant influence on the 
probability of debt arrears though their magnitudes are small relative 
to the effect associated with any of the ratios mentioned earlier in 
the paragraph. Concerning political indicators, the index of 
government changes and the proxy for military history are both 
significant but the impact on the log-odds ratio is very small. A 
switch from military-dictatorship to democracy reduces the log-odds 
ratio by 2. As stated earlier, only the dummies for El Salvador and 
Haiti were found significant. Again, ceteris paribus, the El Salvador 
dummy reduces the probability of repayment problems while the Haiti
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dummy shifts it up.
We use two methods to investigate the effects of a change in an
independent variable on the probability of arrears. Firstly, we
calculate the derivatives of the probabilities at the mean values of 
the independent variables and thus compute the implied 
"quasi-elasticities". Secondly, we replicate the model for a 1% 
change in each economic indicator in turn and then compare the 
predicted probabilities before and after the change. For variables 
indicating rescheduling and IMF history, as well as for the political 
variables (index of government changes and military history), we 
assume a one unit change instead. We also ask whether the
probabilities would change if no country switched from a 
military-dictatorship to a democratic regime. Note that because of 
non linearities in the system, these two procedures of estimating the 
elasticities are different and not strictly comparable. The former 
procedure tells us about the "quasi-elasticities of the average". The 
latter procedure gives the "average of the elasticities".
According to the first method, if the average interest/exports 
ratio rises by 1%, ceteris paribus, the probability of arrears
increases by 0.33%. Similarly, an increase of 1% in the
reserves/imports ratio decreases the probability of arrears by 0.42%. 
A decrease of 1% in the debt/gnp ratio decreases the probability of 
arrears also by 0.42%. An increase of 1% in the investment/gdp ratio 
decreases the probablity of arrears by 0.60%. The
"quasi-elasticities" of real growth of gdp, the proxies for OPEC
surplus, world demand and history of repayment problems (cumulative
number of reschedulings) are less than 0.30% though their influence on
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Table 4
Latin American Countries: Significant1 Regressors in ttodel III
All LACs All LACs except Bolivia
Colombia 2.593 3.027
(1.428) (1.660)
El Salvador -4.001 -5.616
(1.950) (2.203)
Haiti 2. 595 3. 158
(2.164) (2.512)
Peru 2.430 2.938
(1.642) (1.936)
int/export 12.832 13.132
(1.871) (1.813)
res/import -5.014 -6.343
(2.237) (2.607)
debt/gnp 4. 133 4.541
(2.061) (2.165)
(inv/gdp) -8.365 -8.087
(1.710) (1.747)
real growth of gdp -0.112 -0.126
(2.208) (2.310)
ca/gnp OPEC -0.084 -0.126
(2.543) (3.210)
real growth of OECD -0.292 -0.317
(2.427) (2.427)
rescheduling history 0.513 0.523
(1.946) (1.911)
IMF history -1.034 -1.239
(2.686) (2.980)
index of gov changes 0.769 1. 169
(2.352) (2.494)
military history 0.241 0.286
(2.189) (2.439)
back to democracy -1.911 -1.900
(2.282) (2.088)
Sample size 293 277
Log likelihood -93.11 -82.68
Correct predictions (%) 87. 71 89.17
Type I error (%) 5.67 5.35
Type II error (%) 25.25 22.22
Notes : xAt least 15% significance level.
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the probability of arrears is very significant. A 1% increase in the 
number of cumulative SBA will decrease the probability of arrears by 
0.55%. Concerning political indicators, a 1% change in the index of 
government changes will increase the probability of arrears by 0.34%. 
A 1% change in the proxy for military history will increase the 
probability of arrears by 0.45%.
In terms of the second method, ceteris paribus, an increase of 1% 
in the interest/export ratio would increase the average probability of 
debt arrears by 0.16%. Similarly, if countries had signed an
additional rescheduling, the probability of arrears would increase by 
0.16%. An extra SBA would decrease the probability of arrears by 
0.28%. The effect of a 1% change in the other economic indicators is 
less than 0.005%. With respect to political variables, a one unit 
increase in the index of government changes would increase the average 
probability of arrears by 0.42% while one year more of military regime 
would raise it by 0.24%. If no countries were to return to
constitutional democracies, then the probability of arrears would 
increase by 0.21% on average.
How many countries would fall into arrears after a change in one 
of the independent variables? In the logit (also probit) regression,
a change in an exogenous variable would have the greatest impact on 
the probability of being or not being in arrears at the midpoint of 
the cumulative distribution. The low slope at the beginning and end
of the distribution implies that a large change in an exogenous
variables is necessary to change the probability. In our estimated 
equation, a 1% increase in the interest/export ratio would increase 
the number of predicted country-year observations in debt arrears by
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21%. An extra rescheduling would have implied a 14% increase while an 
extra SBA would have switched only one year-country observation into 
the group of predicted countries with no arrears. An additional unit 
in the index of government changes would have shifted an extra 54% of 
observations into the group of predicted countries with debt troubles; 
while an additional year of military regime would implied 29% more. 
If countries with mi 1itary-dictatorships were not to return to 
constitutional regimes, then the predicted countries with arrears 
problems would increase by 20%.
It is interesting to note that for the countries in the sample 
(except Haiti and Nicaragua), the long term interest/export ratio 
increased on average by 29% between 1981 and 1982. Over the same 
period, the reserves/import ratio fell by 17%, the debt/gnp ratio rose 
by 22% and real gnp declined by just over 2%. The OPEC current 
account/gnp ratio fell from 6.7 to -0.9 while the growth of real 
income of the five largest OECD countries declined from 1.7% to -0.7%. 
As we will see in chapter 5, the situation of the LACs has not 
improved substantially.
Finally, since Bolivia exhibited the highest number of changes in 
presidents and coups d ’etat (see table 1), we estimated the whole set 
of equations excluding Bolivia from the sample. The results did not 
change substantially. We report our findings for model III in the
second column of table 4.
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6. Conclusions
In summary, on the basis of statistical tests, the logit model 
estimates indicate that economic and political variables are
significantly related to debt service capacity. In addition to the 
interest payments to exports ratio, reserves to import ratio, total 
debt to gnp ratio, investment to gdp ratio and real income growth
drawn from the studies we surveyed, our results indicate that the 
election term moving aggregate, the cumulative count of years of 
military political presence since 1970 and the "back to democracy" 
dummy are also relevant.
Indicators of repayment history (as suggested by McFadden et. 
al., 1985) were used in order to capture some of the country effects. 
They were found to be statistically significant. In addition, the
country effects for El Salvador and Haiti were very signifcant but 
only marginally significant for Peru. There is no obvious 
interpretation of these variables, though to a certain extent we 
attempted some explanations.
We have, in part, reconciled the inclusion of political variables 
in the assessment of
creditworthiness as is often done by bankers. The election term
moving aggregate was found to be significant suggesting, other things 
being equal, the shorter the planning horizon (due to succesive 
changes in the head of state) the more likely the occurrence of debt 
repayment problems. In spite of the fact that authoritarian and 
military regimes might have some apparent advantages in managing debt 
related issues over democratically elected governments, the history of 
their intervention appeared to be counter-productive. Most of the
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countries which returned to democracy did so during the first half of 
the 1980s. This coincidence might support the view that military 
regimes withdraw from politics because of their inability to manage 
further austerity policies and their discredited reputation. Since 
actual debt problems are in general blamed on the predecessor, new 
democratically elected governments might not only gain the sympathy of 
the international comunity but also be more succesful in gaining 
political support for adjustment measures. Our estimate of political 
inclination of the head in office is subject to measurement error bias 
but gives some support to the Alesina and Tabellini hypothesis.
In terms of economic related variables, the countries’ debt 
service capacity seemed to be affected by both short and long term 
creditworthiness indicators.
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Latin Anerican Presidents
Country/President Date Political Party and Comments
Argentina
A. Frondizi 1958
A. Guido 1963
A. 111i a 1963
Gral. J.Ongania 1966
Gral. R.Levingston 1970
Gral. A.Lanusse 1971
Gral. H.Campora 1973
J. Peron 1973
E. Peron 1973
Gral. J.Videla 1975
Gral. E.Viola 1978
Gral. E.Galtieri 1981
Gral. E.Bignone 1982
R. Alfonsin 1983
UCRI
UCR/Transitional Constitutional 
UCRP
Military coup 
Military 
Military coup 
MNJ/Resigned 
FREJULI 
FRE JUL. I 
Military coup 
Military 
Military
Mi 1 itary/Malvinas war 
UCR
UCR:
UCRI:
UCRP:
MNJ:
FREJULI:
Term election: 
Regime type:
Union Civica Radical
Union Civica Radical Intransigente
Union Civica Radical del Pueblo
Movimiento Nacional Justicialista
Frente Justicialista de Liberacion
six years
1970-72 (R)
1973-74 (CR)
1975-82 (R)
1983-85 (CL)
Bolivia
Dr. V.Paz Estensoro 1960 
Gral. R.Barrientos 1964 
Gral. A.Ovando 1965
Gral. R.Barrientos 1966 
L. Siles Salinas 1969
MNRM
Military coup/Resigned 
Military
MNB/Military elected 
MNRH/Succeeded as vice president 
after the death of Barrientos
Gral. A.Ovando 1969 Military coup
Gral. R .Miranda 1970 Military coup
Gral. J .T orres 1970 Military coup
Gral. H .Banzer 1971 Military coup
Gral. J .Pereda 1978 Military elected
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Gral. D.Padilla 1978 Military coup
U. Guevara 1979 Interim president
Col. A.Natush 1979 Military coup
L. Gurilier 1979 Interim president
Gral. L.Garcia 1980 Military coup/Resigned
Military Junta 1981
Gral. C.Torrelio 1981 Mi 1 itary/Resigned
Gral. C. Vildoso 1982 Military
Dr. H.Siles Zuazo 1982 MNRI
Dr.V.Paz Estenssoro 1985 MNRH
MNRH: Movimiento Nacional Revolucion Historico
MNB: Movimiento Nacional Barrientitsta
Term election: four years
Regime type: 1970-77 (CR)
1978-81 (R)
1982-85 (CR)
Brazil
J.da Oliveira 1956
J.da Silva 1961
Mar. H.Castello 1964 Military coup
Mar. A.da Costa 1967 Military
Gral. E.Garrastuzu 1969 Military
Gral. E.Geisel 1974 Military
Gral. E.Figueiredo 1979 Miliaty
J. Sarney 1985 PDS
PDS: Partido Democratico Social
Election term: six years
Regime type: 1970-78 (R)
1979-85 (CR)
Chile
J. Alessandri 1958
E. Frei 1964 PDC
S. Allende 1970 UP
Gral. A.Pinochet 1973 Military coup
PDC: Partido Democrata Cristiano
UP: Unidad Popular
Election term: six years
Regime type: 1970-72 (L)
1973-85 (R)
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Colonbia
A. Lleras 1958 PL
G. Valencia 1962 PC
C. Ileras 1966 PL
M. Pastrana 1970 PC
A. Lopez Michelsen 1974 PL
A. Turbay Ayala 1978 PL
B. Betancur 1982 PC
V. Barco Vargas 1986 PL
PL:
PC:
Election term: 
Regime type:
Partido Liberal 
Partido Conservador 
four years 
1970-73 (R)
1974-81 (CR)
1982-85 (R)
1986 (CR)
Costa Rica
M. Jimenez 
F. Orlich 
J. Fernandez 
J. Figueres 
D. Oduber 
R. Carazao 
L. Monge 
0. Arias
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
PLN
PLN
PU
PLN
PLN
PLN:
PU:
Term election 
Regime type:
Partido de Liberacion Nacional 
Partido Unidad 
four years 
1970-86 (R)
Doainican Republic
Gral. R. Trujillo 
J. Balaguer
R. Bonelly 
J. Bosch 
Cnel. E.Wessin
H. Godoy
J. Balaguer
A. Guzman
1930 Dictator/Assassinated
1961 Overthrown by militaries/ 
Council of State succeeded
1962 Head of Council of State
1963 PLD
1963 Military coup
1965 Provisional Government after
U.S.A. intervention
1970 PR/Re-elected for another term
1971 Attempted coup
1978 PRD
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1979 Attempted coup
S. Jorge 1982 PRD
Dr. J. Balaguer 1986 PRSC
PLD: Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana
PRD: Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
PR: Partido Reformista
PRSC Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano
Term election: four years
Regime type: 1970-85 (CR).
Ecuador
Dr. C.Ponce 
J. Velasco
C. Arosemena Gomez 
Military Junta 
C. Yerovi
0. Arosemena Monroy
J. Velasco
Gral. G.Rodriguez
Military Junta
J. Roldos
0. Hurtado 
L. Febres
1956
1960
1961 
1961 
1963 
1966 
1966 
1968 
1972
1975
1976
1979
1979
1984
1986
Military coup 
PNR
Military coup 
Interim Government 
CID/Interim Government
Military coup 
Attempted coup
Whole cabinet resigned and the 
crisis led to its formation. 
PDC/Resigned '
PDC/Succeeded as Vice President 
PSC
Attempted coup
PNR: Partido Nacional Revolucionario
CID: Coalicion Institucionalista Democratica
PDC: Partido Democrata Cristiano
PSC: Partido Social Cristiano
Election term: four years
Regime type: 1970-78 (R)
1979 (CL)
1980-86 (CR)
El Salvador
Lt. Col.J .Lemuo 1957 
Gral. M.Castillo 1960
Gral. A. Portillo 1961
Gral. E. Gordon 1962
Cnel. J. Rivera 1962
Gral. F.Sanchez 1967
Military coup
Military
Military
PCN/Military elected 
PCN/Military elected
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Cnel. A.Molina 
Gral. C.Romero 
Cnel. J.Gutierrez 
Cnel. A. Majano
J. Duarte 
A. Magana 
J. Duarte
PCN:
PDC:
Election term: 
Regime type:
Guatemala
Cnel. C.Castillo 
Gral. M .Idigoras 
Cnel. E.Peralta 
J. Mendez 
Cnel. C.Arana 
Cnel. K.Laugerud 
F. Lucas 
Gral. E.Rios 
Gral. 0.Mejia 
V. Cerezo
PR:
PID:
PDCG:
Election Term: 
Regime type:
Haiti
F. Duvalier
J .Duvalier 
Gral. H.Namphy
PUN:
Regime type:
1972 PCN/Military elected
1977 PCN/Military elected
1979 Military coup
1979 Head of the civil/military
Junta formed after the coup
1980 PDC
1982 Provisional president
1984 PDC
Partido de Conciliacion Nacional 
Partido Democrata Cristiano 
five years 
1970-79 (R)
1988-86 (CR)
1954 Military coup/Assesi
1958 Military
1963 Military
1966 PR
1970 CAN/Military elected
1974 Military elected
1978 PID
1982 Military Junta
1983 Military coup
1986 PDC
Partido Revolucionario
Partido Institucional Democratico
Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatelmateco
four years
1970-85 (R)
1958 Elected but degenerated in
dictator.
1971 PUN/Dictator
1986 Military coup
Parti de l’Unite Nationale 
1970-85 (R)
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Honduras
R. Villas 1957
Cnel. 0.Lopez 1963
Cnel. 0.Lopez 1964
R. Cruz 1971
Cnel. 0.Lopez 1972
Cnel. J.Melgar 1975
Gral. P.Garcia 1978
R. Suazo 1982
J. Azcona 1986
Military coup
Designated president by the 
Constituent Assembly 
Constitutional president 
PN/Military coup 
Military coup 
Military coup 
Constitutional president 
PLH
PN:
PLH:
Election term: 
Regime type:
Partido Nacional 
Partido Liberal de Honduras 
four years 
1970-71 (R)
1972-74 (CR)
1975-81 (R)
1982-86 (CR)
Hexico
A. Lopez Mateo 1958 PRI
G. Diaz Ordaz 1964 PRI
L. Echevarria 1970 PRI
J. Portillo 1976 PRI
M. de la Madrid 1982 PRI
C. Salinas 1988 PRI
PRI:
Election term: 
Regime type:
Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
six years 
1970-86 (CL)
Nicaragua
L. Somoza
R. Shick 
L. Guerrero 
A. Somoza 
Junta Nac,
D. Ortega
1956
1963
1966
1967
Reconst. 1979 
1985
Dictator/Power remained in the
Somoza familiy under the PLN
PLN/Dictator
PLN/Dictator
PLN/Dictator
FSLN
FSLN
PLN (R):
FSLN (L): 
Regime type:
Partido Liberal Nacionalista de Nicaragua 
Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 
1970-78 (R)
1979-86 (L)
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Panana
R. Chiari 1960
M. Robles 1964
A. Arias 1968
Gral. A.Torrijos 1968 Military coup
A. Royo 1978 PRD/Designated by the National
Gral. A.Torrijos 
and R. Espriella 1980
Assembly
R. Espriella was designated
N. Ardito Barletta 1985
vice president in 1978 
Forced to resigned by Gral. M.
E. del Valle 1986
Noriega
PRD/Designated by Gral. Noriega
PRD: Partido Revolucionario Democratico
Election term: five years
Regime type: 1970-77 (R)
1978-86 (CR)
Paraguay
Gral. A.Stroessner 1954 ANR-PC/Dictatorship
Gral. A.Rodriguez 1989 Military coup
ANR-PC: Asociacion Nacional Republicana-Partido
Colorado
Regime type: 1970-85 (R)
Peru
Gral. R.Perez 1962 Military coup
Gral. N.Lopez 1963 Military coup
F. Belaunde 1963 AP
Gral. V.Alvarado 1968 Military coup/Resigned
Gral. F. Morales 1975 Mi 1itary
F. Belaunde 1980 AP
A. Garcia 1985 APRA
AP: Accion Popular
APRA: Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
Term election: five years
Regime type: 1970-77 (CL)
1978-84 (CR)
1985 (CL)
Uruguay
0. Gestido 1967 PC/Died 9 months after election
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J. Pacheco 
J. Bodaberry 
Grals Martinez/ 
Calda/Cristi
A. Demichelli 
A. Mendez
Gral. G.Alvarez 
J. Sanguineti
1967
1971
1973
1976
1976
1976
1981
1984
PC/Succeded as vice president 
PC
Military intervention due to
corruption
Military coup
Succeded as vice president 
Elected by Council of Nations 
which was controlled by the 
armed forces 
Military elected 
PC
PC:
Election term: 
Regime type:
Partido Colorado 
five years 
1970-72 (CR)
1973-75 (R)
1976-85 (CR)
Venezuela
R. Betancourt 1959 AD
R. Leoni 1964 AD
R. Caldera 1969 PSC-COPEI
C. Perez 1974 AD
L. Herrera Campins 1979 PSC-COPEI
J. Lusinchi 1984 AD
AD: Accion Democratica
PSC-COPEI: Partido Social Cristiano - Comite
Organizado Pro Elecciones Independiente
Election term: five years
Regime type: 1970-86 (CR)
Source: A. Banks (1980, 1986) Political Handbook of the World.
Notes : Regime type:
R: Right
CR: Center right 
CL: Center Left 
L: Left
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Chapter 5
Latin Aaerica: A Case for Debt Relief?
1. Introduction
It has been recently recognised that the debt crisis poses less 
of a threat to the international financial system now that the banks 
are less exposed and have made large loan loss provisions (Williamson, 
1989; World Bank, 1989; Sachs, 1989b; Sachs and Huizinga, 1987). In 
spite of the continuous reschedulings and the implementation of new 
financial packages, the situation of the borrowers has not improved. 
Indeed, it is said that borrowers are suffering from a debt overhang 
problem (i.e. the expected present value of potential resource 
transfers to creditors is less than their outstanding debts). This 
holds back their growth and threatens their political stability and 
has led to an active debate about the type of strategy that is 
required to solve the debt problem.
The "financing" approach or "muddling-through" strategy is the 
one that has been followed up to now and emphasised in the 1985 Baker 
plan. Within the "debt reduction" approach or "debt relief" strategy, 
the international community debates not only the pros and cons of 
voluntary debt reduction through market-based schemes, but also the 
possible ways to attempt a global debt solution.
Some Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela) have been experimenting with market-debt 
reduction schemes to ease their debt burden. However, it is not clear 
if this will help to reverse current trends such as decline in output, 
high inflation, negative international transfers and social unrest.
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Most of the discussion is still at the theoretical level and compares 
the costs and benefits of straight debt-relief, buy-backs, debt equity 
swaps, exit bonds, etc. (Sachs, 1989; Froot, 1989; Krugman, 1988; 
Bulow and Rogoff, 1988; Corden, 1988). This has raised issues such as 
moral hazard, the possible return of capital flight and adjustment 
incentives.
The purpose of this chapter is to participate in the debate by 
examining the seriousness of the problem of debt overhang in Latin 
America and assessing how the debt problem has been handled. This is 
important not only for the borrowers’ welfare but from the perspective 
of future fulfillment of debt obligations and restoration of voluntary 
lending. Although the economic situation in Latin America has not 
improved since 1982, our statistical results suggest that only 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru are suffering from debt 
overhang. The account of how the debt has been managed up to now 
suggests that a prompt solution to the debt problem can rely neither 
on "refinancing" nor on market-based debt reduction schemes.
The chapter is divided into four parts. Section 2 analyses the 
economic performance of LACs in the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis 
and explores the extent of the debt overhang problem a la Krugman 
(1988) and Cohen (1988) for the period 1986-1988. We then evaluate 
how the debt problem has been handled, in particular the 1985 Baker 
Plan and the 1989 Brady Plan. The final section concludes this 
chapter and suggests some lines for further research.
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2. Latin Aaerica After the Debt Crisis
Recession, inflation and external net resource transfers 
characterise LACs in the 1980s. Table 1 shows the evolution of the 
GDP per capita since 1982 in several LACs. According to CEPAL" 
estimates, the regional GDP per capita for 1989 is 8% less than in 
1980. With the exception of Chile and Colombia, the countries exhibit 
negative or stagnant rates of GDP per capita growth. The most extreme 
cases are Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua where the cumulative 
variation for 1981-89 is over -20%. This has been attributed mainly 
to (see Cepal, 1989; Edwards, 1989): 1) the sudden unavailability of
foreign loans; 2) the rapid adjustments in current account and trade 
balance achieved through devaluations, reductions in imports and 
investment; 3) fiscal deficits and the attempts to curb inflation .
Annual inflation measured by the variation of the CPI from 
December to December is shown in table 2. Through the decade, 
inflation intensified in the region. At the end of November 1989, 
annual inflation in Argentina was 3731%, Brazil 1476%, Nicaragua 3452% 
and in Peru 2949%. By 1989 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Mexico were still facing inflation of more than 15% despite the 
severe stabilisation programmes implemented.
The social effects of the crisis are difficult to quantify. Real 
wages have deteriorated substantially. Comparing 1989 to 1980, the 
average urban minimum wage has fallen 23% in Argentina, 29% in Brazil, 
58% in Ecuador, 49% in Mexico and 73% in Peru. The average rate of
xSee Balance preliminar de la Economia Latinomericana 1989, CEPAL 
(December 1989).
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Tsble 1
Per Capita Growth Rates in Latin Aaerican Countries
(percentages)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 19891 Cumulative 81-891
LACs ^ -3. 5 -5. 0 1. 2 1. 3 1. 3 0 .7 -1. 5 -1. 0 -8. 3
Argentina -7. 2 1. 1 0. 9 -5. 9 4. 4 0 . 5 -4. 4 -6. 7 -23. 5
Bolivia -6. 9 -9. 0 -3. 0 -2. 8 -5. 6 -0 . 6 0. 0 -0. 4 -26. 6
Braz i 1 -1. 6 -5. 6 2.. 8 6. 1 5. 2 1. 5 -2. 4 0. 9 -0. 4
Chile -14. 5 -2. 2 4., 3 0. 7 3. 6 3 . 7 -5. 3 6. 7 9. 6
Colombia -1. 1 -0. 2 1.,7 4. 9 3. 7 3 .7 1. 6 0.,9 13.,9
Costa Rica -10. 0 -0. 3 4., 8 -2. 1 2. 4 2 . 5 0. 1 2.,3 -6. 1
Dorn. Repub. -1., 1 2. 5 -2., 0 -4., 1 0.,8 4 . 7 -0. 7 0., 7 2.,0
Ecuador -1., 7 -3. 8 2., 0 2.. 1 0., 7 -11 . 5 14., 1 -2.,0 -1., 1
El Salvador -6., 5 -0. 3 1.. 3 0.. 5 -1.,2 0 .8 -0.,4 -3., 1 -17..4
Guatemala -6.. 1 -5. 4 -2.. 8 -3., 3 -2., 6 0 .7 0., 8 0.. 8 -18.,2
Haiti -5., 1 -1. 2 -1,. 4 -1.. 5 -0.,8 -2 . 1 -2.. 1 -1..6 -18.,6
Honduras -5.. 4 -3. 6 -1.. 2 -1.. 9 1.. 6 0 . 7 0.. 7 -0.. 7 -12., 0
Hex ico -3,.0 -6. 5 1,.2 0.. 2 -6..0 -0. 8 -1.. 1 0.. 8 -9..2
Nicaragua -4.. 0 1. 2 -4.. 8 -7..3 -4.. 3 -4. 0 --11., 1 -6,.4 -33.. 1
Panama 2.. 7 -2. 2 -2,. 6 2., 6 1.. 3 0. 1 --18..2 -2,.0 -17,.2
Paraguay -4,. 0 -6. 0 0,. 0 0.. 9 -3,.3 1. 4 3,. 6 2,.6 0..0
Peru -2,.3 -14.1 2,. 1 -0,.3 6,.2 4. 6 •-10,.9 -12,. 4 -24,.7
Uruguay -10.. 7 -6. 6 -1,.9 -0,. 4 7,. 2 5. 8 -0,.4 -0,. 1 -7,.2
Venezuela -4..0 -8. 1 -4 . 2 -1.. 0 3,. 1 -0. 5 2,. 1 -10 .8
<N1 .9
Source: CEPAL 1989
Notes : "Preliminary
“Includes Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica
221
Table 2
Changes in CPI froa Deceaber to Deceaber
(percentages)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Latin America^ 84.6 130.5 184. 7 274. 1 64.5 198.9 757. 7 994.
Argent ina 209. 7 433. 7 688. 0 385.4 81.9 174. 8 387.5 3731.
Bolivia 296.5 328. 2 2177.2 8170.5 66.0 10.7 21.5 15.
Brazil 97.9 179. 2 203. 3 228. 0 58.4 365.9 933.6 1476.
Chile 20.7 23.6 23. 0 26. 4 17.4 21.5 12.7 21.
Colombia 24. 1 16.5 18.3 22. 3 21.0 24.0 28. 2 27.
Costa Rica 81.7 10.7 17.3 11.1 15.4 16.4 25.3 13.
Dorn. Repub. 7.2 7.7 38. 1 28. 4 6.5 25.0 57.6 43.
Ecuador 24. 3 52. 5 25.1 24. 4 27. 3 32.5 85.7 59.
El Salvador 13.8 15.5 9.8 30. 8 30.3 19.6 18.2 21.
Guatemala -2.0 15.4 5.2 31.5 25.7 10. 1 12.0 14.
Haiti 4.9 11.2 5.4 17.4 -11.4 -4.1 8.6 5.
Honduras 8.8 7.2 3.7 4.2 3.2 2.7 6.7 10.
Mex ico 98. 8 80. 8 59. 2 63. 7 105. 7 159. 2 51. 7 18.
Nicaragua 22.2 35.5 47.3 334. 3 747.4 1347.9 33602.6 3452.
Panama 3.7 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.
Paraguay 4.2 14. 1 29.8 23. 1 24. 1 32.0 16.9 28.
Peru 72. 9 125. 1 111.5 158. 3 62.9 114. 5 1722.6 2948.
Uruguay 20. 5 51.5 66. 1 83.0 76.4 57.3 69.0 81.
Venezuela 7.3 7.0 18.3 5.7 12.3 40. 3 35.5 90.
Source: CEPAL 1989
Notes : ^Preliminary. The figures for Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay are October-October variations; 
for El Salvador is September-Septernber and for the rest of 
the countries are November-November.
“ Includes Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica.
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urban unemployment in Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama is above 10%“.
Most of the external debt in Latin America is public and publicly 
guaranteed. Cardoso (1989) relates the resurgence of inflation in 
Latin America to the large government debt. The lack of foreign 
capital inflows needed to finance interest payments forced countries 
to run a balance of trade surplus to produce the required foreign 
exchange. Governments finance debt service by reducing expenditures, 
increasing taxes, but also by purchasing foreign exchange by issuing 
debt and printing money. The inflation impact of trade surpluses via 
money creation might come directly from the increase in foreign 
reserves as well as from the proceeds used to pay interest on 
government debt which is not counterbalanced by an increase in taxes.
Of course, in order to achieve balance of trade surpluses, 
countries have to depreciate their currency in real terms to gain 
competitiveness. This, in turn, leads to high prices of imported 
intermediate and final goods and also raises the cost of debt service 
in domestic currency which feeds back into the budget deficit, more 
money creation and thus, inflation. Therefore, in the presence of 
international credit rationing, debt service requires not only trade 
surpluses but also improvements in the budget deficits. Interestingly 
enough, Sachs (1989) argues that "debt relief’ was the main component 
of the Bolivian stabilisation programme. In Bolivia a complete 
moratorium of interest payments helped to reduce expenditures, 
increase taxation and overcome the political harshness of implementing 
tough adjustment measures. Inflation was brought down from more than 
8000% in 1985 to 11% in 1987.
“See CEPAL op. cit.
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Between 1982 and 1988, Latin America’s total net resource 
transfers to creditors exceeded $140bn. Long term transfers alone 
were more than $108bn (see table 3). This was the result of a sharp 
decrease in loans as well as the efforts of LACs to “play by the 
rules" which transformed a persistent balance of trade deficit into 
surplus. Indeed, the 1981 trade deficit of $2bn was followed by a 
surplus of almost $9bn in 1982 and more than $39bn in 1983. Moreover, 
the trade balance remains in surplus and is estimated to be of the 
order of $28bn in 1989'. As table 4 shows, this rapid improvement in 
the trade balance was achieved despite the deterioration in the terms 
of trade. Imports decreased sharply below the 1981 level while the 
volume exported increased.
According to Pastor (1989) international capital availability 
measured as last year’s net inflow of long term capital to last year’s 
GNP is, among other variables, an important determinant of the current 
account deficits in Latin America during 1973-84. An increase in 
capital availability leads to a large current account deficit and debt 
accumulation. The 1970s saw a shift in supply of loans resulting from 
“recycling" of petrodollars and the aggressive lending practices of 
the international banks; hence the capital account was not 
constraining the current account. In contrast, lenders restricted 
their supply in the 1980s and current account improvements have 
occurred partly because the capital availability constraint is 
binding. On the policy side, Pastor suggests that neither higher 
growth rates in industrial countries nor the adjustment efforts in 
LACs will resolve the debt crisis without relieving the capital 
account via new inflows of capital, debt relief or partial default by
JSee CEPAL op. cit.
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Table 3
Kfet Transfer of Resources from Official and Private Creditors
to Latin Anerica
(millions U.S. dollars)
Long Term
Total Net Transfers" Disbursements Net Transfers
1970 n. a. 6055 1595
1980 - 1808 42860 5223
1981 5504 59692 15945
1982 - 6783 48249 2074
1983 -12554 29034 - 9813
1984 -18671 27151 -15866
1985 -30632 19063 -21002
1986 -28057 19454 -20196
1987 -19879 18810 -19467
1988 -26659 22167 -24148
Source: Data from World Debt Tables 1989-90.
Notes : iTotal net transfers includes short and long net transfers
Net transfers=disbursements-principal repayment-interest payments 
Disbursements=long term debt+IMF purchases 
Principal Repayment=long term debt+IMF repurchases 
Interest Payments=long term debt+IMF+short term debt
225
Table 4
Trade Balance, Current Account and Terns of Trade in LACs
(millions U.S. dollars)
Exports Imports Trade Balance Current Account Terms of Trade
index, 1980=100
1980 89130 90552 -1422 -30538 100
1981 95894 97938 -2044 -42147 92
1982 87441 78462 8974 -40463 83
1983 87495 56016 31476 -6375 87
1984 97589 58243 39347 -36 92
1985 92196 58140 34056 -1293 88
1986 78131 59612 18519 -15378 79
1987 89240 67317 21923 -8869 79
1988 101731 76204 25528 -8935 78
Source: Most of the data for exports, imports, trade balance and
current account are from several issues of the IFS, IMF. Data for 
terms of trade, exports and imports for Brasil in 1988, El Salvador in 
1987 and 1988, Guatemala in 1988 and Nicaragua in 1987 and 1988 are 
from Notas Sobre la Economia y el Desarrollo, CEPAL (Dec. 1988, Dec. 
1989).
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the borrowers.
Creditworthiness has not improved in the region. The 
debt-to-export ratio remains high and for most of the LACs it has not 
fallen below the 1982 level (table 5). The region experienced a 
decrease in this ratio only in 1984 when the terms of trade improved 
and in 1988 due to export expansion and debt stock reduction of more 
than S14bn\ However the ratios still far exceed the levels 
acceptable to restore confidence and voluntary lending. Table 6 shows 
how the market judges the performance of Latin American borrowers. 
The steady deterioration of the market valuation for debt reflects 
pessimistic expectations concerning future debt servicing.
Are Latin American countries suffering from a debt overhang 
problem? In other words, are these countries on the wrong side of the 
Debt Laffer curve? If so, creditors and debtors might benefit from a 
debt stock reduction because the potential repayment of a country is 
not independent of its debt burden (Krugman, 1989).
Answering the above question involves calculating the elasticity 
of the market price of debt with respect to its face value. If this 
measure is greater than one, then a debt overhang problem exists. To 
do so we follow Cohen (1989) and estimated a reduced form equation in 
which the dependent variable has the logistic form p/l-P (where p is 
the secondary market price for one U.S. dollar debt) so as to let the 
elasticity depend upon the price level. This transformation of the 
dependent variable helps to avoid making inferences for the entire 
sample since it may be the case that only a subgroup of countries are
"See CEPAL op. cit and World Bank Debt Tables 1989-90 edition.
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Table 5
Debt /export Ratios in Latin Aaerica
(percentages)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Latin America 202. 9 224. 7 279. 5 315. 0 296. 0 319. 1 383. 1 374. 1 319. 2
Argentina 242. 4 302. 0 447. 3 470. 3 493. 1 493. 2 592. 4 612. 3 512. 0
Bolivia 258. 2 314. 9 362. 2 452. 4 505. 1 651. 3 814. 9 844. 2 788. 3
Braz i1 304. 3 299. 2 392. 8 400. 5 345. 3 355. 9 445. 8 436. 2 313. 4
Chile 192. 5 279. 0 335. 9 371. 1 410. 0 436. 6 395. 3 331. 2 232. 5
Colombia 117. 1 170. 5 204. 3 273. 9 223. 0 301. 7 219. 3 222. 5 237. 0
Costa Rica 224. 5 274. 0 317. 2 355. 1 302. 3 344. 1 314. 4 314. 2 270. 5
Dominican Repub 133. 8 134. 4 188. 5 202. 5 196. 8 220. 5 218. 3 210. 2 188. 4
Ecuador 203. 1 262. 5 291. 0 282. 6 279. 0 259. 5 355. 7 425. 9 410. 1
El Salvador 71. 1 111. 3 149. 4 167. 2 162. 3 163. 1 144. 2 191. 0 195. 0
Guatemala 63. 6 82. 9 117. 1 149. 3 185. 8 219. 7 229. 0 241. 3 199. 3
Haiti 72. 9 114. 8 143. 4 148. 4 160. 6 161. 4 174. 8 196. 5 214. 8
Honduras 152. 5 189. 0 235. 1 260. 8 264. 9 297. 8 292. 4 338. 4 322. 5
Mexico 259. 2 281. 7 311. 5 324. 0 291. 3 326. 0 422. 7 363. 0 316. 5
Nicaragua 422. 3 442. 3 731. 2 874. 2 1173 1604 2079 2226 2623
Panama 38. 4 33. 9 41. 7 60. 3 66. 8 75. 4 80. 3 89. 3 128. 4
Paraguay 122. 3 148. 6 163. 6 239. 6 225. 9 279. 9 261. 7 238. 7 169. 4
Peru 207. 7 244. 4 293. 7 312. 0 328. 4 361. 1 462. 0 495. 2 498. 1
Uruguay 104. 1 117. 8 157. 1 223. 4 237. 6 294. 7 245. 3 258. 8 203. 8
Venezuela 131. 8 130. 9 159. 5 220. 3 195. 3 201. 0 290. 8 277. 4 270. 3
Source: Data from World Debt Tables 1988-89 and 1989-90 ed.
Notes : '‘'Debt stocks include long-term debt (public and publicy
guaranteed, private non guaranteed), use of IMF credit and 
short term debt.
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Table 6
Secondary Market Bid Prices" for Latin Aaerican Debt
(monthly averages)
6/86 12/86 6/87 12/87 6/88 12/88 6/89
Argentina 64.0 65. 0 50.5 34.9 25.0 21.2 13.0
Bolivia 6.0 7.0 9.0 10.5 11.0 10.0 11.0
Brazil 75.0 75.0 61.0 46.2 51.4 41.4 31.0
Chile 66. 0 67. 0 69.0 60.5 60.2 55. 7 61.0
Colombia 84.0 86.0 84.5 65.0 65.0 57.2 57.0
Costa Rica 55.0 35.0 36.0 15.0 11.0 11.5 13. 5
Dominican Repub n. a. n . a . 23.0 21.5
Ecuador 63. 5 65. 0 50.0 37. 1 26.5 12.5 12.1
Honduras 22.0 22.0
flex ico 60.0 56. 0 56. 8 51.2 50.9 43. 4 39. 5
Nicaragua 3.5 2.0
Panama 67. 0 68. 0 66. 0 39.0 24.0 20. 5 10.2
Peru 20. 0 18.0 15.0 7.0 6.1 5.0 3.0
Uruguay 63. 0 65. 0 73.5 59. 5 59. 7 59.5 55.5
Venezuela 76. 0 74.0 71.0 58.4 54.9 40.9 36.9
Source: Solomon Brothers (several issues).
Notes : "'Bid prices for a $100 U.S. dollar debt.
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facing a debt overhang problem.
We re-estimated Cohen’s equation for a sample of Latin American 
countries where data on secondary market prices for December 1986 to 
December 1988 was available. The pooled sample was further reduced" 
because of lack of data for the explanatory variables. The results 
came out as follows:
log = 0.849 - 1.151 logD/X + 0.502 Xgrowth - 0.149 dum87 (1)
” ■*' (2.162) (4.346) (0.453) (0.410)
where p: December bid price of one dollar debt in the secondary market
D/X: debt-to-exports ratio
Xgrowth: real rate of growth of exports
dum87: dummy taking the value of 1 in December 1987 to indicate the
influence on the market of Citicorp’s decision to build up 
reserve losses for up to 3 billion U.S. dollars.
Absolute "t“ statistics are given in parenthesis, R “=0.294.
Although Cohen used a different sample for his estimations, our 
results are quite different. All regressors were found significant in 
Cohen’s estimation. Moreover, his estimated coefficient on Xgrowth 
had a negative sign and the coefficient of logD/X was -1.509. Note 
that in his estimation the elasticity of the price with respect to the 
debt is 1.509 (1-p) so the hypothesis of debt overhang could not be
rejected (at 95% degree of confidence) for countries for which the 
price was almost zero. In our estimation, the absolute value of the
coefficient of logD/X is significant but for countries with zero
secondary market price, the debt overhang problem is not rejected with 
70% degree of confidence. In addition, the other two regressors are 
insignificant.
"The countries included in our estimation are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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It is not clear whether the sign of the Xgrowth estimated 
coefficient should be positive or negative". On the one hand, Dhonte 
(1975) found that higher growth rates of debt were maintained by those 
countries that had higher growth rates of exports presumably because 
in a growing country, import expenditures (as well as debt service 
obligations) are likely to increase. A negative relation between the
price of debt and the rate of export growth is more likely in
countries where the outstanding debt is already large. On the other
hand, Feder and Just (1977) found that countries with higher export
rate growth were less likely to default or ask for reschedulings, 
hence a positive relation between the price of the debt and export 
growth is also plausible.
We decided to estimate a different type of equation since the one 
we have just reported did not look very promising. We postulated 
instead that the price of the debt was influenced by debt indicators 
(debt/gnp and reserves/imports ratios), the effective cash return of 
official and commercial bank lenders, and macroeconomic aspects of the 
country (inflation, export growth and trade regime). In addition, we 
included a dummy for Citicorp and a dummy for Peru.
Before reporting our results, we briefly discuss some of the 
regressors chosen for the estimation:
The debt/gnp and reserves/imports ratios have the usual 
explanation and need no further justification.
"Unfortunately, Cohen does not provide an explanation of its sign in 
his 1989 paper.
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- The effective cash return of official lenders and commercial 
banks measures the net resource transfers of each kind of creditor in 
proportion to the outstanding claims of that creditor. We split them 
because it was suggested by Sachs (1989) that official creditors have 
been implicitly “subsidising" commercial bank creditors by receiving 
much less cash flow earnings than banks and hence, allowing borrowers 
to devote much of their repayments to banks.
Table 7 is useful to explore the Sach’s argument. The share of 
official creditors (medium and long term debts) to Latin American 
public borrowers has increased from 20% in 1983 to 29% in 1988. The 
cash return on Latin American loans earned by both official and 
private creditors shows a clear upward trend reflecting the efforts of 
LACs to transfer funds and the lack of new lending. However, the cash 
return to official creditors has been negative until 1987 and always 
below the return received by private creditors, in particular, 
commercial banks. Therefore, on this account, it is plausible that 
official creditors have been implicitly bearing more costs than banks 
in lending to LACs.
The crude proxies for return on loans were lagged one year since
they might be influenced by the price of debt. We expect a positive
association between the price of debt and the return to commercial
banks and a negative one for the return on official loans.
- Domestic inflation reflects macroeconomic management polcies of 
the country. Unless corrective measures are implemented, higher 
inflation leads to higher imports and lower exports. Therefore, we 
anticipate a negative correlation between inflation and the price of 
debt.
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Table 7
Latin American Public External Debt" by Type of Lender 
and Cash Return" to Lenders
(percentages)
Debt owed to Cash Return to
Official Private Official Private
1970 51.9 48. 1
1980 22. 9 72. 1
1981 22.5 77.5 -8.65
CMSt■s*1
1982 21.8 78. 2 -7.98 -3. 18
1983 19.7 80.3 -4.65 -2.93
1984 19.4 80. 6 -6. 50 5.02
1985 22.2 77.8 -4.65 7.87
1986 25. 0 75. 0 -3.49 7. 64
1987 28. 1 71.9 0.77 5. 46
1988 29. 1 70. 9 1. 02 6.71
Source: World Bank Debt Tables 1990-91 ed.
Notes : Includes only long and medium term debt
Calculated as the net resource transfer of a creditor in 
proportion to the outstanding claims of that creditor.
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- The 1987 World Bank Development Report suggests that the 
macroeconomic performance of outward oriented countries has been 
superior to that of inward looking strategies. This view has been 
criticised' but it appears to be generally accepted that outward 
oriented trade policies foster the growth prospects of developing 
countries and their capacity to adjust to external shocks. We 
constructed a dummy variable for trade regime using the categorisation 
of trade policies provided by the World Bank (1987). Forty-one less 
developed countries were classified on the basis of four groups: 
strongly inward oriented, moderately inward oriented, moderately 
outward oriented and strongly outward oriented. The dummy variable 
was then assigned a value ranging from 1 to 4 accordingly. None of
the countries in our sample were among the strongly outward oriented 
group. Neither Ecuador, Panama nor Venezuela were in the list so we 
decided to classify them according to their trade policies, share of
exports in 6NP and export growth relative to the other LACs already 
grouped. Ecuador’s trade regime was incorporated in the moderately 
inward oriented group with Panama and Venezuela in the moderately 
outward oriented group.
The dummy variables for Peru and Brazil indicate their 
unilateral decision to suspend debt repayments as a result of an 
explicit policy decision"'. Peru has imposed a partial debt moratorium 
by limiting debt repayments to 10% of exports since 1985, while Brazil 
declared moratorium in February 1987. We expect both country dummies 
to have a negative influence on the price of debt. We also
,‘See for example, Singer (1988) and Singer and Gray (1988).
"These dummies should not be taken as inidcating arrears. They are
intended to capture the conflicting attitude between creditors and 
borrowers.
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incorporate time dummies (one for 1987 and another for 1988) to 
control for time effects.
Next we report the results of our estimation5 :
log
1-P
log —
1-  o
= -1.529 - 1.377 log(D/GNP) + 1.659 res/M - 2.157 offloans (2)
(3.898) (5.310) (2.184) (2.105)
+ 1.222 comloans - 0.056 CPI/100 + 0.617 Xgrowth/100 + 0.495 outWB
(0.581) (1.956) (0.847) (3.933)
- 1.597 dumPeru - 0.789 dumBrazil - 0.729 dum87 - 1.161 dum88 
(3.697) (1.262) (3.277) (4.859)
=0.812
= -1.473 - 1.456 log(D/GNP)+ 1.617 res/M - 2.504 offloans (2’)
(4.375) (6.092) (2.189) (2.138)
-0.061 CPI/100 + 0.503 outWB - 1.683 dumPeru - 0.919 dumBrazil 
(2.262) (4.088) (4.127) (1.547)
-0.728 dum87 - 1.143 dum88 
(3.398) (5.099)
R*=0.819
December bid price of one dollar debt in the secondary market 
debt-to-GNP ratio
international reserves-to-imports ratio
effective cash return to official creditors lagged one year 
effective cash return to commercial banks lagged one year 
inflation (*) based in the consumer price index 
real rate of growth of exports lagged one year 
dummy for trade regime based on World Bank (1987) 
dummy taking the value of 1 for Peru and 0 otherwise,
dummy taking the value of 1 for 1987 and 0 otherwise,
dummy taking the value of 1 for 1987 and 0 otherwise
dummy taking the value of 1 for 1988 and 0 otherwise.
Absolute values of the "t" statistics are given in parenthesis
Although not all the estimated coefficients were significant, all
had the expected signs. Real export growth influenced the price of
debt at only 40% level of significance. The cash flow net return on
commercial bank loans was insignificant but with the expected sign.
The cash flow return on official loans was significant at the 5% level
where p: 
D/GNP: 
res/M: 
of f loans: 
comloans: 
C P I : 
Xgrowth: 
outWB: 
dumPeru: 
dumBrazil: 
dum87: 
dum88:
'Real export growth was entered with a year lag to attenuate the 
problem of simulataneity.
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and with negative coefficient, supporting the view of Sachs (1989). 
After dropping insignificant variables from the regression, equation 
(2*) suggests that the debt-Laffer-curve problem (for December 1988) 
could not be rejected for Nicaragua at the 95% degree of confidence;
Peru at 90%; Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador at 85%; and Argentina,
Honduras and Panama at 70%. Given that since then the price of the 
debt has not increased nor has a substantial macroeconomic improvement
occurred, we can argue that debt overhang is still a problem in some
Latin American countries.
3. Handling of the Debt Crisis
For not only LACs but all LDCs, 1982 marked the beginning of both 
delays in debt servicing and attempts to renegotiate the terms of debt 
repayment. The international financial system was jeopardised and 
there were fears of a collapse. We have argued in the previous 
section that country borrowers seem to be in a very difficult 
position. In this section, we will explore how lenders faced the 
problem and overcame the threat of financial instability.
Rescheduling and refinancing"' of official loans has been a 
common experience during the postwar period (ECLAC, 1985; Hardy 1982). 
Between 1956 and 1981, there were more than thirty multilateral debt 
restructurings involving more than twenty developing countries (Kisic,
"'Debt refinancing involves the provision of new money to avoid
default on existing obligations while rescheduling consists of a
change in the contractual terms (maturity, grace period, interest
rate) of payments of principal (and exceptionally interest) falling
due in a specified period.
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Danino and Morales, 1985). Most of the renegotiations took place 
under the auspices of the Paris Club. Among the LAC borrowers, 
Argentina, Brasil and Chile participated in the forum at least twice.
Until the mid 1970s, private creditors solved sovereign debt 
repayment problems by refinancing because there were few countries 
facing difficulties and the amounts involved were not too large. It 
was in the second half of the 1970s that banks began to reschedule 
with troubled borrowers^. Prior to 1980, there were few 
reschedulings and the pattern consisted of short amortisation periods 
(usually five to six years) and short grace periods (two years as the 
norm), high spreads (above 1.75 margin over Libor) and high 
commissions. Reschedulings were generally conducted under the 
auspices of the IMF. The 1976 Peruvian agreement was an exception 
since it was achieved without an IMF programme.
The 1980s brought a totally different picture and a challenge for 
commercial bank lenders. Between January 1980 and June 1981, more 
than ten Latin American countries experienced repayment difficulties. 
The lowest spread over LIBOR was charged to Mexico (0.65%) and the 
highest to Brazil (1.62%). The amortisation period fluctuated from 5 
years for Cuba to 9.1 for Uruguay.
The main guidelines for the emerging pattern of bank 
reschedulings included^":
differentiation between official debt contracted with governments,
"iSee Devlin (1989) and Plan (1985) for an account of the first 
experiences in commercial bank reschedulings.
i"See ECLAC (1985) and Calverly (1982).
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multilateral institutions and banks.
- highest priority placed on the servicing of bank debt
the willingness to consider rescheduling of payments was usually 
ranked (in decreasing order) as follows: future due principal,
arrears of principal, arrears of interest and future due interest. 
Note that banks wanted to maintain loans as earning assets, hence they 
were reluctant to reschedule interest payments.
- short-term lines of credit were not rescheduled
- any agreement involved the banks’ committees, the country borrower 
and the IMF.
More than twenty five LDCs began debt negotiations at the beginning of 
1983. The focus of attention was in Latin America where not only 
Brazil and Mexico (the two largest borrowers among developing
coutries) but an additional fifteen countries experienced repayment 
problems. Banks started to be very concerned about the
creditworthiness of their customers and demanded substantial payments 
which is reflected in the positive net cash flow transfers from 
borrowers to lenders.
Given that ECLAC"' and Devlin (1989) provide detailed
explanations of the four rounds of LAC reschedulings, we will just 
provide a broad outline and relate them to the 1985 Baker Plan and 
1989 Brady Plan.
Tables 8 and 9 summarise the amounts and conditions of bank debt 
rescheduled in Latin America prior to the Baker initiative. It is
ivSee Economic Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean (several 
issues) and Balance Preliminar de la Economia de America Latina y el 
Caribe (several issues).
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Table ft
Rescheduling of External Debt with Cowaercial Banks for 
Selected Latin American Countries
(millions U.S. dollars)
First Round 82/83
Maturities New loan
Second Round 83/84
Maturities New loan
Large Borrowers
Argent ina
Braz i 1
Chile
Mexico
Venezuela
13000 (82-83) 1500
4800 ( 83 ) 4400
3424 (83-84) 1300 
23700 (82-84) 5000
5400 ( 84 ) 6500
780
12000 (82-84) 3800
Small Borrowers
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Dorn Rep 
Ecuador 
Honduras
Nicaragua" 
Panama 
Peru 
Uruguay 
(cont inued)
650 (82-84) 225
568 (82-83)
1970 (82-84) 441
121 (82-84)
80 ( 83 ) 100
400 ( 83 ) 450
630 (83-84) 240
662 (84-85)
Source: ECLAC
Notes : ( ) years of restructured maturities, (...) negligible amount 
maturities refer to restructured maturities, new loan refers 
to medium and long credits.
"Nicaragua rescheduled 180 millions in 1981 and 55 millions in 
1982.
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Table 8 (continued)
Rescheduling of External Debt with Coaaercial Banks for
Selected Latin Aaerican Countries
(millions U.S. dollars)
Third Round 84/85
Maturities New loan
Fourth Round 86/87
Maturities New loan
Large Borrowers 
Argent ina
Braz i 1 L
Chile
Mexico
Venezuela""
16500 (82-85) 3700
16300 (85-86) 
5700 (85-87) 
48700 (85-90)
21200 (83-88)
714
29500 (86-90) 1550
12490 (88-91)
43700 (85-90) 7700
20450 (86-88)
Small Borrowers
Bolivia'
Costa Rica
Dorn Rep
Ecuador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
440 (85-86) 75
790 (84-89)
4800 (85-89)
220 (85-86)
603 (85-86) 60
1700 (85-89) 45 1780 (86-91)
Source: ECLAC
Notes : ( ) years of restructured maturities, (...) negligible amount 
maturities refer to restructured maturities, new loan refers 
to medium and long credits.
^Between January and August 1988, Brazil rescheduled 62100 
millions and obtained 5200 millions of new credits.
"Venezuela restructured and additional 6000 millions in 1988.
'In March 1988, Bolivia anounced a debt buy-back for 334 
millions at a discount of 89%.
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Table 9
Terns of Rescheduling of External Debt with Coaaercial Banks for
Selected Latin Aaerican Countries
First Round 82/83 Second Round 83/84
Spread Amort i s Grace Spread Amort is Grace
(*)
M NL
(years) 
M NL
(years) 
M NL
(%)
M NL
(years) 
M NL
(years) 
M NL
Large Borrowers
Argent ina 
Braz i 1 
Chile 
Mex ico 
Venezuela
2.13 2.50 
2.50 2.13
2.13 2.25 
1.88 2.25
7.0 5.0
8.0 8.0
7.0 7.0
8.0 6.0
3.0 3.0 
2.5 2.5
4.0 4.0
4.0 3.0
2.0 2.0 
1.75 
1.50
9.0 9.0 
9.0 
10.0
5.0 5.0
5.0
6.0
Small Borrowers
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Dorn Rep 
Ecuador 
Honduras
2.25 1.75
2.25
2.25 2.38 
2. 25
8.0 3.0
6.0
7.0 6.0
7.0
4.0 2.0
2.0
1.0 1.5
1.0
Nicaragua"
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
2.25 2.25
2.25 2.25
2.25 2.25
6.0 6.0 
8.0 8.0 
6.0 6.0
2.0 2.0
3.0 3.0
2.0 2.0
1. 75 9.0 5.0
(continued)
Source: ECLAC
Notes : Spread=spread over LIBOR, Amortis=amortisation period,
Grace=grace period, M=rescheduled maturities or principal,
NL=new loans.
"■The terms of the 1981 and 1982 rescheduling were: 1.5 average spread 
over Libor, 10 years amortisation period and 5 years grace period. 
Only one year of upcoming maturities was rescheduled in 1982 while
1.7 years were rescheduled in 1981.
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Table 9 (continued)
Teras of Rescheduling of External Debt with Coaaercial Banks for
Selected Latin Aaerican Countries
Third Round 84/85 Fourth Round 86/87
Spread Amort i s Grace Spread Amort is. Grace
(*) (years) (years) (*) (years) (years)
M NL M Nk M NL M NL. M NL. d  NL.
Large Borrowers
Argent ina 1. 38 1.63 12.0 10.0 3.0 3.0 0.81 0.88 19.0 12.0 7.0 5.0
Braz i 1 1. 13 12.0 5.0
Chile 1. 38 1. 63 12.0 12.0 6.0 5.0 1.0 15.0 6.0
Hex ico 1. 13 14.0 0.81 0.81 20.0 12.0 7.0 4.0
Venezuela 1.13 12.5 0.88 14.0
Small Borrowers
Bolivia
Costa Rica 1.63 1. 75 10.0 7.0 3.0 1.5
Dorn Rep 1. 38 13.0 3.0
Ecuador 1.38 12.0 3.0
Honduras 1.58 11.0 3.0
Nicaragua
Panama 1. 38 1. 63 12.0 9.0 3.5 3.0
Peru
Uruguay 1. 38 1. 63 12.0 12.0 3.0 3.5 0.88 17.0 3.0
Source: ECLAC
Notes : Spread=spread over LIBOR, Amortis = amortisat ion period,
Grace=grace period, M=rescheduled maturities or principal, 
NL=new loans.
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apparent that, over the successive rounds, larger amounts of 
maturities were rescheduled and new loans were drying up for large and 
small borrowers. The terms of rescheduling during the first round 
were tougher than before 1982. The margin over Libor was between 
1.75% and 2.25%; amortisation periods were between 3 and 8 years and 
grace periods ranged from 1 to 4 years. According to ECLAC (1985), 
the increase in the negotiated cost of credit was 242% higher in 
Ecuador and 217% higher in Argentina relative to the prevailing ones 
in 1980-81.
The second round of rescheduling meetings started in 1983 and saw 
some favourable changes although no agreement was reached with 
Argentina and Venezuela (they were seeking better terms) nor with 
Bolivia (reluctance to accept the IMF programme). Costa Rica, Panama 
and the Dominican Republic also found it difficult to negotiate since 
they had not honoured the conditions of the previous agreement. 
During this second round, the margin over Libor was between 1.75% and 
2.0%, maturities were lengthened to 9 or 10 years and grace periods 
extended to 5 or 6 years.
The situation for the debtor countries did not improve and the 
third round of reschedulings started in mid 1984. Most of the Latin 
American countries restructured their debts but few received new 
loans. Conditions for rescheduling were eased substantially for all 
countries. However, the improvement in the terms of indebtedness was 
more favourable for large borrowers than small borrowers. In most 
cases reschedulings went beyond two years. The lowest margins over 
Libor on restructured maturitites were charged to Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela (1.13%) and the highest to Costa Rica (1.63%). Amortisation 
periods were also lengthened. The maximum was given to Mexico (14
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years) and the shortest to Costa Rica (10 years). Grace periods were 
also extended. Among the biggest borrowers, Chile was granted 6 and 5 
years on restructured maturities and new loans respectively and Costa 
Rica, 3 and 1.5 years.
As we have just pointed out, the cost of rescheduling and new 
credits decreased from 1980 to mid 1985. Better conditions and new 
credits were granted to big borrowers rather than to small borrowers. 
In 1985, the debt/export ratio for LACs was substantially above the 
1982 level while the transfers from the region were five times higher.
In this scenario, the U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker III 
launched a new proposal at the end of September 1985. The emphasis 
was put on adequate financing, commitments to adjustment policies, 
economic reforms, growth and a case-by-case solution. Baker called 
for a renewal of commercial bank and World Bank lending for the 
fifteen or so most indebted LDCs"". The idea was to secure over the 
next three years, $20bn of new lending from commercial banks and $9bn 
from multilateral development banks, especially the World Bank. 
Despite the recognition of the need for credits to enable debtors to 
reorientate their economies and grow, the initiative also stressed 
that interest payments to commercial banks should be paid on schedule 
and at market interest rates, thus allowing only for principal 
payments to be rescheduled. It also highlighted the role of the IMF 
and World Bank as entities charged with supervising the implementation
 ^"The initiative focused explicitly on the following fifteen heavily 
indebted countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cote
d ’Ivoire, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The World Bank includes Costa Rica 
and Jamaica and calls all of them the Baker 17 countries. Eleven out 
of the 17 countries listed are LACs.
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of adjustment policies and economic reforms. Finally, it encouraged 
market-based-debt reduction operations (e.g. debt buybacks, 
debt-equity swaps, exit bonds, etc.).
Reschedulings under the Baker Plan were more favourable to the 
borrower. The fourth round of reschedulings was characterised by 
lower spreads and longer amortisation and grace periods than in the 
previous rounds. Most of the borrowers restructured their debts but 
the drying up of funds continued despite efforts to mobilise new 
credits.
The position of LACs four years after the implementation of the 
Baker Plan is summarised in table 10 Most of the few new credits were 
granted to large borrowers. However, as suggested by Sachs (1989b), 
"new credits" or “new money package" are misleading descriptions 
because principal and interest payments exceeded disbursements in most 
of the LACs. That is funds were transfered from borrowers to lenders 
(see table 11). Therefore, the large flows expected from commercial 
banks to enhance growth did not materialise and banks continued 
reducing their exposure. The World Bank (1989) attributes this to the 
reluctance of commercial banks to lend new money, the fact that only 
few borrower countries implemented macroeconomic and reform-orientated 
policies called for and the sales by the banks of their LDC debt.
The debt crisis hit the largest U.S. banks despite the fact that 
only around 35% of the debt in Latin America was held directly by 
them. They attracted world attention because they have been the 
leaders in lending to Latin America, the exposure-to-capital ratio of 
the top major U.S. banks was above 250% for all LDCs and around 180% 
for LACs and finally, because there exist strict U.S. acounting and
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Table 10
New Itoney, Interest Arrears and Debt Stock Reductions Between 
Private Creditors and Selected Latin Aaerican Countries
1985 1986 1987 19881 19891
Large Borrowers
NM AR DR NM AR DR NM AR DR NM AR DR NM AR Df
Argent ina Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y N na na
Brazi 1 N N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N Y N na na
Chile Y N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N na na
Mexico N N Y N N Y Y N Y N N Y N na na
Venezuela N N N N N N N N N Y N Y N na na
Small Borrowers
Bolivia N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N na na
Colombia Y N N N N N N N N N N N Y na na
Costa Rica Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N Y Y N na na
Dominican Republic N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N na na
Ecuador N N N N Y N N Y Y N Y Y N na na
Honduras N Y N N Y N N Y N N N Y N na na
Panama Y Y N N N N N Y N N Y N N na na
Peru N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N na na
Uruguay Y ^ N N N N N N N Y N N Y N na na
Source: World Bank Debt Tables 1989-90
Notes : NM stands for new money or disbursement of medium and long 
term concerted loan, AR for interest arrears on long debt 
outstanding, DR for debt stock reduction, na for not 
available, Y and N indicate yes and no respectively.
^Prel iminary.
^Contingent credits.
246
Table 11
Long Tern Net Resource Transfers fron Private Creditors1
to Selected Public-Sector Borrowers
1985 1986 1987 1988
NF NT NF NT NF NT NF NT
Large Borrowers
Argent ina 2532 -760 579 -2226 888 -2115 -39 -2077
Brazil 380 -4339 -170 3820 -122 -4067 2533 -6387
Chile 696 -188 304 -741 106 -791 -125 -706
Mexico 69 -6865 -689 -6102 3592 -1797 642 -4779
Venezuela -527 -1929 -863 -2562 -733 -2315 473 -1535
Small Borrowers
Bolivia -9 -33 -5 -9 16 11 -32 -38
Colombia 261 -157 950 545 -273 -766 277 -219
Costa Rica 57 -192 -16 -106 2 -51 -15 -78
Dorn Rep 24 -66 -7 -134 4 -39 -6 -84
Ecuador 202 -365 365 -120 34 -101 51 -30
Honduras 38 7 26 6 -34 -47 -6 -18
Panama 6 -229 7 -229 36 -107 0 0
Peru 118 -43 38 -17 92 81 255 241
Uruguay 86 -296 81 -189 58 -20 -20 -292
Source: World Bank Debt Tables 1989-90
Notes : NF indicates net flows and NT, net transfers.
"Bonds, commercial banks and other private sources.
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regulatory requirements (Kuczynsky, 1988; Mortimore, 1989).
The strategy of the U.S. banks was to strenghten their balance 
sheet, increase loan loss provisions, augment their capital and reduce 
lending as much as possible. The difficulties in agreeing concerted 
loans and the regulatory pressure to disclose loans to LDCs reinforced 
the tendency of banks to cut back lending. Table 12 shows that not 
only large U.S. banks but also the smaller ones have decreased their 
LDC and Latin America exposure substantially. At the end of 1987, the 
top nine U.S. banks were 97% exposed in Latin America while the small 
U.S. banks decreased their exposure from 78.6% to 31.9%. Sachs 
(1989b, p.12) emphasises that “...the banks as a group are already out 
of crisis range with regard to their Latin America exposure".
The continuous deterioration of the valuation of debt in the 
secondary market signalled an expectation that full repayment would 
not occur, flarket-based-options allowed private creditors to exchange 
existing debt for new assets and further reduced their exposure. 
Although the amount traded compared to the debt outstanding is small, 
debt conversions (and in consequence, debt stock reductions) followed 
an upward tendency between 1986 and 1988 (table 13). Large borrowers 
have been more involved in debt conversions than small borrowers and 
among all debt conversion programmes, debt-equity swaps have been the 
most popular. Note that much of the secondary market activity is 
still in interbank trading which does not reduce the outstanding stock 
of LDC debt.
According to the World Bank’s projections, debt conversions in 
1989 will end up being 38% less than 1988. Debt-equity programmes in 
large borrower countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have been
248
Table 12
Exposure of U.S. Banks in LDCs and LACs 
as a Percentage of their Priaary Capital
End 1982 Mid 1984 End 1986 End 1987
All U.S. banks
LDCs 186. 5 156. 6 94.8 78.1
LACs 118.8 102. 5 68.0 57.9
Top major banks
LDCs 287. 7 246. 3 153.9 130.9
LACs 176.5 157. 8 110.2 97.0
All other banks
LDCs 116.0 96. 1 55. 0 43. 1
LACs 78. 6 65.2 39. 7 31.9
Memorandum Item: Total bank primary capital (billions U.S. dollars)
All U.S. banks 70. 6 84.7 116.1 129.2
Top nine banks 29. 0 34. 1 46.7 51.5
All other banks 41.6 50. 6 69.4 77.7
Source: Jeffrey Sachs, New Approaches to the Latin American Debt Crisis
(International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton 
University, 1989)
Notes : Exposure=total amount owed to U.S. banks after adjustments for 
guarantees and external borrowing
LDCs=0PEC, nonoil Latin America, nonoil Asia, nonoil Africa 
LACs=nonoil Latin America plus Ecuador and Venezuela.
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Table 13
Secondary Market for Developing Country Debt
(millions U.S. dollars)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 19891
Argent ina 31 469 - 35 1330 500
Braz i 1 731 537 176 1800 9175 4000
Bolivia - - - 1 349 20
Chile 11 313 987 1983 2905 2000
Costa Rica - - 7 146 17 10
Ecuador - - - 125 258 -
Jamaica - - - 2 100 -
Mexico - 769 1023 3804 6670 6000
Nigeria - - - - 95 200
Peru - - - - 15 -
Phi 1ippines - - 43 287 806 300
Uruguay - - - - 97 -
Venezuela - - - - 477 -
Yugoslavia - - - - 50 -
Others - - - 6 15 750
Total conversions " 773 2088 2236 8188 22358 13780
Total trading' 2000 4000 7000 12000 50000 40000
Total LDC Debt^ 347630 388650 435759 480563 470105 465071
Memorandum Item: Debt conversions by type of transaction
Debt-equity swaps 773 1843 1522 3335 9205
Exit bonds - - - 15 4725
Buybacks - - - - 648
Informal - - - 3500 5414
Other - 245 714 1337 2366
Source: World Bank Debt Tables 1989-90.
Notes : "Projected.
"Debt for equity and domestic swaps, loan to bond conversions, 
debt repurchases and other transactions excluding interbank trading.
'Total conversions including interbank trading.
^Goverment long term debt outstanding to private creditors
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suspended in 1989. This decision was partly taken because of concerns 
about the adverse fiscal and monetary consequences with inflationary
implications, the possible negative effects on net foreign exchange
(in particular, *round-tripping") due to diversion of funds, and the 
influence on creditworthiness".
Has the Baker Plan been successful? Yes in the sense that it has 
bought time for the banks to move away from insolvency risk associated 
with their LDC exposure; but despite the massive resource transfers to 
private creditors, the situation of LACs did not improve much.
Interest arrears of the Baker 17 countries to all long term 
creditors increased from $1.9 billion in December 1985 to $9.6 billion 
in December 1989 while over the same period, arrears owed to
commercial banks increased from $1.0 billion to $6.5 billion (World 
Bank, 1989). Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru were 
among the countries in arrears. Moreover, from 1985 to 1988, six out 
of the eleven LACs included within the Baker 17 countries, experienced 
a modest fall of the debt/export ratio and only two (Chile and Costa 
Rica) ended 1988 with debt/export ratios slightly lower than in 1982.
The need for a review of the debt strategy was apparent and in
March 1989, the U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady outlined a new 
plan to cope with the debt problem. The proposal confirmed that the 
impediments to a succesful resolution of the debt crisis remained. 
External financial flows were scarce. Growth, investment and savings
" S e e  World Bank (1989) and Krugman (1988). A discussion of
debt-equity conversions in Chile is provided by Schinke (1990) and 
Livingston (1988); for Bolivia and Mexico, see Laudany (1989) and for 
Venezuela, see Velasquez (1989).
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in debtor countries did not show much improvement. Debt reduction 
through market mechanisms showed progress but the pace was still too 
slow for borrowers to regain creditworthiness. It also recognised 
that further stretching out of debt repayments without debt reduction 
was unlikely to solve the debt impasse because of the large stock of 
bad debts. In view of these shortcomings, Brady put forward a new 
initiative containing the following key elements: growth is essential
to easing debt problems, economic reforms are necessary to achieve 
this growth, debtor countries are in need of external financial 
resources and the solution of the debt problem should be pursued on a 
case-by-case basis.
Besides the strong emphasis on debt reduction (Brady Plan), 
another difference between the Brady Plan and the Baker Plan lies in 
the role of the World Bank and IMF. They were not only going to serve 
as a 'catalyst" to debt rescheduling and new financing but "...support 
and encourage the debt reduction process by redirecting a portion of 
the funds which they have currently available" (Department of the U.S. 
Treasury, 1989, p.26). Debt service reduction through voluntary 
schemes would remain in the marketplace and not under World Bank or 
IMF management. However, they will help to accelerate debt 
conversions by providing funds for some debt reduction transactions 
(e.g. financing to collateralise debt-for-bonds exchanges, 
replenishing foreign exchange reserves after a cash buyback, etc.).
Debt analysts have expressed concern about the Brady Plan. The 
Institute of International Finance criticises the Brady initiative for 
potentially creating "a loss of discipline in the (international 
financial) system and the build-up of payment arrears to commercial 
banks and official agencies" (Financial Times, 4/5/90). The institute 
estimates that total arrears to commercial banks rose to $18.15bn at
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the end of March 1990, up sharply from $14.37bn and $6.45bn at the end 
of 1989 and 1988 respectively. They argue that one of the mistakes of 
the Brady Plan is the changing policy of the IMF since it will 
tolerate payment arrears to the banks"". In contrast, they suggest 
the the IMF should revert to its traditional policy and make sure 
arrears are paid before countries can borrow from the fund.
Dil (1989) argues that the two major components of the Brady 
Plan, new money and debt relief, are contradictory. On the one hand, 
new money assumes that debtors are capable of handling not only their 
current level of indebtedness but higher levels. On the other hand, 
debt relief assumes that debtors are insolvent and unable to service 
their current level of indebtedness. Therefore, Dil proposes that the 
Baker Plan should be modified to distinguish between debtor countries 
which require debt relief and those which require new money.
From a different perspective, Sachs (1989a) and Dornbusch (1989) 
commented on the limitations of voluntary debt reduction schemes. One 
limitation is related to the debt overhang and free rider problem. 
Participation in debt reduction plans must be no worse for the banks 
than carrying the original claim. If debt relief is sufficient to 
restore creditworthiness, then all the claims of the debtors (even the 
portion not involved in the debt reduction operations) will increase 
in value to face value. Therefore, banks have an incentive to hold
out until creditworthiness is restored and therefore the aims of debt
reduction will not be achieved. This incentive is reinforced by the
fact that major commercial banks see an advantage in waiting for
■'For a discussion of the new role and policies of the IMF towards 
heavily indebted countries, see Camdessus (1989).
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bailouts from the official creditor community.
Next is the resistance of the U.S. money centers to debt 
reduction operations. Given that their exposure in Latin America was 
still above 80% of capital at the end of 1988, a massive debt
write-down would in general require book losses because banks are 
still holding the debt at book values. Note that although the debt 
reduction operation might raise the market value of banks’ stock of 
debt, many banks will be obliged to report losses because the capital
adequacy standards are based on book values. Note as well that a
substantial reduction operation will also wipe out loan loss reserves
and capital and will require banks to create new capital and reserves, 
hence there will be little scope for new lending. If multilateral 
agencies are going to support a large debt reduction program, then 
huge funds would be required, say, to collaterise exit bonds or 
increase reserves in countries buying back their own debt. The 
largest five public Latin American borrowers owed more than $203bn to 
private creditors in 1988. If all these debts were reduced to their 
secondary market price, then more than $79bn in guarantees would be 
required.
Finally, it is not clear what action should be taken in the case 
of "good" debtors. For example, Colombia has never been in interest 
arrears but its debt was traded at 57 cents in the dollar at the end 
of July 1989. Should the debt be written off even though they have 
not been in arrears? There may be other difficulties, for instance if 
the Brady Plan is interpreted as only providing relief to countries 
with a "bad" debtor record, what is to prevent other LDCs deliberately 
suspending repayments in order to gain debt relief?
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4. Conclusions and Lines for Further Research
The economic performance of Latin America has shown very little
(if any) improvement after the debt crisis. Although our empirical
results should be taken cautiously, they show that some Latin American 
borrowers (Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador at least 
at 15% level of significance) were suffering from debt overhang in 
December 1988.
The successive rounds of reschedulings show improved 
renegotiation conditions (spread over Libor and amortisation and grace 
periods) in particular for the large Latin American borrowers. 
However, these settlements have not involve provision of "fresh" money 
nor substantial debt relief. The strategy followed has been one of
credit rationing and increase in provisions for possible loss.
Can we expect voluntary debt reductions to provide sufficient 
debt relief? The answer seems to be a provisional no. Debt equity 
conversions have been halted in several LACs and other types of 
transactions such as exit bonds and buybacks require guarantees, money 
donations or new concessional loans. LACs have a resource constraint 
which, we suggest, seems to be binding and it is unlikely that they 
would direct their international reserves to purchase their own debt 
if no new loans are forthcoming.
One way of resolving some of the problems mentioned above is the 
establishment of an International Debt Facility (IDF) as urged at the 
beginning of the 1980s by both Kenen (1983) and Rohatyn (1983) and 
reconsidered by Dornbusch (1989) and Sachs (1989a, 1989b).
An IDF would be created by the goverments of the creditor nations
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and/or international institutions like the World Bank. This new 
institution would borrow money from creditor governments in order to 
purchase debt from commercial banks at a discount and then pass along 
some or all of that discount to the debtor countries.
There are several ways in which the scheme might be implemented: 
a) The IDF might raise cash through bond issues guaranteed by creditor 
governments, use this money to buy the existing debt at secondary 
market prices and then provide some relief through interest or 
principal reduction (Kenen, 1983). b) If banks and debtors negotiate 
a reduction on interest payments on a bilateral basis, the IDF could 
offer to guarantee (part or all) of the future interest payments 
accrued to banks (Rohatyn, 1983). c) The IDF could donate money 
directly to debtors to repurchase debt in the secondary market as in 
the Bolivian case. d) The IDF could buy debt from banks in exchange 
for low interest loans and then pass the same low interest rate onto 
debtors (Weinert, 1986-87). e) The IDF could guarantee exit-bonds. 
That is, a debtor country could repurchase old debt by issuing senior 
claims to future income which would be guaranteed by the IDF.
Advocates of the IDF suggest that alleviating the debt overhang 
through debt forgiveness might help country borrowers generate enough 
income to repay the remaining debt obligations. In other words, any 
form of debt relief which decreases expected payments but increases 
the probability of full repayment and thus, the market valuation of 
the debt, would benefit debtors and creditors. Therefore, the IDF 
stands a chance of making everyone better off.
The above statement is controversial. Firstly, forgiving a 
portion of the debt does not imply that the remaining debt would be
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paid off. It just says that in borrower countries, the "willingness" 
to repay would be greater than if debt is not forgiven. Nothing 
ensures that the remaining debt would be paid and that the IDF would 
have its money returned. Secondly, some researchers believe that 
schemes such as debt buybacks might not benefit the debtors.
Bulow and Rogoff (1990a) acknowledge that buybacks stimulate 
investment by relieving the debt overhang; but, they argue, it is 
likely to be an inefficient cure for the debt overhang. A highly
indebted country with good investment projects has two strategies: 
either use its endowment to invest and consume or use part of it to 
repurchase some of its commercial bank debt. The latter strategy has 
two effects. On the one hand, it not only reduces total resources 
available for investment (and consumption) but also alleviates 
perverse investment incentive effects; hence, the net effect on 
investment might be positive. On the other hand, the buyback 
increases the probability of repayment of the remaining debt and 
raises its market price. Therefore, a substantial amount of this 
efficiency enhanced investment (gained trough the buyback) will end up
\ 7
in the creditors’ pockets without benefiting the debtors"'. In other
words, for the debtor, the buyback strategy might be suboptimal since 
a debtor country could always do better (relative to what they would 
have achieved from a buyback) by using the resources earmarked for a 
buyback to increase investment (and consumption). Lenders who sell 
would benefit since they would sell only if the return from selling
equals the return of the non-sellers. Lenders who do not sell would
also benefit since the debt-income ratio would be lower.
" I n  fact, in the model developed by Bulow and Rogoff, the net effect 
of buybacks on investment is positive and creditors reap more than 
100% of the efficiency-enhancing gains from investment.
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In the the case of buybacks financed by the IDF, a similar 
reasoning might apply. A substantial amount of the IDF funds would 
probably go to private creditors with little (if any) benefit to the 
debtors. If this is so, why should "taxpayers" money be used for debt 
buybacks instead of new lending? Even if this was not the case, would 
the amount of total aid provided by the developed countries need to be 
curtailed in order to provide funds for the IDF? Assuming that the 
IDF is not a substitute for "traditional" aid, would it be socially 
desirable to transfer funds from the IDF to middle-income countries 
with large bank debts instead of using it in alternative projects in 
low-income countries? (see Bulow and Rogoff, 1990b).
Besides welfare considerations we may need to question how the 
facility would be financed and in particular, the extent to which 
taxpayers’ money of the creditor nations paticipating in the IDF would 
be put at risk. Among other queries raised about the implementation 
of an IDF-type scheme are: At what price would the IDF buy loans from
banks? How large would the write-down by banks be? How much debt 
relief would the IDF provide? Would the IDF be able to eliminate (or 
at least) decrease the free rider problem? Note that if debt relief 
is provided and creditworthiness of the debtor improves, then 
creditors that stayed out of the IDF agreement would benefit from 
capital gains. These, we believe, are also valid questions in the 
event that the IDF proves to be a viable institution and this is an 
area where further research is necessary.
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